The Ship Model Forum

The question of why Germany did not develop more effective radar has got to be one of those real puzzlers, particularly as they captured magnetrons from downed British bombers almost as soon as they were deployed.

From the Naval point of view I would guess the answer is the same as to why the Napoleonic French fleet did not pick up on British innovations such as the flintlock firing mechanism for cannon: they spent too much time in port.

The RN were out there and swinging, remember radar was first fitted to ships as an aid to finding range for the big guns, captain's were under orders not to use it unless needed to stop giving away their position. But operationally crews soon realised that by keeping the radar on and sweeping the director from side to side gave them one tremendously powerful device. Graf Spee discovered the same technique during her cruise. With the RN the critical need to detect surfaced U-Boats, or even periscopes, drove the fantastic advances in maritime radar and led to the seperation of gunnery and surveillance radars.

The only operational arm of the Kriegsmarine was the U-Boats and radar was a double edged sword for them since they were in the business of concealing themselves.

Without the same experience of war at sea the German Navy inevitably still regarded radar as an aid to optical gunnery rather than as a weapon in it's own right.

Thank you.

Guest,

OK. I'll give you that one.

The Japanese territorial concessions to Soviet Union is negligible. Except for North Korea, Russia got almost nothing out of the war with Japan. But giving those little islands to Russia was a master stroke. It has the effect of giving Russia nothing valuable, costing the Japanese nothing valuable, and yet has the valuable effect of poisoning the relationship between the two country for the next 62 years and counting.

If Germany had saner leadership in the 1930s-40s, it may well have become a true superpower. As it was, it was only a strong regional power by the time the war started in 1939.

If Hitler had taken the advice of his own military leaders, and not commenced hostilities until 1945, he would have been in a position to accomplish what he set out to do in 1939.

By 1945, if all had gone pretty much according to plan, the German navy would have been a world-class force. Under Plan Z, the Germans would have had the follow-on class of battleships to the Bismarck-class, the H class. There would also have been a viable aircraft carrier arm, more smaller surface units, and a viable heavy cruiser fleet.

Submarines would have standardized on the type XXI for fleet boats and type XXIII for short-range work. Naval aviation could have developed some true shipboard-based designs, especially if the naval air arm were to be separated from the Luftwaffe.

Greater time to develop tanks could have resulted in the big Tigers being the main battle tanks, in numbers sufficient to carry the tide of battle against the Soviets.

Aircraft would have made more use of turbine engines, and a true heavy bomber type could have been developed.

And, as Chuck pointed out, Germany could well have had nuclear bombs (perhaps even hydrogen bombs) by then.

That is the kind of power Germany would have needed to be a superpower.

Hitler managed to squander all this by starting the war six years too soon.
It is well known that the early start Germany had in jet aircraft was wasted because Hitler did not think they would be needed. By the time the program was reinstated, it was too late to make a difference.

Germany never did get a viable heavy bomber. This project was cancelled because hitler thought there would not be a need for them in the European war he had planned.

Nuclear bomb research was put on the back burner when Hitler thought he had the war won without them.

The naval superpower that allied mitself with Germany turned out to be a liability to the Germans. Japan's surprise attack was a surprise more to the Germans than to the Allies. This had the effect of forcing the United States into the war at the time Hitler needed most for it to stay neutral.
This rash act sealed Germany's fate.

I think the lesson of history shows that we should have beaten the Soviets to Berlin, and continued our penetration into the Balkans, as General Patton hoped to do.

And as for Stalin declaring war on Japan two weeks before the surrender:
Truman should have told him to "get real" and denied any Soviet claims for territory or war reparations from Japan.

chuck wrote:Germany would have had the atomic bomb in 1946 or 1947. Germany would have had the bomber to carry it to New York.

When, if there had been no war? They certainly wouldn't have either of those things during the war. Their atomic bomb program was not as far along as first thought, and the Amerika Bomber was still far from a reality in 1945. Meanwhile, the US would have used the atomic bomb on Germany if the Allies thought the Germans were close to their own atomic weapon.

But again, we digress from the original posting about the Battle of the North Cape...

