by bengtsson » Sun Sep 16, 2007 2:11 pm
Looking for the British part in all this, my copy of Roskill has again come to the rescue.
Speaking of the northen exits to the Atlantic and Britains home fleet at the time:
An inevitable consequence of the importance attached by the cabinet to carrying help to Russia and affording her visible support, and of the simultaneous need to reinforce the Mediterranean and carry fighter aircraft to Malta, was that the home fleet's watch on the northern exits to the Atlantic had to be relaxed, in spite of the fact that Tirpitz, Scheer and all four 6-inch Cruisers were now believed to be ready for sea. The departure of a large convoy for the Middle East further reduced Admiral Tovey's strength. On the other hand, the American occupation of Iceland in August and the President's more forward policy regarding the defence of the Atlantic routes eased the Commander in Chief's anexity regarding a break out into the Atlantic, since, as soon as warning of such a movement was received by the Admiralty, the American naval and air forces based on Iceland would join in the watch on the northern passages; they would ,moreover ,attack any enemy ships that would enter the American defence zone. The significance of President Roosevelt's moves was not lost on the German Naval Staff; they now realised that their surface ships would find it much harder, if not impossible, to break out throught the northen passages undetected. etc. etc.
But Hitler was insistent that the Navy should avoid incidents which might further provoke the United States, at any rate until his campaign against Russia had ended victoriously, and refused to allow any retaliatory steps.
What I take away from the first part of the quote is that the USN was deadly serious in it's willingness to attack any German surface ships going through the Denmark strait and thus into the American declared defence zone.
The Germans would have put about and headed away if they recognized a USN task force, thus following Hitler's direct orders.
In 1941, the German submarine force was faced with a United States in open alliance with the UK and an active battle force in the Battle of the Atlantic. But the U-Boat's rules of engagement crippled the U-Boat war. US cargo ships supplied the UK and could not be torpedoed, USN Escorts handled the run from Canada to MOMP and relieved the RN from large escort operations on the West side of the Atlantic. All the time the Germans were under orders NOT to fight USN escorts. As many U-Boat commanders have written in their memoirs, the US was openly hostile and the German Navy could do nothing about it, not even fight. Hitler's Russian adventure/disaster was a nail in the coffin of the German war against trade. They did manage some sweet revenge later in their attacks on the US Eastern Seaboard.
Bob B.
Looking for the British part in all this, my copy of Roskill has again come to the rescue.
Speaking of the northen exits to the Atlantic and Britains home fleet at the time:
An inevitable consequence of the importance attached by the cabinet to carrying help to Russia and affording her visible support, and of the simultaneous need to reinforce the Mediterranean and carry fighter aircraft to Malta, was that the home fleet's watch on the northern exits to the Atlantic had to be relaxed, in spite of the fact that Tirpitz, Scheer and all four 6-inch Cruisers were now believed to be ready for sea. The departure of a large convoy for the Middle East further reduced Admiral Tovey's strength. On the other hand, the American occupation of Iceland in August and the President's more forward policy regarding the defence of the Atlantic routes eased the Commander in Chief's anexity regarding a break out into the Atlantic, since, as soon as warning of such a movement was received by the Admiralty, the American naval and air forces based on Iceland would join in the watch on the northern passages; they would ,moreover ,attack any enemy ships that would enter the American defence zone. The significance of President Roosevelt's moves was not lost on the German Naval Staff; they now realised that their surface ships would find it much harder, if not impossible, to break out throught the northen passages undetected. etc. etc.
But Hitler was insistent that the Navy should avoid incidents which might further provoke the United States, at any rate until his campaign against Russia had ended victoriously, and refused to allow any retaliatory steps.
What I take away from the first part of the quote is that the USN was deadly serious in it's willingness to attack any German surface ships going through the Denmark strait and thus into the American declared defence zone.
The Germans would have put about and headed away if they recognized a USN task force, thus following Hitler's direct orders.
In 1941, the German submarine force was faced with a United States in open alliance with the UK and an active battle force in the Battle of the Atlantic. But the U-Boat's rules of engagement crippled the U-Boat war. US cargo ships supplied the UK and could not be torpedoed, USN Escorts handled the run from Canada to MOMP and relieved the RN from large escort operations on the West side of the Atlantic. All the time the Germans were under orders NOT to fight USN escorts. As many U-Boat commanders have written in their memoirs, the US was openly hostile and the German Navy could do nothing about it, not even fight. Hitler's Russian adventure/disaster was a nail in the coffin of the German war against trade. They did manage some sweet revenge later in their attacks on the US Eastern Seaboard.
Bob B.