Fire Control
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Fire Control
Had a long talk with Norman Friedman a day or so ago, and it seems that the fire control equiptment for Japanese, Italian and German battleships of the WW11 period was British, something that I did not know. This will be written up in Friedman's book due out very late this year.
Thought that this would be of small interest to some.
Thought that this would be of small interest to some.
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Tiornu
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Re: Fire Control
Can you explain what that means?it seems that the fire control equiptment for Japanese, Italian and German battleships of the WW11 period was British
- Laurence Batchelor
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Interesting, but wouldn't 'British derived' or 'British based' F/C be better descriptions?
I doubt they are like for like carbon copies.
Please see here ar:-
http://www.shipmodels.info/mwphpBB2/vie ... hp?t=22704
I doubt they are like for like carbon copies.
Please see here ar:-
http://www.shipmodels.info/mwphpBB2/vie ... hp?t=22704
- Werner
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Whether or not the machinery has the same lineage, there seem to be several practical solutions to the maths involved.
The fire control is solving some calculus which include assumptions about the future position of ships. The different behaviors of Japanese, German and Italian shooting in "dodge the salvo" engagements imply to me that if these are similar systems some different decisions were taken along the way.
The fire control is solving some calculus which include assumptions about the future position of ships. The different behaviors of Japanese, German and Italian shooting in "dodge the salvo" engagements imply to me that if these are similar systems some different decisions were taken along the way.
If an unfriendly power had attempted to impose on America the mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war.
-- "A Nation at Risk" (1983)
-- "A Nation at Risk" (1983)
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- Filipe Ramires
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- Werner
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It appears the US relied more heavily on gyroscopic stable elements and other inertial features to supplement spotters telescopes, pitometers and anemometers. Rather than having read-outs written and hand entered into the fire control table, these inputs were directly fed to the computer, which made for a somewhat different experience, probably later in any engagement.
When radar was incorporated (after the war), it's readouts were also fed directly to the computer, making the solution much more reliable.
When radar was incorporated (after the war), it's readouts were also fed directly to the computer, making the solution much more reliable.
If an unfriendly power had attempted to impose on America the mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war.
-- "A Nation at Risk" (1983)
-- "A Nation at Risk" (1983)
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Gone Asiatic
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Japanese Fire Control
In Evans & Peattie`s book Kaigun, mention is made of the IJN acquiring Barr and Stroud fire control tables for Kongo:
"...these tables were studied intensively and probably provided a basis for the fire control tables developed by the Aichi Company in the 1930`s, the first manufactured in Japan."
A "uniquely Japanese" intrument is discussed in this book - the sokutekiban which functioned as a rudimentory Target Motion Analysis device.
A quote that seems to refute the claim:
"The sokutekiban represented the state of Japanese fire control during the interwar period. All its instuments were excessively heavy and manpower intensive, using manual follow-up systems rather than incorporating automatic inputs. The navy`s adherence to these systems may have reflected the contemporary Japanese lack of of technical resources for the development of smaller, lighter, and more complex computing devices like those used by the Brithish and American navies."
Evans, David C, Peattie, Mark A., KAIGUN: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy 1887-1941, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997
"...these tables were studied intensively and probably provided a basis for the fire control tables developed by the Aichi Company in the 1930`s, the first manufactured in Japan."
A "uniquely Japanese" intrument is discussed in this book - the sokutekiban which functioned as a rudimentory Target Motion Analysis device.
A quote that seems to refute the claim:
"The sokutekiban represented the state of Japanese fire control during the interwar period. All its instuments were excessively heavy and manpower intensive, using manual follow-up systems rather than incorporating automatic inputs. The navy`s adherence to these systems may have reflected the contemporary Japanese lack of of technical resources for the development of smaller, lighter, and more complex computing devices like those used by the Brithish and American navies."
Evans, David C, Peattie, Mark A., KAIGUN: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy 1887-1941, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997
Last edited by Gone Asiatic on Mon Jun 11, 2007 11:34 pm, edited 1 time in total.
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- Werner
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One thing is certain: day or night, Japanese fire control was deadly inside 13Km. Outside that range it was nearly useless.
In US practice, fire control was little better in 1942, but by 1944 the US advantage is appreciable.
Like the Chevrolet Vega, it was perfected by the USA just before it was buried by new ideas.
In US practice, fire control was little better in 1942, but by 1944 the US advantage is appreciable.
Like the Chevrolet Vega, it was perfected by the USA just before it was buried by new ideas.
If an unfriendly power had attempted to impose on America the mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war.
-- "A Nation at Risk" (1983)
-- "A Nation at Risk" (1983)
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phil gollin
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Werner wrote:One thing is certain: day or night, Japanese fire control was deadly inside 13Km. Outside that range it was nearly useless.
In US practice, fire control was little better in 1942, but by 1944 the US advantage is appreciable.
Like the Chevrolet Vega, it was perfected by the USA just before it was buried by new ideas.
The Japanese must have perfected a force field which forms an invisible barrier 13 km from their ships and which sharply deflects the trajectory of any shells that attempts to fly out through it.
I don't know what American excuses were in 1942, thou.
- Werner
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There is not a lot of data on the intermediate ranges. An entire Japanese Task Force fired on Gambier Bay, a non-maneuvering, 18-knot target for at least an hour before registering a hit, when range to the cruisers had fallen to 13Km.
Her damage control insists only one hit was larger than 8-inch caliber (14-inches), and no hits registered from Yamato & Nagato in their only surface action.
Her damage control insists only one hit was larger than 8-inch caliber (14-inches), and no hits registered from Yamato & Nagato in their only surface action.
If an unfriendly power had attempted to impose on America the mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war.
-- "A Nation at Risk" (1983)
-- "A Nation at Risk" (1983)
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Foeth
- Werner
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They do pretty well against flaming enemy ships in the dark, under 10,000 yards, especially when those ships already suffered torpedo hits and were not at general quarters for the first time in days.
On the other hand, two 10-gun cruisers literally emptied their magazines in a several hour, long range engagement at the Komondorski Islands in 1942 with no hits of consequence by either side. The cruisers had to return to Japan to have their guns relined and their Admiral was cashiered.
On the other hand, two 10-gun cruisers literally emptied their magazines in a several hour, long range engagement at the Komondorski Islands in 1942 with no hits of consequence by either side. The cruisers had to return to Japan to have their guns relined and their Admiral was cashiered.
Last edited by Werner on Tue Jun 12, 2007 5:47 am, edited 1 time in total.
If an unfriendly power had attempted to impose on America the mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war.
-- "A Nation at Risk" (1983)
-- "A Nation at Risk" (1983)
- Laurence Batchelor
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and that was in a heavy sea!Foeth_ wrote:The number of heavy shell hits of Japanese heavy calibre weapons throughout the war isn't very good, especially compared to well... anybody. Taking the early-war battle of the denmark straight, neither side had much trouble landing a few hits at 20k.
How well did Japanese cruisers do in general?