I reacted a bit too in my last posting, should have read the whole thread. You do not seem to realise that Germany in 1941/2 was much more than a regional bully . The country had rebuilt itself in about 8 years from a european power into the center of a superpower, especially as she was allied to one major and one secondary naval power. Hitler went for superpower status and has he defeated Stalin he would have been that superpower - and unlike Stalin he would have been able to command 95% of of the european continent instead of 40% (post-yalta europe). This would include the most advanced industry / technology in the world without a communist ideology interfering, Hitlers' Germany still being a market economy. A Hitler dominated Europe could possibly have won a cold war. And it would have been at least as deadly as Stalin's empire. I think a main reason for the western allies to support Stalin was a realisation that they were supporting the weaker of the two rivals. The mistake (not supporting the republic) during the spanish civil war may have have played a role in this. It showed Stalin alone could not win a war by proxy.
[quote="Lesforan"]

The situation at the end of WWII in Europe was far from satisfactory. If we were trying to support the lesser of two evils, I think we picked the wrong one. In our efforts to defeat a regional bully, we wound up turning half of Europe over to our superpower rival for half a century. This same power refused to join us in our fight against Japan, even while demanding material support in Europe.

Every time we wind up supporting one bad guy against another we wind up on the short end of the deal. Supporting the "lesser of two evils" is not a valid strategy....we should have opposed the Germans, but left the Soviets to their own fate.[/quote]

Germany would have had the atomic bomb in 1946 or 1947. Germany would have had the bomber to carry it to New York. Germany would have dominated the most developed portion of Europe that combined was capable of 3-4 times the industrial output of Soviet Union. There is no way a Germany under the Nazis would participate in a war against the Soviets unless the bulk of European Soviet Union was given to Germany as reward. A Germany in possession of European Russia would easily become a rival for the US in economy and resource.

Furthermore, Germany has no desire to make the world safe for democracy. If Germany is not fighting Soviet Union, Germany will quickly form some alliance with Soviet Union.

Pieter,

We did lose the war in the East. We lost it to Stalin and paid the price for 50 years.

My observation stands. This was not worth the loss of any Allied life.

Laurence Batchelor wrote:

MartinJQuinn wrote:
Hipper had been out of action since the previous January, when she and Lutzow embarrassed themselves at the Barents Sea. Tirpitz had been out of action since September, after the X-Craft attacks, which occured shortly after Operation "Sizilien" (which is what I think you are referring to). Prinz Eugen was languishing in the Baltic, along with Lutzow and Scheer. Scharnhorst was the ONLY unit left in Norway. Goes back to my point about the short sightedness of not finishing Gneisenau and Seydlitz.

I think I'm correct in saying though, that months before 3 capital ships were in Norwegian waters exercising and it was intended that these 3 ships remain there.
(as Hitler was always worried about an Allied invasion into Norway as the second front),
Once the Artic convoys resumed after the summer months of 1943 it was these 3 ships which were meant to prey on the convoys and not Scharnhorst by himself.

Germany obtained bulk of its iron ore from Sweden. Allied attack on Norway will cut Germany off from more Swedish ore, which would mean rapid capitulation.

And possibly loose the war in the east? Hitler came quite close to winning it in both 1941 and 1942 and soem of the allied supplies did make a difference. They could have left out the sherman tanks though.
[quote="Lesforan"]Phil,
a
Personally, I feel it was a mistake to risk any Allied lives to help Stalin. No exceptions.[/quote]

MartinJQuinn wrote:
Hipper had been out of action since the previous January, when she and Lutzow embarrassed themselves at the Barents Sea. Tirpitz had been out of action since September, after the X-Craft attacks, which occured shortly after Operation "Sizilien" (which is what I think you are referring to). Prinz Eugen was languishing in the Baltic, along with Lutzow and Scheer. Scharnhorst was the ONLY unit left in Norway. Goes back to my point about the short sightedness of not finishing Gneisenau and Seydlitz.

I think I'm correct in saying though, that months before 3 capital ships were in Norwegian waters exercising and it was intended that these 3 ships remain there.
(as Hitler was always worried about an Allied invasion into Norway as the second front),
Once the Artic convoys resumed after the summer months of 1943 it was these 3 ships which were meant to prey on the convoys and not Scharnhorst by himself.

