I would not characterize the discussion as "conspiracy clap-trap". The fact of the matter is that there are enough unusual circumstances surrounding the loss of PQ17 that competing theories to explain its failure have arisen. Obviously, not all the explanations can be correct.
As an active participant in the forum referred to, I would invite anyone to read what has been posted and make up their own mind. The other issue brought up here, the reasoning behind Bismarck's long signal, has also been throughly discussed on that site.
Les,
While I don't participate to the degree that you do, I'm a member of that forum as well. I have to agree with Phil on this one the thread in question about PQ-17 does have a bit of "conspiracy theory" to it, especially by one person who seems to have it out for Churchill. But, we digress, and are in danger of hijacking this thread!
Lesforan wrote:Personally, I feel it was a mistake to risk any Allied lives to help Stalin. No exceptions.
You have the benefit of 60+ years of hindsight to make that judgement. In 1942, anything that could take the pressure off the Allies in the West and in the Med was probably seen as a good idea.
Martin
"Tomorrow is the most important thing in life. Comes into us at midnight very clean. It's perfect when it arrives and it puts itself in our hands. It hopes we've learned something from yesterday." John Wayne
Actually, all three of us (you, Phil, and myself) participate "over there".
Sorry to have wandered off topic so far.
We shouldn't hesitate to use hindsight gained. That is how we learn from our mistakes.
I don't disagree about hindsight. I'm just saying that at the time, he was the lesser of two evils, and thoughts of future ramifications were of the least importance.
In hindsight, Bey shouldn't have dispatched his screen. If the sea was too rough for his escorts, the entire mission should have been scrubbed and Scharnhorst should have returned to her lair together with the destroyers. It wasn't as if there was no precedent as to what happened to an unescorted German heavy unit prowling the seas...
Martin
"Tomorrow is the most important thing in life. Comes into us at midnight very clean. It's perfect when it arrives and it puts itself in our hands. It hopes we've learned something from yesterday." John Wayne
MartinJQuinn wrote:
In hindsight, Bey shouldn't have dispatched his screen. If the sea was too rough for his escorts, the entire mission should have been scrubbed and Scharnhorst should have returned to her lair together with the destroyers. It wasn't as if there was no precedent as to what happened to an unescorted German heavy unit prowling the seas...
One of the points I stated in my 1st post was the German High Command felt the risks were just.
This was because of the value of sinking one convoy to the outcome of the campaign on the Eastern Front.
This still stuck even when the destroyers were no longer able to form a close escort.
I think the worst calamity of the operation was a Luftwaffe reconnaisance pilot who had spotted and reported the presence of DoY as 1 battleship 'probable'.
He was repremanded by his superior not to report what was 'probable' but to report what he saw.
Suffice to say this sighting report was not rapidly advanced to the DKM High Command in time and also was never transmitted to Bey.
A quick comment on the importance of Lend-Lease to the Russian front.
Most of the help arrived after the Soviets had stopped the German advance at Stalingrad. It did help the Soviets push the Germans back faster than without...one of the most valuable vehicles was probably the US made trucks that gave a lot of mobility to the Red Army and which freed up Soviet production lines for the T-34.
No offense to Lesforan, but I recall that discussion and a fair amount was speculation and "clap-trap."
JoeA wrote:A quick comment on the importance of Lend-Lease to the Russian front.
Most of the help arrived after the Soviets had stopped the German advance at Stalingrad. It did help the Soviets push the Germans back faster than without...one of the most valuable vehicles was probably the US made trucks that gave a lot of mobility to the Red Army and which freed up Soviet production lines for the T-34.
No offense to Lesforan, but I recall that discussion and a fair amount was speculation and "clap-trap."
I agree; Morison deeply discounts the Arctic convoys as little more a political token than an actual aid to Soviet warfighting. He viewed them as a counterweight to Stalin's constant demands for a second front.
If an unfriendly power had attempted to impose on America the mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war.
Somewhere I have word for word the actual orders radioed to Admiral Bey in Scharnhorst from the Naval Command.
It is these which I base my view on the Germans seeing the vital need to sink these convoys for the Eastern Front battles.
Thus leading them to risk Scharnhorst on her own for the fatal sortie.
Remember only a few weeks before Hipper, Tirpitz & Scharnhorst were all operating together in Norwegain waters, but of course events meant that when the artic convoys were resumed, after the summer months of 1943, only the Scharnhorst was available to sortie.
Last edited by Laurence Batchelor on Tue Jul 10, 2007 5:03 pm, edited 1 time in total.
Those orders may have been issued in an effort to force a diplomatic schism in the Allies rather than to gain a true advantage on the battlefield.
If an unfriendly power had attempted to impose on America the mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war.
