Who would Win early 1942

[PetrOs]

Well, Skulski is biased, thats I agree

Well, as the duel is early 42, I would say, result would depend on a tactics and crew education. If americans would try to close in, they are doomed. If they stay at a very long range and try to shell Yamato from there, anything goes.

For question about long-range hits.... can you tell me at least one US long-range battleship hit at the same period?

And no japanese hits at long range does not really mean for me, that it was not possible - it just means no encounters. As between 41 and 44 there were no major long range battleship engagements. Only a confusing close-quarters battle of Washington and SD against Kirishima.

[Filipe Ramires]

Even at Java the Japanese fired upwards of 3,000 rounds for two 8-inch hits in the first hour.

I doubt that Haguro and Nachi expended that much ammo. I would eventually put the figures to 800 shells expended by each (1.600 total). As far as I can tell at least 4-5 hits were registered during the battle (all at average-big range) being 1 or 2 on Houston which were duds, 1 on De Ruyter also dud and 1 on Exeter that knocked out steam pipes and leaving 6 of her boilers out of comission.

The heavy lifting was done by the light cruisers and destroyers, and of course the torpedoes.

Not exactly. Light cruisers did very little because Doorman apparently was more interested in a long-range gunnery duel (which proved useless) and his only advantage was the number of light cruisers (3 against 2) and he barelly made use of them. Of course some shells were fired from the light cruisers but at long-ranges and eventually they managed to hit one of the Japanese destroyers. Japanese light cruisers conducted themselves accordingly their doctrines...flottilla leaders... and charged the enemy formation when the opportunity took place. Electra felt victim of one of such flotillas (Jintsu's one). The remaining allied destroyers (2 dutch and 4 american) did very little being Kortenaer thevery first casualty of the battle and Witte de Witth (spelling?) escorted Exeter to temporary safety. The American destroyers acted only at the end of the day light battle by charging and firing their torpedo loads at 10,000 yards off their targets...still, they managed to "scare" off the Japanese ships for sometime. They would come later in the evening...

[Filipe Ramires]

For question about long-range hits.... can you tell me at least one US long-range battleship hit at the same period?

And no japanese hits at long range does not really mean for me, that it was not possible - it just means no encounters. As between 41 and 44 there were no major long range battleship engagements. Only a confusing close-quarters battle of Washington and SD against Kirishima.

Good point of view indeed. Why bother to build almost a dozen BB's when you don't use them against BB's?
Only two major engagements between BB's did take place in the Pacific Campaign...the Second Battle of Savo (Washington and South Dakota vs Kirishima - in which Washington fired 91 16' shells against Kirishima at pratically point blank range to get 9 hits!!!!!) and Surigao Strait (Yamashiro vs half a dozen BB's, plus cruisers and destroyers - Fuso was apparently sunk by torpedoes long before she reached the range of the USN battle line).

The point being... so much is spoken of the marvellous weapons of the USN BB's against the poor IJN BB's ones when in fact they also performed very poor against equal odds.

[Werner]

Filipe, I will leave the reference section to the Tracy; I'm sure he has seen the Hugh Rodman memos and can speak to the accuracy of USN long-range fire. Even anecdotally, Stillwell's Arizona book refers to over-the-horizon shooting sinking target tows in the 1920s. The USN developed shooting at 25,000+ yards and refined it to a science in the 1920s and 1930s. The differences in the essential elements of the fire control system such as gyroscopic stable element and computer become dramatic at this time.

I really don't want to get into yet another battle about this. Suffice to say, the USN battle line was a generation ahead of the Japanese in 1941. After Pearl Harbor, the differences only become more and more marked in the USN's favor.

[Guest]

For question about long-range hits.... can you tell me at least one US long-range battleship hit at the same period?

And no japanese hits at long range does not really mean for me, that it was not possible - it just means no encounters. As between 41 and 44 there were no major long range battleship engagements. Only a confusing close-quarters battle of Washington and SD against Kirishima.

USN BBs probably scored numerous hits beyond 10,000 yards in Sarugao strait. But your generally point is highly valid. There is no real evidence that Japanese optical fire control were sub-standard. Werner's style is to pick a position based on his preference and his pet peeves, and he has many pet peeves, carefully select a few flimsy pieces of trivia that appears to point in his preferred direction but really prove nothing, and then build his arguments to incredible heights, arguing until he is blue in the face, based these rather sorry foundations.

