The Italian Navy in WWII, what went wrong?

[bengtsson]

One more point:

I find it rather remarkable that the RN-philes are advocating the position that all the RN accomplished in the Med was defeating a bunch of incompetent nincompoops and the Yank in the crowd is the one saying they did much more than that!!

As infamous Canadian thespian William Shatner so succinctly put it, "Sometimes irony can be pretty ironic!!"

No, you are trying to deflect the criticisms of your rather simplistic interpretation of the revisionists' arguments.

The revisionists, in general, try to demonstrate that performance at the lower levels of the Italian navy were of a high standard and have been ignored or denegrated due to factors outside of their control. In general this has been reasonably well received.

However, the revisionists have also tried to find reasons for the general poor results (arguable wording - but it is not meant to be derogatory). They emphasise such things as lack of fuel, lack of organic air, political interference, RN advantages in intelligence and radar, etc..... However, they tend to ignore the actual opportunities and performance of the Italian navy.

By ignoring the opportunities they put themselves most against the "traditional" Mediterranean historians. People generally looked at the means available to the Italians and the opportunities that were presented to them (mainly the Malta Convoys and the possibility of invading Malta, but also supporting North African operations). The general, and of course mainly British view, looked at these opportunities and were both relieved at not having to deal with them and, by extension, critical of the Italians for not having taken advantage of the very attractive opportunities).

One can have a sensible debate between the "why weren't the Italians more aggressive" and the "the Italian navy was hindered by larger concerns" but one cannot ignore one side totally and the revisionists often just think waving the magic wand of "oil shortage" or whatever absolves the Italian navy and high command of any requirement to have actually done something. It is the "over-egging" of the argument that tends to ruin the "revisionists" case.

In particular I find the maritime logistics argument supremely weak. It tends to revolve around a total ignoring of the requirements of the time and a mysterious ability to think that the Italian navy could exist and operate in a vacuum and had no necessity to actually do anything to win the war. Why does the Italian navy get a "bye" in terms of having to think strategically and to do something.

I would agree with this response 100%.

Bob B.

[1Big Rich]

Phil,

You disagree about one of your (and the revisionists major claims) but don't give any evidence or reason.

That's a nice rhetorical trick, but it's not going to play here. Your own quote is that the supplies that got through were insufficient, which is your OPINION. It's you who've posted no facts to support your opinion that more supplies were available. Can you provide a list from an authoritative source on litres of petrol, bullets, shells, beans and men left in Italy that allocated to the North Africa campaign and were never loaded on a ship? Before El Alamein, of course.

They did not have proper ASW tactics

I'm sure the Upholder crew and those of the other dozen U-class lost in the Med will agree with you. Oh, wait... nevermind....

The Italians had insufficient merchant and escort ships

So they SHOULD have instituted coastal convoys but had insufficient merchant ships? You really need to make up your mind on this one, you're contradicting yourself.

and did not instigate major building programmes to rectify the situation (unlike the Allies).

And even at war the Italian economy was pathetic (unlike the Allies) thanks to the Fascist handling for a couple decades.

Who else's fault was it ? The navy was responsible for naval affairs. To sit back and say to the army - it's your army you look after it is just plain silly.

My point, if you'll re-read my post, was how do you know that RM didn't suggest such a distribution system and was overruled or blocked from doing so by the Army? Given the inter-service rivalries in Il Duce's Italy, I wouldn't put it beyond the realm of possibility, which you so obviously have. When I asked what you were privy to, I was hoping you would divulge the information that lead you to that conclusion.

The High Command had no real idea about maritime logistics

The same could be said of Italy's Axis partners.

People generally looked at the means available to the Italians and the opportunities that were presented to them (mainly the Malta Convoys and the possibility of invading Malta, but also supporting North African operations). The general, and of course mainly British view, looked at these opportunities and were both relieved at not having to deal with them and, by extension, critical of the Italians for not having taken advantage of the very attractive opportunities).

