Which is the best fleet aircraft carrier class of WW2?

[chuck]

Admiral Fisher was nuts to build her but she managed to have a useful career as an aircaft-carrier.

Admiral Fisher imagined her as new kind of shallow drought vessel with 15" battleship firepower and light cruiser mobility that would absolutely dominate in the shallow Baltic where previously only 4.7" and 6" light cruisers could operate. In some way she foreshadows the American "Large cruisers" of Alaska class. She was know as the "Large light cruiser". She was meant to be the light cruiser to end all other light cruisers, and really put in a deadly bind any navy that only had normal light cruisers with which to operate in a critical theater. She wes meant to put the fire power of a battleship where no one has ever expected a battleship to be before-In Germany's vulnerable but seemly inaccessible northern shores. She was meant to be part of a daring British project to open a third front in the German Baltic coast, to force the Germans to draw forces away from the main fronts in the east and west, and to enable the Germans to be defeated.

The fact that British high command proved far less daring that Fisher is not fisher's fault. Fisher's plan was more daring than the German advance through the Ardennes in 1940. It probably had reasonable chance of success. What was needed was a political understanding in 1914 to enable the British to put her entire army in the Baltic rather than the Flanders.

[Werner]

The Kamikaze was quite unforseen when the British carriers were designed, and a small change to the design would have defeated the armored deck.

Nimitz said it best -- the best defensive system for a carrier task group is an organized CAP of sufficient strength.

[Guest]

The Kamikaze was quite unforseen when the British carriers were designed, and a small change to the design would have defeated the armored deck.

Nimitz said it best -- the best defensive system for a carrier task group is an organized CAP of sufficient strength.

I think it is extremely fair to say that at least a very substantial percentage of kamikaze attacks that could have been launched in 1945 would have penetrated any plausible CAP available in 1945.

Nimitz's best saying is a good example of words of apparent wisdom which are more likely to deceive than to illuminate the semi-informed.

[Tracy White]

The famous comment made about the Brit carriers operating in the Pacific, by a US naval officer aboard one--something about kamikazes hitting a US carrier and it's six months in Pearl, but on the RN carrier it's "Sweepers, man your brooms!"--speaks to this issue.

But it speaks to it badly, or at least inaccurately.

CV-9 - Hit by a Kamikaze November 25, 1944. She was back in action for the occupation of Mindoro December 14-16.
CV-11 - Hit by a Kaikaze October 30, 1944 but remained in operations until further daaged by a two more kaikazes on November 25th.
CV-15 - Hit by a Kamikaze Francis on March 11, 1945, returned to action under a month.
CV-19 - Hit by a Kamikaze 1 April, she was back in action an hour later and was not detached for repairs for over a week.

The damage report for CV-14 Ticonderoga I posted has a bit in the ships report that is very telling:

Offensively, the ship is considered to be less than 10% effective due to damage to the hangar deck and flight deck. Although it was still possible to use one catapult, and to land aircraft, damage to the flight deck impaired launchings and deck capacity, and the loss of hangar deck curtains and light locks made it impractical to perform necessary night check on aircraft.

Otherwise this ship was able to operate at nearly 100% efficiency for the time being, but damage and deterioration of electrical wiring and equipment would soon bring this efficiency to a very low percentage.

My emphasis added.

[Tracy White]

I think it is extremely fair to say that at least a very substantial percentage of kamikaze attacks that could have been launched in 1945 would have penetrated any plausible CAP available in 1945.

I disagree. Especially after Okinawa.

[Guest]

I think it is extremely fair to say that at least a very substantial percentage of kamikaze attacks that could have been launched in 1945 would have penetrated any plausible CAP available in 1945.

I disagree. Especially after Okinawa.

My sources say of the 193 Kamikaze aircraft launched during Okinawa, About 30, or 15%, penetrated the CAP to strike ships. Clearly, the bottlenecks in the Kamikaze campaign were the lethality of the kamikaze aircraft, and the technique for discerning target value. It was not the ability to penetrate the defenses.

[Guest]

I would have to agree with RNfanDan about the designs being best for conditions of operation.
Operating in the Axis air dominated Med definitely required the armored decks while allowing for much shorter range.
Operating in the Pacific, range was king and dominated the all US designs.
Over all I would have to vote for the Essex but part of that is a result of seeing the overall history of the class.
Because they were not limited by tonnage totals under the treaty and as wartime builds were built in numbers, with all the damage control features, and skilled crews, they established a great wartime record.
Post war, they were large and new enough to be converted to handle aircraft that were unforeseen before the war lasting until they were old and wornout themselves.
Midways were the best of both worlds, long range and armored decks. Just too late in the war to do anything.
The British wartime carriers were by postwar, too small and short ranged to efficiently convert. Not to mention pretty well worn out. Post war needs and economies then killed them off.