[Guest]

For question about long-range hits.... can you tell me at least one US long-range battleship hit at the same period?

And no japanese hits at long range does not really mean for me, that it was not possible - it just means no encounters. As between 41 and 44 there were no major long range battleship engagements. Only a confusing close-quarters battle of Washington and SD against Kirishima.

USN BBs probably scored numerous hits beyond 10,000 yards in Sarugao strait. But your generally point is highly valid. There is no real evidence that Japanese optical fire control were sub-standard. Werner's style is to pick a position based on his preference and his pet peeves -and he has many pet peeves - carefully select a few flimsy pieces of anecdotes and trivia that appears to point in his preferred direction but really prove nothing, and then build his arguments to incredible heights, arguing with great appearance of conviction until he is blue in the face, based these rather sorry foundations.

[Laurence Batchelor]

For question about long-range hits.... can you tell me at least one US long-range battleship hit at the same period?

And no japanese hits at long range does not really mean for me, that it was not possible - it just means no encounters. As between 41 and 44 there were no major long range battleship engagements. Only a confusing close-quarters battle of Washington and SD against Kirishima.

USN BBs probably scored numerous hits beyond 10,000 yards in Sarugao strait. But your generally point is highly valid. There is no real evidence that Japanese optical fire control were sub-standard. Werner's style is to pick a position based on his preference and his pet peeves, and he has many pet peeves, carefully select a few flimsy pieces of trivia that appears to point in his preferred direction but really prove nothing, and then build his arguments to incredible heights, arguing until he is blue in the face, based these rather sorry foundations.

Hello Chuck!

Werner the USN may have fired at a few towed targets in the 20s and 30s and developed this long-distance tactic, but it seems very cowardly to me.

What happened to good old battle-ensigns flying from the yardarm, ding-ding

"full revolutions engine room"

"guns open fire as soon as your in range"

and "we'll bring him to action regardless of the risk to ourseleves"

"we'll ram the beggar if he gives us half a chance!"

there's no comparison with pounding a speck on the horizon!!!

[Werner]

As between 41 and 44 there were no major long range battleship engagements. Only a confusing close-quarters battle of Washington and SD against Kirishima.

True, but the battle of the Komondorskis can serve as a proxy. The Japanese admiral was cashiered for his poor gunnery in this battle which should have sunk both American cruisers and several destroyers. Instead, all he did was wear out his gun barrels.

I am willing to give the Japanese the benefit of the doubt at Suriago, but with only one possible 14-inch hit on Gambier Bay and the balance of the hits 8-inch from inside 13,000 yards against an 18-knot non-maneuvering target does not redound to the credit of the IJN's fire control system.

[Filipe Ramires]

True, but the battle of the Komondorskis can serve as a proxy. The Japanese admiral was cashiered for his poor gunnery in this battle which should have sunk both American cruisers and several destroyers. Instead, all he did was wear out his gun barrels.

They still got hits on Salt Lake City. The USN hits on the IJN ships (Nachi only from memory) were very few also and did little damage.

I am willing to give the Japanese the benefit of the doubt at Suriago, but with only one possible 14-inch hit on Gambier Bay and the balance of the hits 8-inch from inside 13,000 yards against an 18-knot non-maneuvering target does not redound to the credit of the IJN's fire control system.

And the point is? We all know how bad the Japanese fire control system and gunnery performance were, still, they can hit the target... even if the odds are 1 to 100. Blind or not Yamato might have luck or run the accurate range and put an 18' shell on her target therefore inflicting severe damage.

[PetrOs]

Well, Komandorskis are quite confusing battle, as shooting from both sides was awful... really AWFUL! I really cant find a good explanation for that.

Surigao - well, older battleships were not equipped with the modern fire control computer. They also had only Type 21/22/13 radars which were not fire-control models. Fuso was damaged by torps before the battle. Compared to that, 2 out of american battleships got the newest fire control equipment, and other four had problems with echoing the Fuso - they were aiming on the shell spashes accoding to Whitley's Battleships book.



In Leyte, Yamato was quite out of action there, after turning away from the torps. Mainly the old ones and cruisers were shooting. Also, visibility was rather bad on that battlefield. American ships were acting very good in tactical respect, and due to well-laid smokescreen and permanent torpedo and aircraft attacks japanese gunnery was VERY confused.