One can have a sensible debate between the "why weren't the Italians more aggressive" and the "the Italian navy was hindered by larger concerns" but one cannot ignore one side totally and the revisionists often just think waving the magic wand of "oil shortage" or whatever absolves the Italian navy and high command of any requirement to have actually done something. It is the "over-egging" of the argument that tends to ruin the "revisionists" case.

At what point did I mention "oil shortage" in any of my posts here? Did I not state, and call it my opinion if you like, that Italian heavy units had to be husbanded? Could the RM have accomplished more? Certainly, Operation Hats, an excellent example. But I understand why they did not, even when they were in action with their opposites.

The fact, and it is a fact, is that Italy could not win a war of attrition with the largest navy in the world, and both the Admiralty and Supermarina knew it, even if Il Duce did not. With the US in the war on December 11th, 1941, Italy had all the more incentive to hold onto her capital ships for postwar bargaining. How can you possibly interpret that as 'seeking to absolve' anyone?

Why does the Italian navy get a "bye" in terms of having to think strategically and to do something.

They were thinking strategically about not squandering their ships in Pyhrric victories that weren't going to alter the outcome of the war.

You know Phil, with all your arguments, I have to wonder why those old fools in the Admiralty should ever have even considered sending supplies to Montgomery and Cunningham around the Cape, they should have just sent them straight across the Mediterranean without fear of the incompetent ninnies in Italy! Or why they needed so many ships to escort the Halberd or Pedestal convoys. Perhaps the men on the spot knew a little more than you give them credit for.

And yet you call me a revisionist... What did Shatner say about irony again?

No, you are trying to deflect the criticisms of your rather simplistic interpretation of the revisionists' arguments.

No, Phil, I think you're trying to deflect from the fact you have trouble digesting that I'm as opinionated as you are and we don't agree. My point is that you and the other RN-philes cling to the rather simplistic view of the RN beating up a bunch of incompetent nincompoops than fighting the hard war in the Med they actually did. And I absolutely cannot fathom why you and others so passionately seek to diminish the sacrifice of those men like Wanklyn, VC, et al.

I anxiously await your fair and even-handed analysis of King's actions in Naiad, 22 May, 1941.

[1Big Rich]

Certainly Jutland was 1916 and the battles in the Medit. were 1940-43. So some time did go by between the wars. The Italian's chose to not prepare for any night action between the wars when other nations did.

Bob, NOTHING between 1919 and 1939 succinctly indicated there was going to be a real need for night fighting. The RN turned to it out of financial desperation, the Japanese out of strategic desperation.

. Germany in WWI, the Japanese in WWII as examples.

Careful. The light forces of the IJN practiced night fighting. The battleline and the Kido Butai did not. The largest ships that did were the Kongos, because they were tasked to help the light forces that were going to attrit the American battleline with torpedoes penetrate the American screen.

No one could be sure that aircraft would force alot of the surface actions at sea in WWII into night time actions.

Very true. For a peacetime and Depression period, the '30s were an era of remarkable developments in aviation.

All my question asked was "What ,if anything, went wrong with the Italian Navy's surface warship effort in WWII". Their performance was less than might be expected given the number of ships, their speed and strategic position vs the RN.

Bob, if you've read War in the Mediterranean by G & M, you already know the answer. For all their faults, they make it very clear Italy had no business going to war. If that "Fine Italian gentleman" (as Franklin Roosevelt called him, before the war) had any wits, he would have stayed out. Unfortunately, he didn't, dictatorships tend not to have naysayers, and the Italian people paid the price.

Even without hindsight, I think they themsleves knew it could have and should have been better at the time

In my opinion their biggest hurdle was a lack of indigenous airpower first, and an insufficient relationship with the RA second. RM admirals and captains frequently railed about insufficient recon and aircover. But in a fascist dictatorship, with an air force dominated by fascists, what could they do about it?