[PetrOs]

Well, I would not see the attacks of Kamikazes as "Aircraft attacks" but rather as "Guided missile" attacks, as in this lethal role they were not much more then a WW2 equivalent of Harpoon or Tomahawk using a "slightly different" targeting system. And nowadays, would anyone plan the defence of cruise missile threat only by means of CAP?

The two paddlewheelers were (according to Chesneau) IX-64 Wolverine and IX-81 Sable. Quite impressive looking ships. Comissioned on 12 August 42 and 8 Mar. 43 respectively.

Both differed slightly in details, but in general they were similar. Figures for (IX-61/IX-84):
7200/8000 tons standard
500 feet / 535 feet overall
8000 ihp/10500 ihp, for 16/18 knots.
270-300 men crew, no armaments (who can attack on the Great lakes?) or own airgroup.
The deck was about of the same size as a deck of a CVE.

Trainee pilots took off on the nearby bases, then made a landing on them, and then trained take offs. It seems that Wolwerine also had a YE or YG beacon.

[RNfanDan]

The famous comment made about the Brit carriers operating in the Pacific, by a US naval officer aboard one--something about kamikazes hitting a US carrier and it's six months in Pearl, but on the RN carrier it's "Sweepers, man your brooms!"--speaks to this issue.

But it speaks to it badly, or at least inaccurately.

CV-9 - Hit by a Kamikaze November 25, 1944. She was back in action for the occupation of Mindoro December 14-16.
CV-11 - Hit by a Kaikaze October 30, 1944 but remained in operations until further daaged by a two more kaikazes on November 25th.
CV-15 - Hit by a Kamikaze Francis on March 11, 1945, returned to action under a month.
CV-19 - Hit by a Kamikaze 1 April, she was back in action an hour later and was not detached for repairs for over a week.

Of course, I wasn't using that example as evidence of the specific length of dockyard time required to patch-up US carriers, but rather to emphasize the British carriers' superior resistance to flight deck penetration. For me, there is no doubt whatsoever that, when it comes down to the ability to resist initial attack damage from falling/crashing airborne weapons, the Brits had the upper hand over the floating picnic tables of the US and IJN designs.

[RNfanDan]

The Kamikaze was quite unforseen when the British carriers were designed, and a small change to the design would have defeated the armored deck.

Small change to the design--of what--the kamikazes? I don't get it....

Sure, the kamikaze wasn't foreseen by the British, but the Japanese certainly knew about British carriers! Taiho wasn't a parallel innovation, by any means.

[RNfanDan]

Over all I would have to vote for the Essex but part of that is a result of seeing the overall history of the class.
Because they were not limited by tonnage totals under the treaty and as wartime builds were built in numbers, with all the damage control features, and skilled crews, they established a great wartime record.

I think it's important to keep in mind, the Essex class didn't have to fight the same war as their immediate predecessors. I'm not implying they had it easy by any means, but they definitely didn't have to face the same IJN that clobbered Hermes, Lexington, Yorktown, Wasp and Hornet, and that twice neutralized Saratoga for months at a time.

Massed numbers of Essexes, essentially free to roam a Pacific largely devoid of significant land-based enemy air power and never faced with the menace of Nagumo's Carrier Divisions 1 and 2 (with their crack aircrews), were able to achieve pretty much whatever they were given to accomplish. Individually, not one ship among them faced the same odds as, nor could match the record of, CV6 Enterprise.

Given these advantages from the outset of their war service, it is hardly surprising they were successful.

[Tracy White]

I disagree. Especially after Okinawa.

My sources say of the 193 Kamikaze aircraft launched during Okinawa, About 30, or 15%, penetrated the CAP to strike ships. Clearly, the bottlenecks in the Kamikaze campaign were the lethality of the kamikaze aircraft, and the technique for discerning target value. It was not the ability to penetrate the defenses.

OK, I'm thumping on you because you're making very short, very broad stateents without backing them up. "My sources" is a step in the right direction but just what are "your sources?"

