The Battle of the North Cape

[Laurence Batchelor]

Two things made my eyebrows raise over the weekend about this battle.

Firstly just how important it was to the Russian Campaign for the Germans to sink a large proportion of just one convoy.
It was stated that the transport capacity of just one Artic convoy, of say 20 ships, amounted to approximately 260 bombers and around 4,000 tanks.
So that was more or less the equipment for a whole Army Section on the Eastern Front.
Therefore this supply to the Eatern Front for the Russians made a significant difference everytime.
This was the first point I had previously downplayed in my mind - the sheer importance of these convoys to the overall effect on the Eastern Front and the war holestically.

Secondly I heard over the weekend the respective radar performances of the Duke of York and Scharnhorst by late 1943 and was rather surprised at the disparity.

It was stated that Duke of York's in 1943 could range upto a maximum of 70km or in old money thats about 43.5miles which is just under 39 nautical miles.
Compare this to Scharnhorst's which could only range to a maximum of 18km! 11.1 miles or about 9.6 nautical miles.
I never before had realised this enormous difference in performance which in the rough weather and dim light of the artic became even more of a tactical advantage.
Though I did realise beforehand that Belfast and Norfolk did pick up Scharnhorst on their radar sets and fired starshell at her before he had spotted them.
Of course those that are familar with the battle also know that Scharnhorst's radar set atop her bridge was disabled early on in the battle by the cruisers and she only had her much lower aft set operational.

Overall then this technical inferiority meant that when Scharnhorst did sortie she was blind in comparison of the Allied warships and it was doubtful if she could ever have survived the trap that awaited her.
Thoughts gentlemen please!

[Guest]

It was stated that the transport capacity of just one Artic convoy, of say 20 ships, amounted to approximately 260 bombers and around 4,000 tanks.

I think it is an unlikely thing in reality. 4000 tanks distributed to 20 ships would mean 200 tanks per ship, or 6000 tons' worth of just tanks. Given the average size of the ship, that means a convoy fully loaded with nothing but tanks. In most cases, I believe convoys carried large variety of wargoods.

In anycase, the total number of Western tanks ever delivered to Soviet Union during the entire war, If I recall, was on the order of 10,000 tanks of rather inferior quality compared to T-34. The loading figure suggested would mean the entire allied tank delivery to USSR is accommodated on just 3 convoys. How much difference these rather weak tanks would have made in the epic tank battles of 1943 and 1944 is easy to exaggerates.

[Laurence Batchelor]

Sorry typo read 400 tanks per convoy. It did not state the number of field guns, anti-tank guns AA guns but that figure would be considerable also one assumes.

Not being an authority on armour during ww2 perhaps I'm wrong, but I believe a Sherman in the right hands could still hold its own on the battlefield.
Would it still not be very useful in infantry support and urban fighting, even if it was inferior to a T-34 on the open plains of Russia & Poland?

360 bombers would surely have a large outcome on the campaign if this was being delivered every 4-6weeks no? this fact you ignore.

Also what about the gunenry radar disparity, again your silent.
It was an enormous reversal of fortunes when one considers Germany had the first working gunnery set at sea on Graf Spee in 1939.
4 years later the Royal Navy (with Ameircan help) now has a set massively superior.
Was German technical progression on radar development retarded massively more than I had thought due to blockade of key materials? or was it the 'Wonder Weapons' programs just consumed all her scientific efforts?

[chuck]

360 bombers would surely have a large outcome on the campaign if this was being delivered every 4-6weeks no? this fact you ignore.

I do not know the overall effect of the red airforce. Certainly they were able to wrestle a good measure of air superiority from the Germans by middle of 1943, and their IL-2 tank killing aircraft made a major impact on the tactical tank battles. But I don't know if the role of normal bombers was a major one, so I can't say anything about whether 360 bombers made a major difference.

