The Ship Model Forum

Hi
After a visit to the Normandy beaches last year one thing that suprised me was the the vast scale of the operation i think from pegasus bridge in the east to Utah beach in the west i drove about 60 miles.
The only visable bombardment damage was at colville battery (2nd and 3 rd photo are a naval shell ,was told at time ship name but fogott) the first photo shows even the biggest bunkers are no match to an raf 10,000 lb tallboy)


I have lots of photos of of very large bunkers howsing german 6 " guns completelly broken by bombing and was suprised to find very little evidence of naval bombardment. 1 reason for this might be that the batteries were a mile or so inland so wowld only be visable from the grownd so need spotting hence the arial attack, were the nature of the turain of coast which would be spotabble, so shellable from sea is verry sandy , some places the sand penetrates 1/2 km inland, so the shelling evidense would disapere quickly ???

Don't forget the Italian Campaign where the Germans learned the hard way just how well 6 inch cruiser fire could disrupt attacks by armor formations as well as disrupt their staging areas. (can't remember if it was Anzio or Salerno)

ar wrote:

Devin wrote:It probably also has something to do with weather conditions: the morning of June 6 saw varying weather over the beaches, the ones with cloud cover did not get as much ordnance on the beaches prior to the landings. The landing infantry at those sites suffered proportionately more casualties than the beaches that had clear weather for pre-landing bombardments.

Like others, you are off point.
Am NOT talking about the 6th of June but the whole FOUR TO FIVE WEEKS of bombardment!!!!

Yes, but that was fundamentally a three-dimensional affair. So it's not really suitable for observing the effects of naval bombardment alone. Which is why I still think Dardanelles is the better example.



Jorit

ar wrote:Like others, you are off point.
Am NOT talking about the 6th of June but the whole FOUR TO FIVE WEEKS of bombardment!!!!

In that case I misunderstood, I thought we were talking mainly of sea based bombardment, which did not occur until immediately prior to the landings (that whole keeping the location secret thing), and admittedly I have no knowledge of fire support after that date.

Devin wrote:It probably also has something to do with weather conditions: the morning of June 6 saw varying weather over the beaches, the ones with cloud cover did not get as much ordnance on the beaches prior to the landings. The landing infantry at those sites suffered proportionately more casualties than the beaches that had clear weather for pre-landing bombardments.

Like others, you are off point.
Am NOT talking about the 6th of June but the whole FOUR TO FIVE WEEKS of bombardment!!!!

Who can dispute that, if the enemy were defending the coasts of a reasonably large land area and therefore must rely on heavy mobile forces to perform elastic defence in depth followed by powerful mobile counter attack, rather than a fixed dug in defense of the beaches , then the artillery support of a naval forces would be able to exert a dominating influence over the 20 miles or so of combat zone. Pacific islands actually fought over during WWII were small and hardly able to support any serious heavy mobile defense. This is why those who dugs deep into the pacific experience can question the value of naval artillery fire support. But I think that type of amphibious action is probably somewhat unique to the pacific war, and more likely types of decisive amphibious action would be against a large land mass protected by a powerful mobile armored land force.

It probably also has something to do with weather conditions: the morning of June 6 saw varying weather over the beaches, the ones with cloud cover did not get as much ordnance on the beaches prior to the landings. The landing infantry at those sites suffered proportionately more casualties than the beaches that had clear weather for pre-landing bombardments.

Hm. I'm inclined to disagree as far as operational aspects are concerned, but you probably mean that there's much more data available for Normandy, and that's undisputable of course.

Jorit

JWintjes wrote:

ar wrote:
Which is why (although not perfect) the Normandy CAMPAIGN is the very best SINGLE area of study for this subject

Better than Dardanelles?

Jorit

Yes

ar wrote:
Which is why (although not perfect) the Normandy CAMPAIGN is the very best SINGLE area of study for this subject

Better than Dardanelles?

Jorit

JWintjes wrote:Shore bombardment is really an interesting topic - right from Caesar onwards.

I must admit, though, that I'm sceptical at the idea of drawing general lessons from any particular operation. As far as my limited understanding goes, the effectiveness of coastal bombardment depends to a great extent on the topography, other natural factor and ultimately on the nature of your targets, ie what you actually haul your ammunition at. Already WW1 experience shows that if you can pinpoint your targets, then it's possible to take them out with great accuracy - if you can see it, you can hit it. Conversely, problems arise when faced eg with mobile artillery.

Generally I'd say that the effectiveness of coastal bombardment depends first and foremost on the intelligence you have of your targets. If you know where to shoot, chances are you get enough suppression on the enemy that it will make things easier for your own troops. If however you are unable to locate the right targets, then even the most sustained bombardment effort is pointless.