To Werner - Well, shooting at targets is the other thing. Japanese also had very same training excercise. But, its like comparing when you are shooting in your local shooting club at metal or paper targets or cans whatever, and other when you are in action when other shoots back, say in war or paintball or similar. And if you dont know, japs also had gyroscope stabilizers and basllistic computer aboard.

In 41? Generation difference of battleline of US and IJN in 41? Please explain me how California or Colorado can be different generation from Nagato? Or Yamato from Washington? They were built by different yards to different traditions, but were same generation

[Walt]

I would have to give the North Carolina the edge even that early on in the War. Her Rate of fire of 2 rounds per minute as well as her excellent firecontrol even early on as well as her 27 to 30 Knot Battle Speed and good seaworthy design and excellent armor put her in my top choice position. The Bismark would be a close 2nd .

North Carolina doing 30 knots!?!?!?!?
In a word Yes. She was officially listed as a 27 Knot Ship but at Battle Stations Flank speed the class was known to blow over 30 knots in stage 2 to 5 seas.

Both of these ships designs were years ahead of the others mentioned.

The respect these 2 ships got from their adversaries would seem support their advanced designs. I do know that Bismark was an older design but her FC and Guns were state of the art for 1940s standards.

Bismarck is pratically based in WWI designs!! Armour scheme nearly obsolete by the time. How come he's ahead of others...specially taking into account that most of the others are much more advanced design and in performance then Bismarck.

Bismark was designed for speed firepower and seaworthness as well as handleing.. To hit first and often much in the same theory of US Navy Battleship design. Take away any one of those fine features then you have a very average ship which is basicly what happened to Bismark.

In a 1 on 1 fistfight between these early monsters fire and movement would be as important to the outcome then as it is now.
The slow firing 1 rpm guns of Yamato and and most of the others on this list would have been their weakness especially when the NC could put 2 rounds on them for every one round sent back.

True but what happens if NC is hit, by any chance, by a 18.1' shell from Yamato!?!? What happens to Yamato if she's hit by a 16' shell???

Either ship would be in bad shape..Yamato was sunk by aircraft torpedos for goodness sakes.. I like NCs chances better with her better armour and a 16" round from NC can hurt the Yamato as badly as an 18.1" would hurt the NC.

I think History has already decieded the "value" of the Yamato Class Battleships.. Beautiful yes.. But not effective, too big, too slow with unreliable powerplants and fuel hogs. The Japanese Command knew very early on to keep them out of a dog fight with and USN or RN BB in the Pacific and with good reason. And if given a choice on which of these ships I'd rather ride into harms way It would be either NC or Bismark hands down.

[PetrOs]

Either ship would be in bad shape..Yamato was sunk by aircraft torpedos for goodness sakes.. I like NCs chances better with her better armour and a 16" round from NC can hurt the Yamato as badly as an 18.1" would hurt the NC.

I think History has already decieded the "value" of the Yamato Class Battleships.. Beautiful yes.. But not effective, too big, too slow with unreliable powerplants and fuel hogs. The Japanese Command knew very early on to keep them out of a dog fight with and USN or RN BB in the Pacific and with good reason. And if given a choice on which of these ships I'd rather ride into harms way It would be either NC or Bismark hands down.

Well

A coordinated air attack of 20 or more aircraft piloted by the experienced pilots cannot be stopped by just AA fire of a single ship. Japs realised it quite early, as early as 41, and Yamato was no exception of their policy of recognising that BBs are useless in modern warfire, except in shore bombardments or as a ultralarge AA (and very stable) escort for carrier task forces.

I dont really agree with you about the value. Too big - well, I dont see a problem with that. It allowed for an enormous punch, and great survivability. For 1934-designed ship it was the optimal solution
Too slow - well, not slower than NCs or SDs. All were 27-28 knoters.
They also were damn manuverable for the size, a turn radius much smaller then other BBs.
Unreliable powerplants? Where you got it? Please show me the source of that info.
Fuel hogs - well, for japanese fuel conditions maybe yeah, but compared to Nagatos or Kongos they were more efficient in term of fuel consumption per PS or fuel consumption per mile on cruise speed.

