USN / Kriegsmarine Nov 1941, war?

[bengtsson]

After the US occupied Iceland, how close were the USN and the German Kriegsmarine to open warfare? USN escorting of convoys to the Mid Ocean Meeeting Point was bringing USN escort ships into contact with U-Boats. But how close was the USN to engaging German surface ships in open warfare before Pearl Harbor?
Orders from Admiral King on July 19th 1941 [operational order number 6-41] directed the USN to attack any German or Italian U-Boats or Surface ships within one hundred miles of any USN escorted convoy.
In a follow on order on November 5th, Acting on intelligence that German Pocket BB Admiral Scheer [or possibly Tirpitz] was expected to sortie from it's base in Norway, King ordered a USN Battle Force out of Iceland to prevent Scheer's breakout into the Atlantic. Task Force #1 with BBs Mississippi and Idaho, cruisers Tuscaloosa and Wichita along with 3 DDs took up attack positions in the Denmark Straight.
Since neither Scheer or Tirpitz made a move to breakout, nothing came of this. But how serious was the USN in this move? They really intended to fight any German ships trying to break out into the Atlantic? Scheer would have been no problem, but what happens to the USN BBs if Tirpitz appears? Moreover, where was the Royal Navy in all this? Had they deployed on the same intelligence information, or were they leaving it to the USN? ANyway you look at it, the German Navy appears and the USN follows orders, we would have had a German American war well before Pearl Harbor.

Bob B.

[kennylibben]

...which most likely would have prevented Pearl Harbor.

[Dustermaker]

Had the german ships broken tried to break out and saw the american fleet my guess is they would have turned around. Im not saying that the germans were scared or anything, but they wouldnt want to get their capital ships damaged if they are trying to destroy convoys. There are plenty of examples of german capital ships being fended off by destroyers simply because they didnt want to get damaged so far from their bases. Im also pretty sure that Hitler gave the order to not use capital ships as commerce raiders by then as well.

[Ron Smith]

USS Niblack attacked a U-boat 04/10/1941 after the U-boat sank a Dutch freighter, no casualties either side. 10/17/1941 USS Kearny hit by torpedo from a U-boat off Iceland. 10/31/1941 USS Reuben James sank by a U-boat torpedo. As early as April we were in a shooting war.

BuShips was well aware of this as were the President and various committee heads in Congress. Correspondence in North Carolina's work records shows they are aware as early as March that we need some heavy firepower in the Atlantic and soon. Within days of Bismark's sortie BuShips, CincLant, CNO (actually the predecessor but I don't feel like finding the acromyn), FDR, Frank Knox and Carl Vinson all push via correspondence and telephone conversations for BB's 55 and 56 to completed as fast as possible and put into service, despite suspected propulsion problems.

The USN was deadly serious about impending surface action in the Atlantic.

[Werner]

It must have been gratifying for the constructors that Kearney was not fatally damaged, even though the torpedo struck her most vulnerable spot, at the break of the forecastle. Not bad for a 1600 ton tin plate destroyer.

Imagine how secure they felt about the 2100 ton Fletcher design after this, whose middle structure was built out of STS instead of mild steel like Kearney.

[Ron Smith]

It must have been gratifying for the constructors that Kearney was not fatally damaged, even though the torpedo struck her most vulnerable spot, at the break of the forecastle. Not bad for a 1600 ton tin plate destroyer.

Imagine how secure they felt about the 2100 ton Fletcher design after this, whose middle structure was built out of STS instead of mild steel like Kearney.

I have photos of the damage to Kearny, she has one hell of a hole in her side.

[Devin]

...which most likely would have prevented Pearl Harbor.

I don't think it would have prevented it at all, maybe changed some of the time frame and planning, but not likely. The Japanese and Germans were allied in the war, but their plans remained their own individually. The Japanese still would have wanted the U.S. fleet destroyed at Pearl, whether the war started before then or not.

-Devin

[kennylibben]

yes but US forces would have been on a much higher level of alert, and we would have taken more action to prevent being sitting ducks.

[Dan K]

>>Had the german ships broken tried to break out and saw the american fleet my guess is they would have turned around. <<

This presumes that the Germans would have properly identified them as such. Not always easy, given the weather in the Denmark Straight

[Werner]

If modern Iraq is any example, the USA would be roundly condemned, even by the British, for interfering with the "right of innocent passage" in international waters.

Survivors would have to be put up in the Waldorf Astoria, and the Brooklyn Navy Yard would have to replace the sunk German battleship.

[bengtsson]

Looking for the British part in all this, my copy of Roskill has again come to the rescue.

Speaking of the northen exits to the Atlantic and Britains home fleet at the time:

An inevitable consequence of the importance attached by the cabinet to carrying help to Russia and affording her visible support, and of the simultaneous need to reinforce the Mediterranean and carry fighter aircraft to Malta, was that the home fleet's watch on the northern exits to the Atlantic had to be relaxed, in spite of the fact that Tirpitz, Scheer and all four 6-inch Cruisers were now believed to be ready for sea. The departure of a large convoy for the Middle East further reduced Admiral Tovey's strength. On the other hand, the American occupation of Iceland in August and the President's more forward policy regarding the defence of the Atlantic routes eased the Commander in Chief's anexity regarding a break out into the Atlantic, since, as soon as warning of such a movement was received by the Admiralty, the American naval and air forces based on Iceland would join in the watch on the northern passages; they would ,moreover ,attack any enemy ships that would enter the American defence zone. The significance of President Roosevelt's moves was not lost on the German Naval Staff; they now realised that their surface ships would find it much harder, if not impossible, to break out throught the northen passages undetected. etc. etc.
But Hitler was insistent that the Navy should avoid incidents which might further provoke the United States, at any rate until his campaign against Russia had ended victoriously, and refused to allow any retaliatory steps.

