Midway, 5 June (Hawaii Time)

[Werner]

Is there any reasonably considered, non-suicidal strategy which Spruance and Fletcher could have put in place after the Hiryu was wrecked, which could have offered at least partial victory to the Japanese? With the combined fleet in withdrawal, there would be little opportunity for a fleet action.

[chuck]

Send the cruisers chasing after the combined fleet to seek a gunnery action?

What type of strategy can be both "reasonably considered, non-suicidal strategy", while at the same time affords a partial victory to a seriously defeated enemy who is in headlong flight?

[Lesforan]

Werner,

No.

Any hopes for the IJN of salvaging any kind of victory lay with themselves.
This has been hashed out here before. The Japanese still had a substantial material advantage in all kinds of warships over the Americans, and, if regrouped, could possibly have achieved a victory even after the loss of their Midway Strike Force carriers. The problem was one of logistics.

As a result of Yamamoto's intricate plan, the Combined Fleet was anything but combined. It was divided into disparate forces, striking from different directions all over the Western Pacific. If he had not divided his forces in the face of the enemy, he may have been able to achieve his plan outright the first day. Japanese supply ships were not in place to be able to replenish a combined fleet.....Yamamoto's plan depended on the Americans reacting the way he expected them to in order for him to succeed. When we didn't, it all came unravelled.

Chuck,

Halsey may have lain seething in his hospital bed, literally itching to do what you have offered. A surface action involving cruisers vs. Yamamoto's Main Body? Snatching defeat from the jaws of victory.

[MartinJQuinn]

Is there any reasonably considered, non-suicidal strategy which Spruance and Fletcher could have put in place after the Hiryu was wrecked, which could have offered at least partial victory to the Japanese? With the combined fleet in withdrawal, there would be little opportunity for a fleet action.

Considering Nimitz told them to work on the concept of calulated risk, it is unlikely that either Admiral would have done anything rash. Though a night time foray by the USN cruisers and destroyers may have better prepared the USN for the upcoming brawl in the Solomons...

[Filipe Ramires]

Though a night time foray by the USN cruisers and destroyers may have better prepared the USN for the upcoming brawl in the Solomons...

Probably learning in the hard way. I can't foreseen much success to the USN in a night action against IJN at Midway.

[MartinJQuinn]

Though a night time foray by the USN cruisers and destroyers may have better prepared the USN for the upcoming brawl in the Solomons...

Probably learning in the hard way. I can't foreseen much success to the USN in a night action against IJN at Midway.

I didn't say they'd win, just that they'd get a taste of what was in store!

[chuck]

Yamamoto did consider recalling the Aleutian force to reinforce his main force and relaunch the Midway attack again in a few days. If they were to do that it would give the Japanese another shot at Victory. However it would not have been a very good shot.

Yamamoto, ever the gambler, calculated his odds well and choose to withdraw.

Incidentally, I think Yamamoto was neither a exceptional tactician nor strategist. He was clearly a brilliant man whose mind had all the gears and cams of a strategist, but his strategic thinking appears to have been untempered by contact with the realities of war, such as uncertainty and enemy intransigence. There wasn't too much evidence to show what kind of tactician or tactical leader he was, he had been promoted to beyond that level by the time the war started.

The main demonstrated skill shown by Yamamato was that of a masterly chief of staff, able to conceive of alternative, weigh odds, and move pieces on a map. But I am not sure he was the right man to actually have the final say on all operational planning and conduct.

[Filipe Ramires]

The main demonstrated skill shown by Yamamato was that of a masterly chief of staff, able to conceive of alternative, weigh odds, and move pieces on a map. But I am not sure he was the right man to actually have the final say on all operational planning and conduct.

Well, a sort of "myth" was created around Yamamoto for his deeds or no deeds. For many decades he was considered a brilliant mind (which was in the way you say it was) and most of the errors committed at Midway went straight to Nagumo. The entire blunder was practically given to Nagumo. Anyway, point being that recent works and research tend to give a contrary vision of this in which Nagumo was in fact a good tactician (apart from being a cruiser/battleship guy rather then a CV one) and Yamamoto only a good overall strategist. The chain of command speaks higher I guess...