The Arctic Convoys may have well have been something to shut Stalin up on his demands for a second front. If so, the men of the RN, USN and Merchant Marine were being used as pawns to allow Churchill to avoid having to tell Stalin "no".
The situation at the end of WWII in Europe was far from satisfactory. If we were trying to support the lesser of two evils, I think we picked the wrong one. In our efforts to defeat a regional bully, we wound up turning half of Europe over to our superpower rival for half a century. This same power refused to join us in our fight against Japan, even while demanding material support in Europe.
Every time we wind up supporting one bad guy against another we wind up on the short end of the deal. Supporting the "lesser of two evils" is not a valid strategy....we should have opposed the Germans, but left the Soviets to their own fate.
Churchill proposed 1 July 1945 as D-Day for WW.III in the West. The Americans, British, French and 45 freshly organized German divisions would cross the Oder, and East from Austria in the South.
The USAAF and RAF based in Iran would smash oil fields in the Caucasus.
Perhaps Mountbatten would attack North from India....
Operation Unthinkable
The overall political or political object is to impose upon Russia the will of the United States and British Empire....
Even though `the will' of these two countries may be defined as no more than a square deal for Poland, that does not necessarily limit the military commitment.
A quick success might induce the Russians to submit to our will at least for the time being; but it might not.
That is for the Russians to decide. If they want total war, they are in a position to have it....
To achieve the decisive defeat of Russia in a total war would require, in particular, the mobilisation of manpower to counteract their present enormous manpower resources.
This is a very long-term project and would involve: a) the deployment in Europe of a large proportion of the vast resources of the United States. b) the re-equipment and re-organisation of German manpower and of all the Western European Allies.
Last edited by Werner on Tue Jul 10, 2007 10:50 pm, edited 5 times in total.
If an unfriendly power had attempted to impose on America the mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war.
Laurence Batchelor wrote:Remember only a few weeks before Hipper, Tirpitz & Scharnhorst were all operating together in Norwegain waters, but of course events meant that when the artic convoys were resumed, after the summer months of 1943, only the Scharnhorst was available to sortie.
Hipper had been out of action since the previous January, when she and Lutzow embarrassed themselves at the Barents Sea. Tirpitz had been out of action since September, after the X-Craft attacks, which occured shortly after Operation "Sizilien" (which is what I think you are referring to). Prinz Eugen was languishing in the Baltic, along with Lutzow and Scheer. Scharnhorst was the ONLY unit left in Norway. Goes back to my point about the short sightedness of not finishing Gneisenau and Seydlitz.
Martin
"Tomorrow is the most important thing in life. Comes into us at midnight very clean. It's perfect when it arrives and it puts itself in our hands. It hopes we've learned something from yesterday." John Wayne
MartinJQuinn wrote:
Hipper had been out of action since the previous January, when she and Lutzow embarrassed themselves at the Barents Sea. Tirpitz had been out of action since September, after the X-Craft attacks, which occured shortly after Operation "Sizilien" (which is what I think you are referring to). Prinz Eugen was languishing in the Baltic, along with Lutzow and Scheer. Scharnhorst was the ONLY unit left in Norway. Goes back to my point about the short sightedness of not finishing Gneisenau and Seydlitz.
I think I'm correct in saying though, that months before 3 capital ships were in Norwegian waters exercising and it was intended that these 3 ships remain there.
(as Hitler was always worried about an Allied invasion into Norway as the second front),
Once the Artic convoys resumed after the summer months of 1943 it was these 3 ships which were meant to prey on the convoys and not Scharnhorst by himself.
And possibly loose the war in the east? Hitler came quite close to winning it in both 1941 and 1942 and soem of the allied supplies did make a difference. They could have left out the sherman tanks though.
[quote="Lesforan"]Phil,
a
Personally, I feel it was a mistake to risk any Allied lives to help Stalin. No exceptions.[/quote]
MartinJQuinn wrote:
Hipper had been out of action since the previous January, when she and Lutzow embarrassed themselves at the Barents Sea. Tirpitz had been out of action since September, after the X-Craft attacks, which occured shortly after Operation "Sizilien" (which is what I think you are referring to). Prinz Eugen was languishing in the Baltic, along with Lutzow and Scheer. Scharnhorst was the ONLY unit left in Norway. Goes back to my point about the short sightedness of not finishing Gneisenau and Seydlitz.
I think I'm correct in saying though, that months before 3 capital ships were in Norwegian waters exercising and it was intended that these 3 ships remain there.
(as Hitler was always worried about an Allied invasion into Norway as the second front),
Once the Artic convoys resumed after the summer months of 1943 it was these 3 ships which were meant to prey on the convoys and not Scharnhorst by himself.
Germany obtained bulk of its iron ore from Sweden. Allied attack on Norway will cut Germany off from more Swedish ore, which would mean rapid capitulation.