Regards,

[phil gollin]

My answers in red (I hope)

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Phil,

That's a nice rhetorical trick, but it's not going to play here. Your own quote is that the supplies that got through were insufficient, which is your OPINION. It's you who've posted no facts to support your opinion that more supplies were available. Can you provide a list from an authoritative source on litres of petrol, bullets, shells, beans and men left in Italy that allocated to the North Africa campaign and were never loaded on a ship? Before El Alamein, of course.


What is rhetorical about it ? The truth is that you claimed that the getting through of 89/91% supplies was a success when in fact the supplies sent were insufficient. It is not just my opinion it is the general view that the Axix effort in North Africa was severely hampered both by the general level of supplies and their inefficient distribution to the front line. The "rhetorical device" here is your trying to ask for infinite details - the pot calling the kettle black indeed !

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I'm sure the Upholder crew and those of the other dozen U-class lost in the Med will agree with you. Oh, wait... nevermind....

And that has some sort of relevence ? The problem the Italians had was an inability to protect their convoys (which were too small anyway). The Italians didn't "defeat" the Malta based subs by ASW tactics, they only succeeded in getting their supplies cutailed for certain periods.

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So they SHOULD have instituted coastal convoys but had insufficient merchant ships? You really need to make up your mind on this one, you're contradicting yourself.

??? No. The whole point was that the Italians didn't build new ships (merchants and escorts) and didn't use their coastal shipping in North QAfrica. That is why I criticise the Italian Navy. They failed. One doesn't criticise the Western Allies for losing their logistics war because they built new escorts and merchant ships to the detriment of other programmes. Ignoring the requirements of the naval logistics war is something due criticism.

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And even at war the Italian economy was pathetic (unlike the Allies) thanks to the Fascist handling for a couple decades.

See above. But they continued to build heavy naval ships and didn't utilise their coastal shippin in North Africa. Just sitting on their hands is NOT a naval strategy.

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My point, if you'll re-read my post, was how do you know that RM didn't suggest such a distribution system and was overruled or blocked from doing so by the Army? Given the inter-service rivalries in Il Duce's Italy, I wouldn't put it beyond the realm of possibility, which you so obviously have. When I asked what you were privy to, I was hoping you would divulge the information that lead you to that conclusion.

It is NOT the army's role to cover naval affairs. It is for the navy to support the war. The navy was responsible for the supplies getting to North Africa. You seem to think that the navy can sit-back and think others have the responsibility - why ?

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The same could be said of Italy's Axis partners.


Fine. Doesn't take away the Italian Navy's responsibility. Spread the responsibility around - but you can't take away the fact that the Italian navy didn't understand their role and didn't succeed.

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At what point did I mention "oil shortage" in any of my posts here? Did I not state, and call it my opinion if you like, that Italian heavy units had to be husbanded? Could the RM have accomplished more? Certainly, Operation Hats, an excellent example. But I understand why they did not, even when they were in action with their opposites.

The fact, and it is a fact, is that Italy could not win a war of attrition with the largest navy in the world, and both the Admiralty and Supermarina knew it, even if Il Duce did not. With the US in the war on December 11th, 1941, Italy had all the more incentive to hold onto her capital ships for postwar bargaining. How can you possibly interpret that as 'seeking to absolve' anyone?

Who said it had to be a war of attrition ? There were plenty of opportunities for both small and large objectives which were totally within the grasp of the Italian armed forces, apart from their duties in support of the army. The general mediterranean historians have looked at the Italian opportunities and wondered why they didn't take them. The idea that the Italians should "hold onto her capital ships" rather than actually fight the war is a joke. If your attitude to war is that we won't bother fighting it then it is condemning oneself to lose.

It is hardly surprising that the ordinary hisorian finds it easy to criticise the Italian command if they had the attitude you claim.

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They were thinking strategically about not squandering their ships in Pyhrric victories that weren't going to alter the outcome of the war.

You know Phil, with all your arguments, I have to wonder why those old fools in the Admiralty should ever have even considered sending supplies to Montgomery and Cunningham around the Cape, they should have just sent them straight across the Mediterranean without fear of the incompetent ninnies in Italy! Or why they needed so many ships to escort the Halberd or Pedestal convoys. Perhaps the men on the spot knew a little more than you give them credit for.

