Would heavy cruisers have been popular without Washington

[chuck]

A major development in the naval world with the arrival of dreadnoughts and battlecruisers is the gradual suppression of large cruisers.

Prior to the dreadnoughs, the world's navies relied heavily on large, heavily armed and heavily armored cruisers for patrol and sea lane security. Some of the large armored cruisers clearly foreshadowed battlecrusiers by being larger than any contemporary battleships.

But by WWI, the continued development of large independentt armored cruisers have been essentially suppressed. The largest new cruisers have shrunk in size until they are no more than scouting minows for the battlefleet and leaders of destroyer squadrons.

Yet something akin to the old armored cruisers revived as class-A cruiser after the signing of Washington treaty and survived strongly until the end of the big gun era.

So, is the new branch of big heavy cruisers purely a result of Washington and the child of the fact that no new battleships were allowed for 10 years, and then survived on momentum and hull life expectancy afterwards until 1945? Or did nature of naval warfare did indeed change again to provide a new natural niche for a larger cruiser intermediate between general fleet work cruisers of WWI and the capital ships?

[Dan K]

That is a really good question, Chuck.

IIRC, the original 1922 treaty limited ALL cruisers to 10,000 tons. (I think I have that right). Subsequent treaties broke the category into subcategories per 8" and 6" batteries. My thought is that the original intent was to limit the size of the type, irrespective of the fact that the type size seemed to be shrinking. Total tonnage limits were not included either in 1922, I think

Coupled with a ban on BBs, it seems likely that nations seized on the the cruiser type (with 8" probably being the largest PRACTICAL battery to mount on that size hull) as a way around treaty restraints. I think this is especially true for the Japanese.

[Werner]

The 8-inch, 10,000 ton heavy cruiser is a direct result of the Washington Treaty capital ship holiday.

With the inability to construct battleships, the heavy cruiser became "capital ship lite", as the battleships became too important to risk and were in eny event scheduled for far too much yard time for reconstruction in the 1930-1935 time frame.

[Terry Pottle]

some cruisers were already going in this direction anyway, Trade Route Cruisers needed the range and gun power to confront/defend against enemy raiders.
the maximum weight and gun were a compromise of :
a) RN already having the large 9,ooo+ton & 7.5" armed Elizabethean class
b) USN requirement for a large ship which could sail from the US West Coast to the Philipines preferablaby without oiling, they came up with the 10,000 tons thought neccessary.

the total tonnage limit was first agreed at the London Conference.

The RN with their requirement for 70+ cruisers soon came to realise that this was not financially possible, and started with smaller 8,000 ton ships (Exeter & York) and then began to build the 6" (light). Always with the numbers required and the cost of buiding/maintaining as reason for the change.

at least, that how I understand the game

Terry

[Werner]

USN thought a cruiser of 10,000 tons was a minimum, and 8-inch was the calibre needed to coexist with HMS Frobisher, which was taken as the prototype. These ships were all classed "light cruisers CL" until the London treaty.

The US designers arrived at the same conclusions as the Japanese, that a Pacific War cruiser would require 13,000-15,000 tons and 8-inch guns. The US actually came up with 8-inch designs well over 20,000 tons, but were put off by the costs.

The London Treaty limited the number of future 8-inch gun ships, but kind of lumped the destroyer and cruiser tonnage together. The US found the 6-inch cruiser attractive because they discovered a modern 6-inch gun ship could quite overwhelm an 8-inch ship in gunfire (60 or more rounds vs 18 or so) and be better protected in the bargain.

The ship hit the span, though, with CL-55, which was to be a 8,000 ton design based on the new treaty limits. The only way this could be accomplished is if BuOrd was able to deliver the 6-inch/47 automatic DP gun on the weights promised and on time. This ship mounted no secondary armament larger than 1.1-inch "Chicago Pianos". It must have been a great relief to the BuShips and the General Board when the British suspended ship treaties for the duration of the war in 1939.

[Laurence Batchelor]

My reading of this is that the cruiser clauses which emerged in the Washington Treaty were largely dictated by the British.

Britain after WWI wished to scale down her battlefleet and wished to still patrol the worlds oceans.
She still saw the cruiser forfilled this role best, as its a large enough warship to operate independently.