After Okinawa there wasn't a credible pool of talent or aircraft necessary for large-scale attacks on US fleets. One or two aircraft might slip through from time to time if they used the right techniques in individual attacks, but if you want to break through on a massive scale you have to start with a large group and they just didn't have this after Okinawa. So I take exception to your blanket statement for all of 1945.

I agree with you on target selection, but there's another factor you missed, which is training. Most of the pilots weren't really well trained in the art of striking a target in a high speed dive. Many of them overshot because of the difficulty in keeping the nose down at high speeds.

I think, too, that the Okha hurt their kamikaze program. A raid of 4 aircraft required something like 32 fighters for escort. If they had sent those aircrarft as Kamikazes instead they might have had a better chance of hitting targets, but at the same time I'm not sure how much luck they would have had getting those pilots to all volunteer for "special attack" missions.

[Lesforan]

Hi guys,

Tracy: The item quoted you credited to me belongs to RNFANDAN (resistance to Kamakazi attack), but I do agree. The quote reminded me of a similar one by Adm. Halsey after a Kamakazi whacked UUS New Jersey, resulting in only damage to the paint.

Werner: I too am wondering what minor change could have been made to the Kamakazis to result in their ability to penetrate an armored flight deck. I'm fairly sure the Okha craft would have been able to do so, but these really fit the definition of a powered air to surface missle.

Perhaps Adm. Nimitz's reference to effectivness of CAP had the following in mind. Conventional Kamakazis could be shot down enroute to the attack point like any other conventional aircraft. In fact, all the more so due to their inexperienced pilots and ragtag nature of the aircraft often chosen for this role. This included some very crude designs built especially for this purpose.

The more experienced Japanese fighter pilots were considered too valuable to be expended in this manner, and provided defensive escort to the actual Kamakazis.

The Kamakazis in their attack dives could not be effectively pursued because of the hail of antaircraft fire directed at them. At this point, the CAP would lose their effectiveness in a defensive role but could concentrate on the escorts.

The Okhas had the vulnerability of all guided air to surface missles of the period. They required large, vulnerable launching platforms. What the Japanese needed was a large, heavily-armed, land-based patrol bomber for this purpose. Something along the lines of a FW-200 Condor.

Lacking these, they used the Betty medium bomber. These could carry only one Okha at a time, and were hampered by the weight of the missle.
As such, they were vulnerable to fighter attack enroute to thier drop points. An Okha, coming down in a near-vertical dive or a wave height, would have been almost impossible to hit (like shooting at a falling bomb).

Dan:

Thanks for helping me out on those carriers' names (Wolverine or Sable).
I think they would make awesome models, especially in 1/350 scale (or as an R/C project: you wouldn't find another one on the pond. And powered sidewheel drive!)

[Lesforan]

PetrOs:

Sorry. You were the one who contributed the stats on the paddlewheelers.
Dan mentioned Wolverine.

I got a little crossed up on who said what.

[Werner]

The British wartime carriers were by postwar, too small and short ranged to efficiently convert. Not to mention pretty well worn out. Post war needs and economies then killed them off.

The big killer of these hulls was the very low hanger deck. The cost to rebuild Victorious to increase hanger deck clear hight was the nail in the coffin for these ships.

They could not stow the best wartime aircraft, let alone the next generation.

[Werner]

The Kamikaze was quite unforseen when the British carriers were designed, and a small change to the design would have defeated the armored deck.

Small change to the design--of what--the kamikazes? I don't get it....

Sure, the kamikaze wasn't foreseen by the British, but the Japanese certainly knew about British carriers! Taiho wasn't a parallel innovation, by any means.

Yes, I meant the Kamikaze. I was writing in haste.

If the Kamikaze carried one of those modified 16-inch shells, a weapon with the properties of the German FX-1400, or even some modern compound charge, the hanger would have been vulnerable even with flight deck armor.

Even a 500 pound AP bomb with a short booster rocket fit to the rear would have given the Kamikaze a "knock out punch". It could be fit with a proximity sensor which launched it when the plane was a hundred feet off the deck and the plane would crash into the very spot just penetrated by the bomb.