However, japs would have been much better served, if instead of each of Yamatos they would have built a pair of Zuikaku or a trio of Hiryu-class carriers. Having 4-5 large carriers more in the first phase of war could have been a decent advantage to IJN.

[Walt]

Either ship would be in bad shape..Yamato was sunk by aircraft torpedos for goodness sakes.. I like NCs chances better with her better armour and a 16" round from NC can hurt the Yamato as badly as an 18.1" would hurt the NC.

I think History has already decieded the "value" of the Yamato Class Battleships.. Beautiful yes.. But not effective, too big, too slow with unreliable powerplants and fuel hogs. The Japanese Command knew very early on to keep them out of a dog fight with and USN or RN BB in the Pacific and with good reason. And if given a choice on which of these ships I'd rather ride into harms way It would be either NC or Bismark hands down.

Well

A coordinated air attack of 20 or more aircraft piloted by the experienced pilots cannot be stopped by just AA fire of a single ship. Japs realised it quite early, as early as 41, and Yamato was no exception of their policy of recognising that BBs are useless in modern warfire, except in shore bombardments or as a ultralarge AA (and very stable) escort for carrier task forces.

I dont really agree with you about the value. Too big - well, I dont see a problem with that. It allowed for an enormous punch, and great survivability. For 1934-designed ship it was the optimal solution
Too slow - well, not slower than NCs or SDs. All were 27-28 knoters.
They also were damn manuverable for the size, a turn radius much smaller then other BBs.
Unreliable powerplants? Where you got it? Please show me the source of that info.

My source is not fresh to my mind and if I remember I will post it, But I do remember it was from a story on the Shanino AC Carrier which was re-engined because the very high pressure/ high temp 12 boiler steam turbine set ups in Yamato and her sister were very high maintence and subjected to breakdowns during High speed operations.. which explains why there is little documentation of Yamato and Musashi doing high speed manouvers for any length of time.. Most contemporary reports wrote it off as trying to conserve fuel!!!!

Yamato and Musashi though lovely and amazing were in fact cows, and doomed to be the coffins of all who sailed them.. especially against the USN and RN of the mid 40s.

Fuel hogs - well, for japanese fuel conditions maybe yeah, but compared to Nagatos or Kongos they were more efficient in term of fuel consumption per PS or fuel consumption per mile on cruise speed.

However, japs would have been much better served, if instead of each of Yamatos they would have built a pair of Zuikaku or a trio of Hiryu-class carriers. Having 4-5 large carriers more in the first phase of war could have been a decent advantage to IJN.

[Werner]

It's not just the guns or the optics....

http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-052.htm

Fire Control Systems in WWII

by Tony DiGiulian
Updated 17 April 2001
Editor's Note:

I originally did this as a response to a question on one of our Bulletin Boards. It remains in that format, pending my finding some time to rewrite it.

Let me start by suggesting a revisit to our friends at the "Baddest" website, specifically in the subject of Fire Control:

Fire Control Page

The above is a good capsule summary of the FCS of the major battleships of each nation and I'm going to refer to it in this post. For purposes of simplicity, I am only going to discuss the British, German, Japanese and US ships. Since you are only interested in optical FC, I'm also not going to discuss radar FC except to state, once again, that radar FC beats optical in almost any situation and so there's little point in comparing the two.

Now, three points to note:

1) The British battleships lacked RPC almost entirely until late in the war. The Japanese never implemented it in any meaningful way. The Germans had it only for elevation (more on that later) while the USN had it for both elevation and bearing. To me, RPC is one of the single most important advancements in the development of accurate gunnery. No longer did the director operator shout down a voice tube "target bearing 230 degrees at 20,500 yards" to which another sailor dialed into the rangekeeper (analog computer) which was then transmitted to a set of dials in the gun mounts which then the gun captain had his trainers and elevators match by slewing/elevating the guns to match the dials, with at every point a potential for operator errors. Instead, the director operator now controlled the laying of the guns almost directly. Plus, in the US system, there was a feedback system where the rangekeeper moved the director sights to where it thought the ship should be shooting. If it wasn't correct, the director operator adjusted the sights back on target, thus setting up a closed-loop system (for a living, I design process control computers that do this digitally. So, please trust me on this, I'm amazed at what was achieved in closed-loop systems using 1930s analog computers). The German system had RPC only for the elevation, but this is not as bad as it may seem. Since, in the German system of "bracket salvos," the first half salvo is really to determine bearing, they did not feel that the extra complication was necessary. Judging from the results at River Plate and Denmark Strait, it's hard to argue, but, my personal opinion is that it would have been worth the investment. The Japanese, as in much of their naval technology, used the same methodology as their British mentors and used a "follow the pointer" system for both elevation and training.