Germany would have had the atomic bomb in 1946 or 1947. Germany would have had the bomber to carry it to New York. Germany would have dominated the most developed portion of Europe that combined was capable of 3-4 times the industrial output of Soviet Union. There is no way a Germany under the Nazis would participate in a war against the Soviets unless the bulk of European Soviet Union was given to Germany as reward. A Germany in possession of European Russia would easily become a rival for the US in economy and resource.
Furthermore, Germany has no desire to make the world safe for democracy. If Germany is not fighting Soviet Union, Germany will quickly form some alliance with Soviet Union.
I reacted a bit too in my last posting, should have read the whole thread. You do not seem to realise that Germany in 1941/2 was much more than a regional bully . The country had rebuilt itself in about 8 years from a european power into the center of a superpower, especially as she was allied to one major and one secondary naval power. Hitler went for superpower status and has he defeated Stalin he would have been that superpower - and unlike Stalin he would have been able to command 95% of of the european continent instead of 40% (post-yalta europe). This would include the most advanced industry / technology in the world without a communist ideology interfering, Hitlers' Germany still being a market economy. A Hitler dominated Europe could possibly have won a cold war. And it would have been at least as deadly as Stalin's empire. I think a main reason for the western allies to support Stalin was a realisation that they were supporting the weaker of the two rivals. The mistake (not supporting the republic) during the spanish civil war may have have played a role in this. It showed Stalin alone could not win a war by proxy.
[quote="Lesforan"]
The situation at the end of WWII in Europe was far from satisfactory. If we were trying to support the lesser of two evils, I think we picked the wrong one. In our efforts to defeat a regional bully, we wound up turning half of Europe over to our superpower rival for half a century. This same power refused to join us in our fight against Japan, even while demanding material support in Europe.
Every time we wind up supporting one bad guy against another we wind up on the short end of the deal. Supporting the "lesser of two evils" is not a valid strategy....we should have opposed the Germans, but left the Soviets to their own fate.[/quote]
chuck wrote:Germany would have had the atomic bomb in 1946 or 1947. Germany would have had the bomber to carry it to New York.
When, if there had been no war? They certainly wouldn't have either of those things during the war. Their atomic bomb program was not as far along as first thought, and the Amerika Bomber was still far from a reality in 1945. Meanwhile, the US would have used the atomic bomb on Germany if the Allies thought the Germans were close to their own atomic weapon.
But again, we digress from the original posting about the Battle of the North Cape...
Martin
"Tomorrow is the most important thing in life. Comes into us at midnight very clean. It's perfect when it arrives and it puts itself in our hands. It hopes we've learned something from yesterday." John Wayne
If Germany had saner leadership in the 1930s-40s, it may well have become a true superpower. As it was, it was only a strong regional power by the time the war started in 1939.
If Hitler had taken the advice of his own military leaders, and not commenced hostilities until 1945, he would have been in a position to accomplish what he set out to do in 1939.
By 1945, if all had gone pretty much according to plan, the German navy would have been a world-class force. Under Plan Z, the Germans would have had the follow-on class of battleships to the Bismarck-class, the H class. There would also have been a viable aircraft carrier arm, more smaller surface units, and a viable heavy cruiser fleet.
Submarines would have standardized on the type XXI for fleet boats and type XXIII for short-range work. Naval aviation could have developed some true shipboard-based designs, especially if the naval air arm were to be separated from the Luftwaffe.
Greater time to develop tanks could have resulted in the big Tigers being the main battle tanks, in numbers sufficient to carry the tide of battle against the Soviets.
Aircraft would have made more use of turbine engines, and a true heavy bomber type could have been developed.
And, as Chuck pointed out, Germany could well have had nuclear bombs (perhaps even hydrogen bombs) by then.
That is the kind of power Germany would have needed to be a superpower.
Hitler managed to squander all this by starting the war six years too soon.
It is well known that the early start Germany had in jet aircraft was wasted because Hitler did not think they would be needed. By the time the program was reinstated, it was too late to make a difference.
Germany never did get a viable heavy bomber. This project was cancelled because hitler thought there would not be a need for them in the European war he had planned.
Nuclear bomb research was put on the back burner when Hitler thought he had the war won without them.
The naval superpower that allied mitself with Germany turned out to be a liability to the Germans. Japan's surprise attack was a surprise more to the Germans than to the Allies. This had the effect of forcing the United States into the war at the time Hitler needed most for it to stay neutral.
This rash act sealed Germany's fate.
I think the lesson of history shows that we should have beaten the Soviets to Berlin, and continued our penetration into the Balkans, as General Patton hoped to do.
And as for Stalin declaring war on Japan two weeks before the surrender:
Truman should have told him to "get real" and denied any Soviet claims for territory or war reparations from Japan.
