Fire Control

[Werner]

Even if you look at the ABDA battles off Java in 1941, the shooting by over 5.5-inch caliber was awful and the real work was done with the 24-inch torpedo.

[Werner]

is it possible this had something to do with dispersion and other faults of the gun or the barrel or the turret mount, rather than the aiming equipment?

Those who fought the Japanese say their salvos were tight with little dispersion.

What they do say is the salvos predictably march closer and closer up to a point, then go in some other direction for a few shots and then start over.

In other words, it appears that as the solution approaches the hitting point, some other factor entered or calculated in their system takes the guns away from the target (this applies to ranges between 14km and beyond).

Organizationally, if the Ford Computer or some other component had such a defect it would promptly be reported up the line. Chuck's writing on the Japanese culture seems to imply the combat officers would rather apologize and take the blame for the failure rather than blame the equipment or the system.

[Foeth]

is it possible this had something to do with dispersion and other faults of the gun or the barrel or the turret mount, rather than the aiming equipment?

I doubt it. I'm not sure how the alignment process went, but it should include a few moored practise shootings to calibrate the entire system. So, any bias error in the aligment of the structure should be calibrated out. That is, assumed that the hull isn't very flexible so that you introduce additional error in seaway. IIRC, Japanese cruiser hulls were not very rigid.

[Werner]

It has to be some factor which introduces increasing error as range falls.

Perhaps their range finders had a gradient error, or the formula for other ship's motion broke down at some specific point in the calculation.

At some point the system considers itself close enough to forget much of the time of flight calculations and so on, and they begin hitting reliably.

Some part of their system was calculated to make AP shells strike a few meters short of the target and then travel underwater. I wonder if this represents a clue to the problem.

Whatever it was, it may also account for the bad AAA shooting by dual purpose secondary guns.

[Filipe Ramires]

They do pretty well against flaming enemy ships in the dark, under 10,000 yards, especially when those ships already suffered torpedo hits and were not at general quarters for the first time in days.

The element of surprise was most needed for the Savo Island Battle therefore they had the chance to fire torpedoes first and they were bold with it. Also Canberra was almost immediately hit by gunfire after the torpedoes hit her. Fire torpedoes first and when they are about to reach their marks open fire with main guns leaving the enemy little time to react...that was the order of the battle. Remember that the IJN puts the torpedo in a more offensive use rather then the guns therefore it is usual to see them using them very often early and during battles, even if large quantities. For some reason most of the Allied ships sunk in Guadalcanal have the signature of Long-Lances.

[Filipe Ramires]

Even if you look at the ABDA battles off Java in 1941, the shooting by over 5.5-inch caliber was awful and the real work was done with the 24-inch torpedo.

Four 8'' hits were made by the Japanese heavy cruisers Haguro and Nachi during the afternoon stage of the battle...2 on Houston (both duds or pass through), 1 on De Ruyter (also dud) and 1 on Exeter which was a very damaging one as we all know. So far no 8'' hits from the Allied cruisers are known.
This battle was made at long range due to the lack of doctrine or the fear of both admirals to risk their ships in such engagement (regarding the heavy cruisers) been the closest actions taken by the light forces (destroyers and some CL's). Admiral Takagi was a submarine guy therefore he was more willing to make use of torpedoes rather then to take a gunnery action and even more he was worried to keep the transports away from the ABDA Striking Force. Doorman on his hand was there to hunt the transports and not a Supporting Force...his strategy was all around to get away from that engagement with light damage and search for the invasion convoys.

[Filipe Ramires]

Chuck's writing on the Japanese culture seems to imply the combat officers would rather apologize and take the blame for the failure rather than blame the equipment or the system.

It's their code of honour afterall. Naval designers took the blame for themselves after the Tomozuru incident for instance. If it's right or wrong I don't know but it was their choice and problem.

[Laurence Batchelor]

Do you think Filipe when the IJN developed the oxygen 24inch Long Lance torpedo in the 1930s they realised how reliant they would become on them in WW2?

Is it just possible they started to realise their large-calibre (long-range especially) firing was a bit pants.
Rather than spend the long time required to cure their gunnery problems, be them barrel or F/C related which could mean lengthy refits and 'retro-fitting' the whole fleet they decided to just really change their doctrine and make the torpedo their primary offensive weapon?

Just a thought!

[Filipe Ramires]

Is it just possible they started to realise their large-calibre (long-range especially) firing was a bit pants.

IJN doctrine for night actions asked for divisions of destroyers harassing the enemy battleline and being the torpedo the main weapon of a destroyer then I consider that they paid much attention to the torpedoes rather then the gunnery in some cases. Even more if they put 16 torpedo tubes on some heavy cruisers (plus reloads) it is evident that they wanted the torpedo to take an important part in the eventual battles. No other Navy that I am aware did that to their heavy cruisers...though I will give credit to the suggestion that having so many volatile torpedoes aboard their ships was a serious risk to be taken and sometimes they paid badly for it.

[Laurence Batchelor]

Filipe,

'Large calibre' doesn't mean 5-inch guns on a destroyer I was speaking of cruisers!

In some cases the Long-Lance proved decisive others times a ticking time-bomb. I think you and the IJN attached too much importance to it.
They put all their eggs into 1 basket.

In hindsight it would have been better for the IJN to invest all that time, money and development in the 1930s into radar.
That way all of their capital ships may have been so fitted by 1942.

Also it seems a bit of a material waste to go to all the trouble to mount (sorry I'll rephrase that squeeze!) 10 8-inch barrels onto a relatively small hull and then up your torpedo armament and make that the weapon you most wish to use.