The discrepency in radar performance is striking. But I am not certain if it was decisive. I believe the Germans have come to be so fearful of out right engagement and so reliant upon opportunistic poaching that it had become an standing principle to rely upon detection of enemy radar rather than attempt detection with one's own radars in the opening stages of combat. So the range of Scharnhorst's own active radar is irrelevent to the initial staging of the battle. So long as British radar emissions can be detected by the Germans at a longer range than the return echos can be sorted out by the British, the German have all the information they their doctrines entitles them to.

During later phases of the battle, I believe Scharnhorst's radars were inoperative anyway, so again their inadaquate performance made no difference.

[Laurence Batchelor]

so I can't say anything about whether 360 bombers made a major difference.

Remember though these convoys are virtually one a month, so thats 360 bombers every 4-6 weeks becoming operational.
Surely in 1943 before Soviet peak production that must be significant?

The discrepency in radar performance is striking. But I am not certain if it was decisive.

I wasn't getting at it was the decisive factor in the battle.
But rather I was trying to highlight Scharnhorst's terrible plight as soon as she began heading North in terms of how blind she was.
I've also read that when her radar on her bridge top was knocked out early on in the engagement by the cruisers it wasn't switched on anyway.
Suggesting what you say the Germans were too fearful for it to be electronically detected, and wished for total surprise.
Little did they know the surprise Burnett & Fraser had already instore for them from Ultra!

So the range of Scharnhorst's own active radar is irrelevent to the initial staging of the battle.

Well yes she had it switched off, but it is very relevant in a gunnery duel were poor light, heavy seas and rain squals are all ongoing issues to hamper your gunnery.
If it wasn't knocked out early on with her engagement with the cruisers, she would have undoubtively had it on and used it.
It was her only eyes in those conditions, apart from weak intelliegence she received from her high command.

So long as British radar emissions can be detected by the Germans at a longer range than the return echos can be sorted out by the British, the German have all the information they their doctrines entitles them to.

I was not aware the Germans could track British radar emissions?, please fill me in!
Norfolk, Sheffield & Belfast were all pinging away on their sets and yet Scharnhorst had no idea they were there until they fired star shells over her to illuminate her.
That doesn't fit with what your saying.

[Michael Riddell]

I was not aware the Germans could track British radar emissions?, please fill me in!
Norfolk, Sheffield & Belfast were all pinging away on their sets and yet Scharnhorst had no idea they were there until they fired star shells over her to illuminate her.
That doesn't fit with what your saying.

Hi Laurence,

The Germans made major use of radar detectors on their U-Boat arm - Such as the Metox and Naxos sets fitted from late 42 onwards:

http://uboat.net/technical/detectors.htm

I'd never really heard of them fitting such equipment to their surface units, until now.

Mike.

[MartinJQuinn]

It always surprised me that for all their technological advancements, the Germans were so far behind on radar.

Not only was the Scharnhorst at a disadvantage with a weaker radar set, but IIRC, she also needed work on her engines, which was delayed so she could deploy to Norway. On top of that, the British knew that she was out of her lair and were expecting her. She was, for all intents, doomed the minute she slipped her moorings...

With the importance of stopping the Russian convoys, it made no strategic sense that the Germans never finished Seydlitz as a cruiser or the rebuilding of Gneisenau. Even if those two ships skulked about the Norwegian coast, they would have tied down British assets that could have been used elsewhere, and perhaps deflected some attention away from Tirpitz.

[Guest]

Germans have used radar detection at least since Bismark. Remember the big radar detection gaff that doomed Bismark? The Bismark's radar detector crew failed to grasp that radar emissions can be detected at much greater range from the target end than return echoes can be sorted out at the source end. So they believed the Bismark was under surveillance as long as Bismark's radar detectors were still picking up British emissions. In fact Bismark has moved well outside of the actual detection range of British radars and the British has lost the Bismark. Thus Bismark glibly sent a long radio message to Berlin outlining ship status and victory over Hood, enabling the British direction finders to once more determine her location. This ultimately led to the destruction of Bismark.

[Laurence Batchelor]

I was aware of the Metox and Naxos sets on U-boats but never their use on DKM capital ships.

Can anyone point me to a decent technical article on this specific DKM radar detection equipment used on their capital ships please?