Further to this Britain had just completed towards the end of WWI cruisers which were approaching the 10,000 size namely the Cavendish class.
This is why in part they pushed for a 10,000ton ceiling.

With BB/BC 'holiday' apart from Nelson & Rodney and modernisation this left only the 10,000ton heavy cruiser the warship class that all Admiralty's/Navy Boards could toy around with for what some 25years?

[Filipe Ramires]

Just have a copy of the 1922 Conference here in front of me. There are the clauses for limitation in capital ships (BB, BC, etc) and to aircraft-carriers, in terms of total tonnage allowed, each ship maximum tonnage and main guns caliber limit. There is no mention in any of the Treaty clauses to the term "cruiser", however, Articles XI and XII states:

"Article XI - No vessel of war exceeding 10.000 tons (10.160 metric tons) standard displacement, other then a capital ship or aircraft carrier, shall be acquired by, or constructed by, for, or within the jurisdiction of, any of theContracting Powers. Vessels not specifically built as fighting ships nor taken in time of peace under goverment control for fighting purposes, which are employed on fleet duties or as troop transports or in some other way for the purpose of assisting in the prosecution of hostilities otherwise than as fighting ships, shall not be within the limitations of this Article."

"Article XII - No vessel of war of any of the Contracting Powers, hereafter laid down, other then a capital ship, shall carry a gun with a calibre in excess of 8 inches (203mm)."

[Werner]

My reading of this is that the cruiser clauses which emerged in the Washington Treaty were largely dictated by the British.

Sorry to disagree, but the USA largely got it's way in the Washington treaty.

Britain's goals were 25,000 tons and 12-inch guns for capital ships. Cruisers, I am not absolutely sure, but I think they tried for a 6,000 ton limit.

America insisted on 35,000 tons as a minimum and wanted 16-inch guns but saw 14-inch as a political advantage because they felt the British would not invest in the calibre and stick with 13.5-inch, giving the US a considerable advantage in gunfire. They did not yet appreciate the dispersion problem of triple 14-inch US turrets would cancel their advantage. Nelson & Rodney were clause exceptions compensating the RN for Colorado & Nagato.

At any event, the RN recognized the defects of their first and second generation dreadnoughts, and were glad to be rid of them. They also knew the remaining ships were deficient and scheduled the QE, "R" & later classes for rehabilitation. Unfortunately, the labor government saw better ways to spend the money. By treaty, Iron Duke and Tiger had to be killed off by 1932, so there was little point in modernizing them.

The British got what they wanted in 1930 with their superb 6-inch cruisers forming the backbone of their cruiser force. The USN was indecisive about the heavily protected 6-inch ship and finally went back to firepower with 15 guns. The Bureau of Engineering saved the day with lighter weights for the machinery, and Construction & Repair learned how to make STS steel an integral part of the ship's hull.

The negotiators were interested in how surprised the British were in US ship weight distributions, and suggested such documents be classified national secrets in the future.

Did I get it right, Admiral HHH?

[Laurence Batchelor]

I was speaky entirely in the context of cruisers only Werner.
Britain was the nation who had just built a class of 9,750tons cruisers with 7.5" guns.
What cruiser sizes were the USN and IJN building from 1915-1919?
The British pushed therefore for this 10,000ton cap to stop others going significantly one better and also they felt this size suited their capabilities well.

I agree with your battleship points, they were looking for retrenchment and to reduce down the spirally costs largely propelled from the pre-WWI arms race.

[Werner]

Laurence, I think you'll find the RN had a hard time thinking up tactics for the 9,000 ton 7.5-inch Frobisher; ultimately converting one to a carrier, and repair ship. I think this size of cruiser was a Fisher idea, and if given a free hand they would have returned to cruisers the size of Enterprise.

[Laurence Batchelor]

To understand Britain's position one must go back to the days of empire, and also the lessons of WWI.

By 1919 the British Empire was very much in full flow but it faced many vunerabilities and the Admiralty, Foreign Office, Treasury & Labour party all knew this.
During the Great War the Royal Navy had used cruisers sucessfully to blockade the central european powers. This had often made American trade with those powers suffer until they came into the war in 1917.