Laurence Batchelor wrote:Remember only a few weeks before Hipper, Tirpitz & Scharnhorst were all operating together in Norwegain waters, but of course events meant that when the artic convoys were resumed, after the summer months of 1943, only the Scharnhorst was available to sortie.

Hipper had been out of action since the previous January, when she and Lutzow embarrassed themselves at the Barents Sea. Tirpitz had been out of action since September, after the X-Craft attacks, which occured shortly after Operation "Sizilien" (which is what I think you are referring to). Prinz Eugen was languishing in the Baltic, along with Lutzow and Scheer. Scharnhorst was the ONLY unit left in Norway. Goes back to my point about the short sightedness of not finishing Gneisenau and Seydlitz.

phil gollin wrote:
That board's comments are mostly a load of conspiracy clap-trap.

It looks like the clap traps have made a trans-species leap into this forum.

Churchill proposed 1 July 1945 as D-Day for WW.III in the West. The Americans, British, French and 45 freshly organized German divisions would cross the Oder, and East from Austria in the South.

The USAAF and RAF based in Iran would smash oil fields in the Caucasus.

Perhaps Mountbatten would attack North from India....


Operation Unthinkable

• The overall political or political object is to impose upon Russia the will of the United States and British Empire....
• Even though `the will' of these two countries may be defined as no more than a square deal for Poland, that does not necessarily limit the military commitment.
• A quick success might induce the Russians to submit to our will at least for the time being; but it might not.
• That is for the Russians to decide. If they want total war, they are in a position to have it....
• To achieve the decisive defeat of Russia in a total war would require, in particular, the mobilisation of manpower to counteract their present enormous manpower resources.
• This is a very long-term project and would involve: a) the deployment in Europe of a large proportion of the vast resources of the United States. b) the re-equipment and re-organisation of German manpower and of all the Western European Allies.

The Arctic Convoys may have well have been something to shut Stalin up on his demands for a second front. If so, the men of the RN, USN and Merchant Marine were being used as pawns to allow Churchill to avoid having to tell Stalin "no".

The situation at the end of WWII in Europe was far from satisfactory. If we were trying to support the lesser of two evils, I think we picked the wrong one. In our efforts to defeat a regional bully, we wound up turning half of Europe over to our superpower rival for half a century. This same power refused to join us in our fight against Japan, even while demanding material support in Europe.

Every time we wind up supporting one bad guy against another we wind up on the short end of the deal. Supporting the "lesser of two evils" is not a valid strategy....we should have opposed the Germans, but left the Soviets to their own fate.

Those orders may have been issued in an effort to force a diplomatic schism in the Allies rather than to gain a true advantage on the battlefield.

Somewhere I have word for word the actual orders radioed to Admiral Bey in Scharnhorst from the Naval Command.
It is these which I base my view on the Germans seeing the vital need to sink these convoys for the Eastern Front battles.
Thus leading them to risk Scharnhorst on her own for the fatal sortie.

Remember only a few weeks before Hipper, Tirpitz & Scharnhorst were all operating together in Norwegain waters, but of course events meant that when the artic convoys were resumed, after the summer months of 1943, only the Scharnhorst was available to sortie.

JoeA wrote:A quick comment on the importance of Lend-Lease to the Russian front.

Most of the help arrived after the Soviets had stopped the German advance at Stalingrad. It did help the Soviets push the Germans back faster than without...one of the most valuable vehicles was probably the US made trucks that gave a lot of mobility to the Red Army and which freed up Soviet production lines for the T-34.

No offense to Lesforan, but I recall that discussion and a fair amount was speculation and "clap-trap."

I agree; Morison deeply discounts the Arctic convoys as little more a political token than an actual aid to Soviet warfighting. He viewed them as a counterweight to Stalin's constant demands for a second front.

A quick comment on the importance of Lend-Lease to the Russian front.

Most of the help arrived after the Soviets had stopped the German advance at Stalingrad. It did help the Soviets push the Germans back faster than without...one of the most valuable vehicles was probably the US made trucks that gave a lot of mobility to the Red Army and which freed up Soviet production lines for the T-34.

No offense to Lesforan, but I recall that discussion and a fair amount was speculation and "clap-trap."