Guest your point doesn't make sense to me.
If Bismarck's crew still thought she was being picked up on British radar [when infact she wasn't] they would have never sent the long mesage back to Germany?
I'm not following your logic?

[Werner]

The Japanese had high quality copies of these ESM sets at sea in the Solomons by mid 1943.

[Lesforan]

This topic, in the context of the disaster that occurred to convoy PQ17,
has been extensively hashed over in the Bismarck-Class Forum. I would recommend anyone wishing in-depth analysis of this subject to have a look over there.

This particular issue centers around the controversy of whether or not PQ17 was set up to fail, to provide an excuse for cancelling the operation.

The Russians did absolutely nothing, as far as I know, to provide air cover or anything else to aid the convoys. Stalin was content to let the Allies run all the risks.

A major problem with the convoys was, in the case of PQ17, they were continued during the Arctic summer. In other words, during the time of year that experienced 24-hr. daylight above the Arctic Circle. The convoy route was beyond the reach of British air cover, but well within the striking range of German long-range bombers.

Apparently, while Stalin was considered an ally by the West, he considered the West to be at least a latent enemy, and every western life that was risked was one less he would have to divert from his own forces.

[Michael Riddell]

"Laurence Batchelor"
I was aware of the Metox and Naxos sets on U-boats but never their use on DKM capital ships.

Can anyone point me to a decent technical article on this specific DKM radar detection equipment used on their capital ships please?

Hi Laurence, me again!

Ever had one of those moments when you think you find something new, only to find you already have a reference!?

The following is taken from "Heavy Cruisers of the Admiral Hipper class" by Gerhard Koop and Klaus-Peter Schmolke, as fitted to Prinz Eugen:

Radar Observation Devices - (should be detectors? Vagaries of translation?)

Foretop Rail:

FuMB 1

Wavelength 60-260cm, and 180-500cm; frequency 113-560Mhz and 60-160Mhz

FuMB 4 Sumatra antenna with oblique dipoles at 9, 90, 180 and 270 degrees (Metox)

Foretop Rail (Group Signals Center):

FuMB 10 "Borkum"

Wavelength 75-300cm; frequency 100-400Mhz

Receiving and sector D/F installation with five aerials, FuMB 3 "Bali I" or FuMB 4 "Sumatra" with FuMZ 6 amplifier, Sept 42 - mid-44.

I've only typed what would be relevent to the Scharnhorst, as the other equipment was fitted to the Eugen in mid-44.

Regretably the book only gives an assesment of the Radar systems, not the detectors.

Mike.

[Laurence Batchelor]

Hi Michael,

Thanks for taking the time to write that out.
I have the book along with the others of the series.

I'm hoping someone, somewhere has wrote a technical article, actually detailing their performance under operational conditions.
One assumes such an article could have be in Conway's warship or Warship International to name but 2 publications where such material is normally punlished.

Infact what is the bible on German electronics and radar?
I only have the RN bible by Howse & Freidman's general radar book.
Is there a German one in english?

[chuck]

Guest your point doesn't make sense to me.
If Bismarck's crew still thought she was being picked up on British radar [when infact she wasn't] they would have never sent the long mesage back to Germany?
I'm not following your logic?

If Bismark had known she was no longer registering on British radar then she would not have sent the transmission to betray her location.

The problem is Bismark's radar detectors can detect British radar pulses from considerably further away than British radars could detect the return echoes from Bismark. So the fact that Bismark's radar detectors are still registering British radar pulses does not mean Bismark herself continues to register on British radar. Crucially Bismark's radar detector operators missed this point. Consequently, as long as they are picking up British radar signals, they informed Leutjens that the British pursuers on still on Bismark's tail. Germans did not know the British could read their code, and thought the only danger of transmission lies in betraying the location of the transmitter, which would be irrelevant since the British must already know where they are. So the Germans felt free to transmit.

In fact Bismark had outdistanced her shadowers, and British radar were no longer registering Bismark. The British no longer know where Bismark was and which way she was headed. They were pinging away futilely in the wrong region trying to relocate the Bismark.