2) The main director baselength on the Japanese, German and US ships was roughly about as long as on the main turrets and was relatively large. By contrast, the British had a relatively short baselength both as compared to the turret rangefinders and as compared to those of other nation's ships. In fact, the main director on British ships was almost an afterthought, intended to be used more for fire direction than for fire control. The real FC rangefinders in the British ships were the ones on the main turrets. Again, I was surprised when I discovered this a couple of years ago, as the British pioneered centralized FC and the Nelson class with their high-mounted directors greatly influenced subsequent designs. The British reliance on turret RF's is really a holdover from pre- and early-dreadnought days, where each individual turret layed the guns for themselves.

This reliance on turret RF was shown flawed at the Denmark Strait: Since Adm. Holland chose to push his ships directly towards the Germans and thus into the wind; sea spray coated the optics on all four forward turrets and forced the British to use the less accurate main directors. I think that the results speak for themselves: The British fired long-spaced ladder salvos and didn't land a hit until after the POW turned broadside to the Germans (i.e., the turrets no longer faced into the sea spray) at a relatively short range of about 16,000 yards. As a result of this engagement, the British belatedly realized their design/concept flaw and installed a larger (but still relatively short) baselength director on the last three KGV ships. However, only the forward director was modified, the aft director was unchanged.

3) The use of stable vertical elements in the US systems. I call your attention to the paragraph at the bottom of the above "Baddest" link, describing the performance of the USS North Carolina (the oldest of the new battleships) during a series of maneuvers where she still maintained target lock. Since you own "British Battleships," I won't repeat the problems and successes that the British had with their systems. I have only limited information on what other nation's ships were capable of, but it appears that the German's systems were at least equivalent to those of the British (I assume this from descriptions in Whitley's and Campbell's books plus Baron Mullenheim-Rechburg's comments in "Survivor").

Bottom line: The Japanese and the Germans had better optical RF's than any other nation. In a fight where only optical systems are used, they had a clear advantage as shown at Denmark Strait, the River Platte and First Savo (I assume that you've seen my previous posts regarding the POW's radar and won't revisit the subject). However, the US had the best FC as a system (FCS). What this meant is that, when 10cm fire-control radar became available, the US was able to easily integrate it into their FCS, thus creating the best overall FCS as compared to the FCS used by any other nation. My (strictly amateur) conclusion is that the US FCS with radar was the most advanced of any nation in the 1942-1945 timeframe.

One other item, per your last post: I do not take the Bismarck's performance at her last battle as being truly indicative of her performance. The crew was exhausted by their night-long skirmishing with Capt. Vian's destroyers and the Bismarck's motion was subject to random direction changes. By contrast, the British battleships had rested crews firing from stable platforms. As always, I dislike to speculate upon "what-ifs," especially this one, as, in my opinion, an undamaged Bismarck with Adm. Lutjens in command wouldn't have fought against the KGV and Rodney, she would have beat feet in the opposite direction as fast as possible. So, I'll leave any thought as to what the outcome of an engagement between healthy ships to others.

Emphasis mine.

Imagine doing differential calculus in your head. Now imagine doing it in your head as part of a team where you shout out intermediate results to the person next to you, who adds it to his approximation and passes that on to the gun layers by voice (or a semaphore pointer system). That's the Japanese fire control system.

Now imagine you're doing it by yourself with a graphing programmable calculator. The calculator is wired directly to the valves and pumps that train the turret and elevate the guns. That's the American system, ca 1941.

[Filipe Ramires]

Either ship would be in bad shape..Yamato was sunk by aircraft torpedos for goodness sakes.. I like NCs chances better with her better armour and a 16" round from NC can hurt the Yamato as badly as an 18.1" would hurt the NC.

No matter the side armour and the torpedo bulges a ship can have no ship whatsoever could have survived the beating that both Yamato and Musashi take.