And yet you call me a revisionist... What did Shatner say about irony again?

Strategic thinking is about winning the war (if possible) - not about thinking about peace instead of winning the war you are in. If one isn't willing to use the opportunities that are presented to you on a plate then you don't deserve to win. You seem to want to look both ways. You realise that the Royal Navy had a huge problem keeping Malta supplied and controlling areas of the Med - but they also realised how much more the Italians could have done. You however look at the Italians and somehow think that they were correct to not take those opportunities. You, like many people now seem to want to allow the Italians the ability to throw away opportunities because the war wasn't that important. That is a weird way of looking at the role of a navy and ignores all those troops fighting in North Africa. Allowing the Italians to pick and choose instead of actually concentrating on trying to win the war means they are not competent to run the navy.

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No, Phil, I think you're trying to deflect from the fact you have trouble digesting that I'm as opinionated as you are and we don't agree. My point is that you and the other RN-philes cling to the rather simplistic view of the RN beating up a bunch of incompetent nincompoops than fighting the hard war in the Med they actually did. And I absolutely cannot fathom why you and others so passionately seek to diminish the sacrifice of those men like Wanklyn, VC, et al.

I anxiously await your fair and even-handed analysis of King's actions in Naiad, 22 May, 1941.

Where have I said such things ? The normal view (to which I generally adhere with regards to at the higher levels of the Italian navy) is that they had numerous opportunities to actually have a large maybe even
decisive effect on the mediterranean war and ignored or fluffed them. That is neither pro-RN, nor simplistic. It merely looks at what resources the Italian Navy had and the opportunities they had. If they want to stay in port and not take those opportunities or do not understand and organise for a logistics war then they are ripe for criticism. Why do you think that the Italian naval high command have a right to throw the war away without criticism ?

You somehow think that bringing up individual RN actions somehow has a bearing on the criticism of the Italian Naval high command - why ? Why do you think that the high command somehow doesn't have to think strategically and take the opportunities that are there ?

[phil gollin]

Bob, NOTHING between 1919 and 1939 succinctly indicated there was going to be a real need for night fighting. The RN turned to it out of financial desperation, the Japanese out of strategic desperation. ..........................

Absolute rubbish.

The RN had decided that night fighting was an intgral part of the fleet's function. It's actual fighting instructions were built around the necessity to fight the enemy as soon as they were encountered day or night. At the higher latitudes where the RN regulary operated "night" could well last 16+ hours in winter.

Post WW1 ship designs included provisions for night fighting. One of the major functions of destroyers was to carry a large searchlight. The requirement for zero-degree firing of battleship guns was due to the requirements of night/foul-weather encounters. Even the requirement for open bridges was partly set by better visability at night.

Night-fighting was part of RN thinking as they believed in their training being better and that aggressive behaviour was the way to win - it was not just an economy measure !

[ar]

Dear Mr Rich,
I believe that the biggest problem that the Italians had from mid 1940 to the end of 1942 was one Admiral Cunningham. He wouldn't go away. Every time they left the house, this terrier would rush up and start biting them in the ankles. and it never seemed to be on a lead. It must have driven them crazy.
Admiral King; as I understand it, received, "ye order of ye boote", and quickly.
Coastal Convoys; had that been instituted, then Cunningham would have gotten down on his knees and said, "Thank you God for this wonderful gift".
Keep writing Mr Rich. All good fun.