Jorit

Which is why (although not perfect) the Normandy CAMPAIGN is the very best SINGLE area of study for this subject

JWintjes wrote:Shore bombardment is really an interesting topic - right from Caesar onwards.

I must admit, though, that I'm sceptical at the idea of drawing general lessons from any particular operation. As far as my limited understanding goes, the effectiveness of coastal bombardment depends to a great extent on the topography, other natural factor and ultimately on the nature of your targets, ie what you actually haul your ammunition at. Already WW1 experience shows that if you can pinpoint your targets, then it's possible to take them out with great accuracy - if you can see it, you can hit it. Conversely, problems arise when faced eg with mobile artillery.

Generally I'd say that the effectiveness of coastal bombardment depends first and foremost on the intelligence you have of your targets. If you know where to shoot, chances are you get enough suppression on the enemy that it will make things easier for your own troops. If however you are unable to locate the right targets, then even the most sustained bombardment effort is pointless.

Jorit

Morrison said coconut log shelters under a few feet of crushed coral were nearly impervious to heavy artillery and aircraft bombs,

Shore bombardment is really an interesting topic - right from Caesar onwards.

I must admit, though, that I'm sceptical at the idea of drawing general lessons from any particular operation. As far as my limited understanding goes, the effectiveness of coastal bombardment depends to a great extent on the topography, other natural factor and ultimately on the nature of your targets, ie what you actually haul your ammunition at. Already WW1 experience shows that if you can pinpoint your targets, then it's possible to take them out with great accuracy - if you can see it, you can hit it. Conversely, problems arise when faced eg with mobile artillery.

Generally I'd say that the effectiveness of coastal bombardment depends first and foremost on the intelligence you have of your targets. If you know where to shoot, chances are you get enough suppression on the enemy that it will make things easier for your own troops. If however you are unable to locate the right targets, then even the most sustained bombardment effort is pointless.

Jorit

I know I will pull my Morrison's D-Day volume off the shelf before I turn in tonight....

You and Werner are a little off point.
The word was "campaign", not JUST the landings.
Bombardment went on for about four or five weeks I believe.
You have to look at the ENTIRE thing.

At Normandy perhaps the effective shore bombardment was when some the destroyer captains off Omaha practically drove their ships on the beach to engage German strong points and pillboxes on the bluffs. Against troops defending a position in open trenches naval bombardment should be very effective provided it uses proximity fuses to detonate the round at the right height above the ground. Against heavily built defenseive positions ala the type of concrete bunkers that were built as part of the Altlantic Wall then you are left with three options, 1) carpet bomb the area with heavy bombers and hope you get lucky, 2) dive bombers or gunfire. Gunfire and dive bombing can both suffer from the same problem. Ater the first few shells or bombs you then have to deal with spotting the fall of shell or seeing the target to aim the bomb due to all the smoke you or the enemy is making. But in todays world the idea of gun fire support has largely been given over to aircraft flying cover doing close air support. Add in the newer guided munitions the only possible advantage that navl gunfire can have is the ability to be there foe longer periods of time. Even that might pale against a cell of B-ones or BUFFs orbiting overhead with a full load of precision munitions and the troops on the ground trained to employ them.

ar wrote:The best area of study would be that of the Normandy campaign.

But that's such a huge operation.

• Did the bombardments actually occur at the same place as the landings?
• Did the bombardments have sufficient depth and air spotting to interfere with reinforcements?
• Was the European D-Day bombardment sufficiently long to neutralize shore defenses to the D+1 line?

I really know so little about this operation. I do know that the same few hours of shelling would have made US Marine General H. M. Smith mad as a hatter. He would have wanted a week, but that would have absolutely given away the location and size of the operation to the Germans early enough to allow reinforcement and movement of the mobile units.

I'm sure the issue of collateral damage was very much more important in Europe.

The best area of study would be that of the Normandy campaign.

I really think the effectiveness is governed by terrain and to a degree by how well the troops are prepared. The biggest effect is in impact on the morale of the soldiers. Holes in Henderson Field were repaired before lunch and even most of the damaged planes were airworthy within hours or days.

Japanese troops already prepared to die are unlikely to suffer much from a bombardment except for a direct hit.

It seems as though the effectiveness of shore bombardment was overestimated early on, Tarawa being a good example. The US Navy got better at it with more experience. However, the Japanese learned lessons well, too. Iwo Jima got pounded for quite some time prior to the landings there, but the Japanese were so well dug in that the Marines still took serious casualties.