What I take away from the first part of the quote is that the USN was deadly serious in it's willingness to attack any German surface ships going through the Denmark strait and thus into the American declared defence zone.
The Germans would have put about and headed away if they recognized a USN task force, thus following Hitler's direct orders.

In 1941, the German submarine force was faced with a United States in open alliance with the UK and an active battle force in the Battle of the Atlantic. But the U-Boat's rules of engagement crippled the U-Boat war. US cargo ships supplied the UK and could not be torpedoed, USN Escorts handled the run from Canada to MOMP and relieved the RN from large escort operations on the West side of the Atlantic. All the time the Germans were under orders NOT to fight USN escorts. As many U-Boat commanders have written in their memoirs, the US was openly hostile and the German Navy could do nothing about it, not even fight. Hitler's Russian adventure/disaster was a nail in the coffin of the German war against trade. They did manage some sweet revenge later in their attacks on the US Eastern Seaboard.

Bob B.

[richter111]

My thoughts (whatever they are worth)

If we had been drawn into war in the Atlantic.....

We would have redeployed the vast majority of our Battleships to escort duty, leaving a token force stationed at Pearl.

My thoughts tend to wonder if the Japanese knowing this would have mounted a major surface assault, and tried to take over Hawaii.

anyone???

Ric

[Werner]

My thoughts tend to wonder if the Japanese knowing this would have mounted a major surface assault, and tried to take over Hawaii.

The authors of Shattered Sword attempted to analyze this option. They concluded the Japanese simply did not possess the ships to lift the supplies and materials to support an army of occupation and the civil population of Hawaii. They couldn't even have supported the Japanese on the island, given the large distance and the absence of fuel supplies at the destination.

Remember, the Pacific Fleet was on elevated watch after the Japanese occupation of French Indo-China following France's unexpected capitulation in Europe. The US embargo of oil was a de facto declaration of war on Japan, and the USA knew it. They just did not plan on Japan attempting to "take out" the US Navy at the start of the war. It was a rear-echelon triumph for Japan to be able to stage so many simultaneous attacks at once; quite unexpected.

[Devin]

yes but US forces would have been on a much higher level of alert, and we would have taken more action to prevent being sitting ducks.

I don't believe so. As Werner said, everyone knew that war with Japan was imminent. No one expected the attack to come at Pearl is the issue. I don't see how there being an actual shooting-war going on with Germany at the time would have changed the mind-set that the initial blow would come on the Japanese side of the Pacific and not at Hawaii. And even fore-knowledge that the Japanese were coming wouldn't mean that people still wouldn't have sat on their behinds and done nothing - MacArthur in the Philippines is the perfect example.

[Filipe Ramires]

The authors of Shattered Sword attempted to analyze this option. They concluded the Japanese simply did not possess the ships to lift the supplies and materials to support an army of occupation and the civil population of Hawaii. They couldn't even have supported the Japanese on the island, given the large distance and the absence of fuel supplies at the destination.

Indeed. Taking a small target such as Wake Island was already a costly operation. One wonders how much it would cost to the IJN to take on the Hawaiian Islands.

[Gone Asiatic]

yes but US forces would have been on a much higher level of alert, and we would have taken more action to prevent being sitting ducks.

And even fore-knowledge that the Japanese were coming wouldn't mean that people still wouldn't have sat on their behinds and done nothing - MacArthur in the Philippines is the perfect example.

You hit the nail on the head with this one. MacArthur was caught with his pants down hours after the Pearl Harbour attack.....and it was the Philippines where the initial attack was expected to occur!

[Werner]

I thought the large invasion force headed South was monitored by the AAF, and when they passed the point where they would approach the Philippines, the assumption was that Singapore and the Cra Peninsula or Java was to be the Japanese target.

Remember, mounting two simultaneous invasions was considered by the experts in Washington to be outside their abilities.

From a strategic standpoint, MacArthur was limited by the forces granted him by The War Department. Half the Philippine Territorial Army was armed with shovels and most of the rest had second-rate equipment.

As for The Navy Department, there were over 90 modern destroyers in commission, but not one was allocated to The Asiatic Fleet, even though the "Four-Pipers" were more suitable for the Atlantic convoy duty, especially after the conversion which removed one boiler and substituted bunkerage.

I don't think you can really blame MacArthur for the state of the Philippines defenses.

[Sean Hert]

I don't think you can really blame MacArthur for the state of the Philippines defenses.

Awww, but I really enjoy blaming MacArthur!

[Werner]

It would be fun to think about how the war would have started had the Asiatic Fleet (such as it was -- 1 CA and 2 CL) was augmented by say, half of the Scouting Force (which consisted of about 3 CV, 8 CAs, 4 CLs and a pile of destroyers).

Of course, the real problem is that there were not enough oilers to keep a large force at sea in the Philippines. The tankers were helping supply Britain at the time.

[Guest]

It is still MacAuthor's fault. The duty of a commander was not to look for sublime delight in the outhouse just because "everyone" guessed the enemy was headed somewhere else. The role of a military commander is to prepare for eventualities in the order of priority. He knew an enemy invasion force was about. He really did not have any thing better to do than to prepare for the eventuality that it was headed for him. So he had no priorities other than preparing to meet it, regardless of where "everyone" thought the Japanese force was going. Yet he did not do what he could have done to prepare for it. The notion that "everybody" thought it was headed for Java or Singapore is a sorry excuse.