British cruiser policy was also influenced by her seeing that in the future she would need a vessel to help enforce economic sanctions at sea against any League of Nations transgressor say.
More importantly, should Britain be involved in another war, they would need cruisers to protect seaborne lifelines both into the home islands and out to the empire and foreign markets.
At the same time as WWI had already showed Britain wanted a cruiser which could also blockade any future enemy.

I still believe it was her pushing for this tight cruiser stipulation just as the French were pushing for a large submarine fleet.

[chuck]

Laurence, I think you'll find the RN had a hard time thinking up tactics for the 9,000 ton 7.5-inch Frobisher; ultimately converting one to a carrier, and repair ship. I think this size of cruiser was a Fisher idea, and if given a free hand they would have returned to cruisers the size of Enterprise.

This is because of the inadequacies of that class of cruisers when compared to the full fledged Washington 8" cruisers. It occupies A class slot but is only worth class B fighting power.

[Werner]

Laurence, I think you'll find the RN had a hard time thinking up tactics for the 9,000 ton 7.5-inch Frobisher; ultimately converting one to a carrier, and repair ship. I think this size of cruiser was a Fisher idea, and if given a free hand they would have returned to cruisers the size of Enterprise.

This is because of the inadequacies of that class of cruisers when compared to the full fledged Washington 8" cruisers. It occupies a class slot but is only worth a class B fighting power.

They had no trouble coming up with work for the "C" and "D" class light cruisers and others. The Hawkins type have plenty of top room to make into AA cruisers. They had reliable power plants.

The problem is they were designed to hunt down larger AMCs made from big, fast liners. By the time they commissioned this was no longer an issue, and they did not fit well into the trade route protection scheme the RN envisioned for their cruisers. For one thing, they used a lot more fuel and required more personnel to operate.

We need someone with a lot more connection to 1930s Admiralty plans, but it is my understanding that they pretty much executed their plan 1939-1941, with clusters of 6,000 or 8,000 ton cruisers hunting down the raiders.

[chuck]

Yes, but C and D cruisers didn't occupy A slots.

[Werner]

Yes, but C and D cruisers didn't occupy A slots.

Niether did Frobisher & Hawkins They were scheduled for scrapping in 1936, but survived the war in secondary roles.

Ships like Enterprise were not ready for scrapping before the war

I think the reason for their lackluster careers is because they consumed too much fuel to perform the same role as the lighter (and older) cruisers.

The main battery had to be fit into pits because their pedestals were too high. Operationally, they may have been difficult to work in boarding seas.

[Laurence Batchelor]

I think to answer this excellent question in a nutshell they would have still been built, but not as popular.

They also would be in a very different form and there would be much more inter-navy variations in range, size, speed and weaponry.

[chuck]

I think to answer this excellent question in a nutshell they would have still been built, but not as popular.

They also would be in a very different form and there would be much more inter-navy variations in range, size, speed and weaponry.

I think that's fair. I think the big navies would not have been so keen on building so many large cruisers of uniform size. I find it hard to believe a Japan with an 8-8 program fully underway could possibly find the funds to build 12 heavy cruisers as well. USN would probably match any match any big Japanese cruisers one for one. RN would probably prefer 1.5 medium cruisers to 1 large cruiser, and would count on its big existing battle cruiser fleet to do what it was intended to do in the first place - deal with any large foreign cruisers.

But I suspect at least one medium navy would have tried to build monster cruisers in the hopes that it could stand in line to stiffen its otherwise weak battle line.

[Laurence Batchelor]

But I suspect at least one medium navy would have tried to build monster cruisers in the hopes that it could stand in line to stiffen its otherwise weak battle line.

I assume somebody like France, Russia, Italy or even Germany then?

The later might build many large cruisers which would be intended for commerce raiding also.

I only thing harder to predict was if these medium navies started to build many heavy cruisers what would the dominant players of GB, USA & JAPAN do in way of rely?
Would this reinvigorate the desire to have Battlecruisers to hunt em down?
or would they simply match them with their own heavy cruiser construction?

[chuck]

That depends on whether we suppose that the rest of the political scene would still be as it were after WWI.

If we do, then Russia after the Revolution would have no capability for building any credible new large cruiser for many years. Germany would still be under stricture of Versailles. So that would leave France and Italy.

[Werner]

Heavy cruisers in principle could only exist because of the artificial limitation on capital ships. No Washington Treaty, very few cruisers.