To Martin:

I didn't say that they would win or said that you said that they would win. Sorry if I misinterpreted you sentence. What I was saying was that a surface battle would most certainly leave few ships afloat for the USN. The IJN numbers were too superior...not to speak in other aspects. The Japanese being allowed to gather a strong surface striking force, properly refueled (which I find hard to believe by the 6th of June) and going into a fight for which they are well trained and equipped I think it will achieve far more disaster for the USN then any of the Solomons/Guadalcanal battles.

[Lesforan]

Yes, I have to agree here with Chuck and Filipe.

Yamamoto has been given a lot of credit in history for being a master strategist. Apparently, this was a sort of self-serving compliment alluding to his American education and skill as a top-notch international poker player. He does need to be credited with percieving that a war of attrition with the West could not be won.

He is credited with the success of the Pearl Harbor attack. He deserves credit for that. But it should be noted that this was an attack against a country Japan was not at war with yet, much as the Japanese had attacked the Russians by surprise in 1905. While not excusing American incompetence in allowing the attack, a declaration of war prior to the attack would not have resulted in us being blindsided.

His plan for Midway probably would have worked if the Americans had not been able to crack the Japanese naval code. He should have considered the possibility of this happening and devised a contingency plan. As it was, his attitude was one of "we want to engage the American fleet anyway, so who cares if they are waiting for us?" (paraphrased).

If the seaplane sent to scout Pearl Harbor had been able to refuel at French Frigate Shoal, he would have known at least that the carriers were not at Pearl. Again, no alternate refueling site chosen if American ships were present there (as they were).

As has been pointed out here, and has been before, Yamamoto possesed overwhelming fleet strength. Even after the battle, his ships outnumbered ours in every catagory, including aircraft carriers.

For his plan to work, the US would have to act the way he thought we would. As soon as we deviated from this plan (carrier ambush) it fell apart and there was no plan "B". Not the mark of a great strategist.

[MartinJQuinn]

Yes, I have to agree here with Chuck and Filipe.

Yamamoto has been given a lot of credit in history for being a master strategist. Apparently, this was a sort of self-serving compliment alluding to his American education and skill as a top-notch international poker player. He does need to be credited with percieving that a war of attrition with the West could not be won.

He is credited with the success of the Pearl Harbor attack. He deserves credit for that. But it should be noted that this was an attack against a country Japan was not at war with yet, much as the Japanese had attacked the Russians by surprise in 1905. While not excusing American incompetence in allowing the attack, a declaration of war prior to the attack would not have resulted in us being blindsided.

His plan for Midway probably would have worked if the Americans had not been able to crack the Japanese naval code. He should have considered the possibility of this happening and devised a contingency plan. As it was, his attitude was one of "we want to engage the American fleet anyway, so who cares if they are waiting for us?" (paraphrased).

If the seaplane sent to scout Pearl Harbor had been able to refuel at French Frigate Shoal, he would have known at least that the carriers were not at Pearl. Again, no alternate refueling site chosen if American ships were present there (as they were).

As has been pointed out here, and has been before, Yamamoto possesed overwhelming fleet strength. Even after the battle, his ships outnumbered ours in every catagory, including aircraft carriers.

For his plan to work, the US would have to act the way he thought we would. As soon as we deviated from this plan (carrier ambush) it fell apart and there was no plan "B". Not the mark of a great strategist.

I have finally gotten the time to read "Shattered Sword", and am about 1/2 way through it. The authors (who do a fantastic job) point out just what you've said, Les - the Japanese expected the Americans to act a certain way and planned accordingly.

[Werner]

Don't be too hard on Yamamoto. It appears to be a common failing among their planners. Morison frequently points out how "uncooperative" US commanders forced many a Japanese commander to the back pages of his play book faster than he would have preferred.