[ar]

And the Germans, Italians and Japanese thought they had gotten their hands on something special; The Admiralty was sneaky in many ways.

They do pretty well against flaming enemy ships in the dark, under 10,000 yards, especially when those ships already suffered torpedo hits and were not at general quarters for the first time in days.

On the other hand, two 10-gun cruisers literally emptied their magazines in a several hour, long range engagement at the Komondorski Islands in 1942 with no hits of consequence by either side. The cruisers had to return to Japan to have their guns relined and their Admiral was cashiered.

[Filipe Ramires]

'Large calibre' doesn't mean 5-inch guns on a destroyer I was speaking of cruisers!

Like I said before, IJN heavy cruisers had a big amount of torpedo banks compared to other Navies. Every single cruiser in the IJN had torpedoes. Light-cruisers performed most of the times as leaders of destroyer squadrons. Cruisers had guns from 8'' to 5.5'' calibers. Torpedo tubes were removed between the wars from their battleships for the obvious reasons.

In some cases the Long-Lance proved decisive others times a ticking time-bomb. I think you and the IJN attached too much importance to it.
They put all their eggs into 1 basket.

Couldn't agree more with that comment...apart from the part of what I think!!!

In hindsight it would have been better for the IJN to invest all that time, money and development in the 1930s into radar.
That way all of their capital ships may have been so fitted by 1942.

Well, funds were not available for everything. I'm sure investing in Radar and ASW would have been ideal but they were "blinded" with surface actions � la Tsushima style. How many navies are investing heavily in radar during the 30's?

Also it seems a bit of a material waste to go to all the trouble to mount (sorry I'll rephrase that squeeze!) 10 8-inch barrels onto a relatively small hull and then up your torpedo armament and make that the weapon you most wish to use.

Treaty limitations eventually. You can't build more numbers then the others but if you tell no one you can squeeze some more 4.000 tons on the cruiser with more guns and torpedoes. Shhhhh, just don't let the others know!!!!

[Laurence Batchelor]

Well, funds were not available for everything. I'm sure investing in Radar and ASW would have been ideal but they were "blinded" with surface actions � la Tsushima style. How many navies are investing heavily in radar during the 30's?

Well the Germans and British for a start thats why both the Germans had a working gunnery set onboard warships by 1939 and the British an air warning radar by the same year.

IJN has 3 more years to play until Midway!

[Laurence Batchelor]

And the Germans, Italians and Japanese thought they had gotten their hands on something special; The Admiralty was sneaky in many ways.

Are you implying they did this intentionally? heavens forebid!

Sneaky isn't the word! Perhaps Dastardly!

[Werner]

Whose would the French have used?

[Werner]

Well, funds were not available for everything. I'm sure investing in Radar and ASW would have been ideal but they were "blinded" with surface actions � la Tsushima style. How many navies are investing heavily in radar during the 30's?

Well the Germans and British for a start thats why both the Germans had a working gunnery set onboard warships by 1939 and the British an air warning radar by the same year.

IJN has 3 more years to play until Midway!

USN had a seaborne experimental set in late 1936/1937 and mounted CXAM-1 aboard California, Yorktown, Chicago, Pensacola, and Northampton. by 1940. I assume they were shared developments since they share the cavity magnetron which I believe was the British breakthrough in this area.

[Laurence Batchelor]

The Royal Navy had experimental set at sea by 1937!
See and early edition of Warship for the detailed examination of early experimental seaborne radar.

I was speaking beforehand a working set fitted to a warship and 'in service' playing an active part in the war.
Germany had her Gunnery set on Graf Spee in 1939 and the Royal Navy her Air Warning Radar on Sheffield in 1939 also.

I've often wondered how the Japanese would have fared if they had developed radar into the war winning weapon it ultimately proved and had it aboard their capital ships by 1941/42.
Remember they were planning for a Pacific war for a very long time, they could have had it inplace in all their large ships and its use largely worked out.
Imagine it allied to their night time doctrines and merely using 'standard' 21inch torpedos which they would most likely have more tubes aboard than anyone else as they had a bit of a torpedo fetish!
Instead they decided to develop a torpedo which was undoubtively the best in the world for a short period of time until homing torpedos made them yesterdays technology.
Such a fatal error to develop the wrong technology pathway, but more importantly to pump all your resources into it blindly without spreading your thin resources over a number of new technology's and then once you get some combat experience, then pump in all your development into which will give you the biggest success on the battlefield.

Whoops have I gone offtopic again! naughty me!

[Werner]

The cavity magnetron came to the USA in a leather satchel in 1940, a gift of the British Government. Later in 1940 they sent Edward George Bowen who opened the MIT Radiation Lab. Half of all radar instruments deployed by the allies in WW.II came from the RadLab.

[Laurence Batchelor]

Remember also most of Britain was covered by coastal radar stations by the Summer of 1940.
Quite an achievement to get it into opertional use so quickly.

Yes we didn't have the ability to pump in the needed RnD into it to develop it further so we sent it Stateside.

We then got cracking on enigma amongst other things!

[ar]

"needed R&D", not true.
Read the histories.

One thing that I always get fractionally upset about, is that most believe that the US built the first "all electronic programmable computer", when in fact it was a Post Office engineer who achieved this feat in late 1943 at Bletchely Park.

Remember also most of Britain was covered by coastal radar stations by the Summer of 1940.
Quite an achievement to get it into opertional use so quickly.

Yes we didn't have the ability to pump in the needed RnD into it to develop it further so we sent it Stateside.

We then got cracking on enigma amongst other things!