When Bismark transmitted her 15 minute long victory report to Berlin, she alert the radio direction finder on every British warship in the vicinity and gave them copious time to pin point Bismark's exact location. The British immediately put themselves back on Bismark's track again.

Another interesting point - The very message that Bismark so ill-advisedly send contained a long and inaccurate complaint about the supposedly extraordinary range of British radar - which is a missimpression gained from the above mentioned confusion between radar acquisition range and radar signal detection range. The German naval high command believed this exaggerated claims of British naval radar performance, and put further unwarranted caution notices and restrictions on German naval operations. This had a material influence on German naval operational decisions after the Bismark.

[Laurence Batchelor]

Oh I see what you mean they were happy to send if they thought they were still located.

[Seasick]

Supplies to the Soviet Army:

The leading supply route to Soviet forces at Stalingrad was Via Iran. The Allies sent material down around the horn of Africa to the Gulf, to Iran, over the Cacusus, to the front.

Most material came via Iran, Next Liberty ships sailed to Alaska transfered to the Soviet Navy sailed to Vladevostok unloaded, sail back to Alaska become American ships again go back to Seattle or Oakland and do it again.

The Murmansk and Archangle convoys supplied material for the northern front, AND priority cargo that had to go quickly.

[phil gollin]

I was not aware the Germans could track British radar emissions?, please fill me in!
Norfolk, Sheffield & Belfast were all pinging away on their sets and yet Scharnhorst had no idea they were there until they fired star shells over her to illuminate her.
That doesn't fit with what your saying.

Hi Laurence,

The Germans made major use of radar detectors on their U-Boat arm - Such as the Metox and Naxos sets fitted from late 42 onwards:

http://uboat.net/technical/detectors.htm

I'd never really heard of them fitting such equipment to their surface units, until now.

Mike.

This is one of those arguments that go round and round on the German warship boards.

two main points:-

1: The German receivers (except towards the very end of the war) were only useful against metric radar rather than centrimetric radar)

2: There are claims (unsubstantiated but heavily backed) that Bismarck had a specialist team on board which could pick up radar signals.

(Of course in the realm of radio/radar intercept and radio [elctronic] warfare theBritish also had a major lead at sea)

[phil gollin]

This topic, in the context of the disaster that occurred to convoy PQ17,
has been extensively hashed over in the Bismarck-Class Forum. I would recommend anyone wishing in-depth analysis of this subject to have a look over there.

This particular issue centers around the controversy of whether or not PQ17 was set up to fail, to provide an excuse for cancelling the operation.

The Russians did absolutely nothing, as far as I know, to provide air cover or anything else to aid the convoys. Stalin was content to let the Allies run all the risks.

A major problem with the convoys was, in the case of PQ17, they were continued during the Arctic summer. In other words, during the time of year that experienced 24-hr. daylight above the Arctic Circle. The convoy route was beyond the reach of British air cover, but well within the striking range of German long-range bombers.

Apparently, while Stalin was considered an ally by the West, he considered the West to be at least a latent enemy, and every western life that was risked was one less he would have to divert from his own forces.

That board's comments are mostly a load of conspiracy clap-trap.

[phil gollin]

The Battle of the Barents Sea was probably more influential, both to demonstrate RN radar superiority and also effects on the German navy.

The Scharnhorst actually recovered from her surprise reasonably well - and started to get quite close by ranging on the DoY's gun flashes.

Re. the convoys - the main problem was, as has been noted above, was the long daylight hours in summer which meant that later convoys were restricted to the darker months (and had "fighting destroyer" escorts)

[Lesforan]

Phil,

I would not characterize the discussion as "conspiracy clap-trap". The fact of the matter is that there are enough unusual circumstances surrounding the loss of PQ17 that competing theories to explain its failure have arisen. Obviously, not all the explanations can be correct.

As an active participant in the forum referred to, I would invite anyone to read what has been posted and make up their own mind. The other issue brought up here, the reasoning behind Bismarck's long signal, has also been throughly discussed on that site.

Personally, I feel it was a mistake to risk any Allied lives to help Stalin. No exceptions.