I have often wondered if this didn't have a lot to do with the structure and style of Japanese writing rather than some cardinal flaw in Japanese military character.

The attack on Mogami and Mikuma on 6 June prove Spruance was not willing to take a calculated risk if he expected a real return. I wonder what Kondo with four battleships and two cruisers well Northeast of Midway could have done for his appetite.

[Guest]

Don't be too hard on Yamamoto. It appears to be a common failing among their planners. Morison frequently points out how "uncooperative" US commanders forced many a Japanese commander to the back pages of his play book faster than he would have preferred.

I have often wondered if this didn't have a lot to do with the structure and style of Japanese writing rather than some cardinal flaw in Japanese military character.

The attack on Mogami and Mikuma on 6 June prove Spruance was not willing to take a calculated risk if he expected a real return. I wonder what Kondo with four battleships and two cruisers well Northeast of Midway could have done for his appetite.

It is a reflection of Japanese military character. The Japanese type of tactical thinking is very appropriate to a style of warfare that has had a long period in which to mature, in which doctrine and practice has been brought up to a very high level of refinement, and tactics have evolved to a very elaborate and comprehensive state with proven countermoves for every false move having been devised and widely disseminated throughout all level on all sides. In another words a world in which tactic are elaborate, complex and formalized, experimentation that is just a bit too bold is much more likely to be savagely punished than to be rewarded, and trying to what you've been doing just a little bit better is likely to much more rewards than any radical innovation.

This is not, however, the world of technological warfare. In technological war, tactics are never developed to a very high pitch. There is no time for the sort of refinement Samurai take to be alter ego of war. Long before tactics have been refined to the point being formalized, technology has moved on and something new has to be devised. This was the world of WWII. But the Japanese still thought in terms of old, elaborate, formalized maneuvers of samurai days. They still expected that there is one prove tactical doctrine, and that there is very little room for deviation.

[Werner]

I keep thinking about the complex attack on Henderson Field in November, 1942. Complete plans with locations and times were distributed well in advance with no discussion of contingencies which would have been essential in an engagement of this complexity. Because the march to the East took longer than expected, the plan was seriously out of kilter, but noone felt the urge to inform the overall commander the main elements were out of place. If the Japanese had changed the timetable a day or so, it may have succeeded, instead of as soon as the weary attackers staggered to their jumping off points, conveniently allowing the Marines to destroy the Japanese in detail rather than having to fight their coordinated battle.

[Guest]

In the Japanese army one does not volunteer unhappy news to one's superiors, like "Sir, you plan is not working." If the superior wants to know, he would ask, and then you might acknowledge that "Sir, your masterly plan is working to perfection, but the ill-will of the enemy has limited the effect of your genius."

It is an indication of the ability of many Japanese officers to have accomplished as much as they did without free and unobstructed tactical information flowing in from beyond their line of sight. But on the whole, how ever able the officers are, they are not likely to accomplish much against real opposition with this sort of illiberal approach to situation awareness.

[Guest]

The Japanese navy suffers less from this sort of thinking, possibly because the most reactionary and inflexible minds tends to be attracted to the army. But the Navy is not immune.

[Dan K]

It is a reflection of Japanese military character. The Japanese type of tactical thinking is very appropriate to a style of warfare that has had a long period in which to mature, in which doctrine and practice has been brought up to a very high level of refinement, and tactics have evolved to a very elaborate and comprehensive state with proven countermoves for every false move having been devised and widely disseminated throughout all level on all sides. In another words a world in which tactic are elaborate, complex and formalized, experimentation that is just a bit too bold is much more likely to be savagely punished than to be rewarded, and trying to what you've been doing just a little bit better is likely to much more rewards than any radical innovation.