[bengtsson]

The Japanese did get kinda lucky on HMS Formidable's second Kamikaze hit of the Pacific War. The Kamikaze carried a 500lb bomb released just before impact, The bomb caught the point of interesection of four armour flightdeck plates, a very persistent slice about one foot by nine inches going down through several decks to come to rest in a fuel tank. On it's way the splinter wrecked the crash barrier operating machinery, buckled the hanger fire curtain and cut a steam pipe which filled the center boiler room with steam. This one splinter had reduced Formidables speed to 18 knots. The shipwrights soon filled the flightdeck hole with rapid hardening cement and the crash barrier was operated by hand ropes on deck.
They had a USN Liaison Officer permanently on board. In a discussion after the hit between the Captain and liaison officer the captain asked "Well what do you think of our bloody British flight decks now"? To which the USN officer answered "Sir, they're a honey"!
Formidable could do 24 knots by early afternoon and was fully operational by 17:00 landing onboard abscent aircraft.
Formidable officer Geoffrey Brooke , from his book "Alarm Starboard"

Hit earlier in the war, Formidable regained full operational abilities within hours of being hit, after clearing away damaged aircraft, and filling any small dents or holes.
The British Armoured flight deck was never designed with suicide attacks in mind, but in this one instance they proved valuable in the last days of
the Pacific war.

I agree with an earlier comment about the Essex class not being faced with the same combat situation as the earlier USN carriers. By late 1943 it was a matter of massed attacks againt isolated air fields,attacks against IJN surface forces without air cover and towards the end suprise attacks against mainland Japan's airfields in the south. Far different than facing the IJN carrier forces in 1942. The Essexs were fine ships though and benefited from war experince and no treaty limitations. It's hardly fair to compare treaty ships to non treaty ships. The latter have a great advantage in design freedom.

Bob B.

[Werner]

At Okinawa, the organization of TF57.4 included 5 Essex-size carriers with armored decks: Indomitable,Victorious, Illustrious, Indefatigable, and Formidable.

These ships fielded the following combined air force: 80 Avengers, 29 Hellcats, 101 Corsairs, 40 Seafires, 9 Fireflies, and 2 Walruses. 261 combat aircraft.

By way of comparison, in the same engagement

• TG 58.1
• Hornet carries 71 Hellcats, 15 Helldivers and 15 TBMs (101 aircraft);
• Wasp has 36 Corsairs, 34 Hellcats, 15 Helldivers and 15 TBMs (100);
• Bennington has 37 Hellcats, 35 Corsairs, 15 Helldivers and 15 TBMs (102);
• (also 2 CVLs with 2 x 34 aircraft = 72)
  
  TG 58.3
• Essex with 36 Hellcats, 36 Corsairs, 15 Helldivers and 15 TBMs (102);
• Bunker Hill with 10 Hellcats, 63 Corsairs, 15 Helldivers and 15 TBMs (103).
  
  There are also 6 more fleet carriers and 4 CVLs in the organization chart.

My point is that with the same investment of treasure, the armored carriers field 261 combat aircraft (about 52 per ship), while five random Essex have traded their armor for 508 aircraft (about 102 per ship, or about 50 more per ship instead of an armored flight deck).

If the USN carriers were only able to project 50 planes each, I bet the Japanese would not have had to resort to Kamikaze attacks at all. Their remaining air force may have been able to defeat the attacks over the target and "defang" the USN.

If the object of a carrier force is power projection, I think the passive armored flight deck gets in the way of the mission.

The fact that Kamikazes got through was a problem of command and control, and was the subject of intense study after the war. It led to new hardware and procedures with names like PIRAZ which have the goal of separating friend from foe and directing the best resources to shoot him down before he can threaten the high value units.

We have to remember how limited radio and radar were in these days. This technology was the most limiting factor.

[bengtsson]

I think the point is, the British Armoured flightdeck carriers were designed for the European waters and Medit sea. They were never designed for vast open ocean pacific warfare. The British had a war in Europe to fight and an Essex in the Medit would never survive what Illustrious went through. If her lift hadn't been down when a bomb hit it, damage would have been much less. The Illustious was a European Warship designed to fight there in close proximity to land based air. Essex was designed to wage open ocean carrier warfare. Kamikaze warfare was never given a thought, it just came up and amoured flight decks were a good protection.
There is no question a Yorktown or Essex carried more aircraft, and aircraft was the weapon a carrier wielded. The carrier was the warship that finally met the goal of an HMS Unapproachable that Fisher was after. Big guns never could meet that aim, but the carrier was indeed an Unapproachable by other surface warships.
Bob B.

The best argument for democracy is a 1 minute conversation with GWB.

[Werner]

Maybe too an extra fifty fighters would have meant the Illustrious would never have been bombed.