This is not, however, the world of technological warfare. In technological war, tactics are never developed to a very high pitch. There is no time for the sort of refinement Samurai take to be alter ego of war. Long before tactics have been refined to the point being formalized, technology has moved on and something new has to be devised. This was the world of WWII. But the Japanese still thought in terms of old, elaborate, formalized maneuvers of samurai days. They still expected that there is one prove tactical doctrine, and that there is very little room for deviation.

I think this is the most concise explanation of the limitations of Japanese thinking and tactics governing their actions that I have encountered. Very good.

[j leyland]

My guess is that if Yamamoto had really wanted Midway, the landing could have been forced through with heavy losses. The US carrier airgroups were depleted and exhausted and later battles showed that a lot of hits were needed to sink a battleship. On the other hand, although B-17s couldn't hit maneuvering ships with any regularity, anchored troop and supply ships would be a different story. The marines at Wake showed how tough they were when cornered on a tiny island.

All that said, I think Yamamoto realized the futility of trying to hold Midway in the face of long supply lines and continuous air and submarine interference. He was really after the US carriers using Midway as bait, and when he realized that that chance was finished, he cut his losses and went home. The idea of continuing on to take Hawaii was a navy pipe dream. The army had other priorities and would not have consented and the War Minister was their man.

[chuck]

My guess is that if Yamamoto had really wanted Midway, the landing could have been forced through with heavy losses. The US carrier airgroups were depleted and exhausted and later battles showed that a lot of hits were needed to sink a battleship. On the other hand, although B-17s couldn't hit maneuvering ships with any regularity, anchored troop and supply ships would be a different story. The marines at Wake showed how tough they were when cornered on a tiny island.

All that said, I think Yamamoto realized the futility of trying to hold Midway in the face of long supply lines and continuous air and submarine interference. He was really after the US carriers using Midway as bait, and when he realized that that chance was finished, he cut his losses and went home. The idea of continuing on to take Hawaii was a navy pipe dream. The army had other priorities and would not have consented and the War Minister was their man.

That's right, Yamaaoto didn't give a rat's ass about Midway. He wanted the decisive fleet action and Midway was just a disposible bait. When his transport fleet chief told him that it would be very difficult to support the occupation force on Midway against determined American efforts to dislodge them, Yamamoto was totally untroubled and said would be easy enough to evacuate Midway should Americans make too much trouble, provided the main American carriers were already destroyed in the effort to take it in the first place. The occupation of Midway, far from being a corner stone of any strategic position, was nothing but a oportunistic tactical probe in force. Unfortunately the probe involved so much force that its defeat crippled the main force of IJN.

During the planning phase of operation MI, the Japanese naval staff already rejected the taking of Hawaii as impossible to achieve because carrier airpower possessed by Japan is insufficient to establish air superiority over Hawaiian islands. Furthermore, the Japanese concluded, rightly or wrongly, that the actual occupation of Hawaii would have negligible effect on American's ability to wage war on Japan, and the occupation of Islands to the east of Australia would enhance Japanese security much more than occupation of Hawaii.

Had Midway operation been successful, the IJN follow up plans called for the carriers to return to Truk and launch further operations in the South rather than build upon Midway to threaten Hawaii. When you take all these things into consideration, it become more and more clear that not only was the Midway operation ill-conducted and fatally compromised from the beginning, it was really ill-conceived and ill-fitting even as part of grand overall strategy. Yamamoto the strategist was not Napoleonic in caliber.

[Werner]

Japan recognized she did not have enough cargo lift to maintain a military force in Hawaii. It was recognized they would have to exterminate a large proportion of the civil and prisoner of war population of Hawaii if they took it.

[Guest]

BTW, can someone explain to me why Yamamoto and 7 battleships are 300 miles behind Nogumo's force? Why were they not screening the 1st air fleet and why did they bother to come along if they were going to linger so far from battle?

What could they have done from 300 miles away that they could not do by being around the carrier force? Had they screened the carriers they could have have considerably strengthened the carrier's AA screen, and the Yamato and other battleships might well have harmlessly absorbed some of the bombs that would otherwise turn a carrier into an inferno??