[Laurence Batchelor]

Why would the RM have to blockade Malta? Not only does it give the RN's excellent submarines easy prey, it provides serves a small/medium navy up on a platter to the largest navy in the world.
With respect to Malta the RM had to do was interdict supply to Malta. This they did, well enough to force the RN's maximum efforts to resupply such as

The Key to Mare Nostrum was Malta either capture it or neutralise it.
Simply a half hearted attempt to stopping supplies getting through to it and bombing the heck out of Valletta won't do!
By stopping Malta you deny the RN the central Med and can happily supply your North African campaign.
Further you can increase your chain of bases from Sardinia to Sicily to Malta to Tripoli.
By stopping Malta you can force the RN to have to supply Egypt and its Eastern Empire by the Cape only.
One also wonders why the Germans put so much effort into capturing Crete from the air when Malta geographically was easier to capture (I've visted both islands) and of course Malta is of greater strategic value.
Oh well a mistake from the German high command that time.

RM submarines were large, had good range and were well armed. Their fatal flaw was they were notoriously slow-diving boats. and Avorio off Bougie, and Perla and Galilei were captured.....
What the RM really had to do was survive. But I've made that point.

This show a total ineptness from their naval design bureau.
What was needed in the shallow clear waters of the Mediterranean was small, short-range boats with good dive times.
Exactly the type of submarines the RN designed, built and sent when it could to the Med.
(Admitively their dive times were not as good as U-boats, but pretty good nonetheless.)

What was preventing the Italians to see what the British could pre-war?
They wanted 'Mare Nostrum' why did they not do a comprehensive tactical and technical evaluation of the types of submarines they would need to do the job?
Again the lack of leadership, preparation, forward-thinking and planning shine through.

I've read that as well, plus the near mutiny aboard Cesare during the sail to internship. I'd think any lower deck would at least have the thought of scuttle cross their minds as opposed to surrendering their ship.
Still, that's has nothing to do with going into combat, and I can't blame men leaving their homes an families in a country where a ground war is going on from getting drunk as they go off to relative safety.

Crew morale and discipline has everything to do with going into combat. Fatigue, moral and discipline can be the difference to winning or loosing a naval battle.
One begins to wonder since the fall of the Roman Empire have the Italians ever been good at fighting wars against a major power?

Better battleships? Are you serious? Twenty guns firing 1,157 lb shells against three ships with 24 rifles firing 1,938 lb shells? Warpite alone had a greater broadside than either Italian battleship by nearly 50%.

Where do you get the idea of 20 x 15-inch guns for the British?
Only Warspite's 8 were in range and in action! the other 16 did not join the engagement apart from Malaya only firing a few rounds out-of-range to try and put the Italians off.
Royal Sovereign especially was a long way off joining the engagement.
So in reality BOTH did NOT join the battle.
Warpite was on her own against 2 modernised and faster battleships Giulio Cesare and Conte di Cavour and had to split her fire accordingly.
The Italians chose to only fire with the former due to rangefinding issues, this choice was theirs, but the numerical superiority and advantage lay with them.

Comparing broadsides:
As I stated earlier Warspite split her fire probably in an attempt to buy her some time until Malaya an RS could get up in support.
Thus your figures are folly.
Conte di Cavour had 7752lb of shells coming her way from Warspite and the same figure for Giulio Cesare.
Giulio Cesare was flinging a broadside of 11,570lb at Warspite.
That makes the Italian advantage at 3,818lb per broadside.
Yet again the advantage is with them.
Finally the Italian ships could make 28knts whereas Warspite after modernisation could only make 22-23knts at a push.

Excellent point. So Cunningham is justified in not continuing pursuit due to enemy dominance in a given category, but the Campioni's withdrawal after damage to his ship is not? Seems a double standard...

Admiral Cunningham would not have tucked tail and withdrawn from the minor damage Admiral Campioni sustained on Cesare.
The very fact Campioni did shows how much the RM feared the RN despite often having superior equipment and the tactical advantage.
I ask you what risks where there to the Italian's for continuing the battle?Look at Cunningham's actions earlier in the battle when he went ahead in Warspite on his own with his cruisers.
Would an Italian Admiral make such a bold move and leave his other 2 capital ships catching up in the rear? I don't think so.

One Admiral clearly was able to have the courage of his convictions to take tactical risks to achieve his aims - the other dithered.
One admiral was also backed by ULTRA intercepts, something again the Italian military machine failed to consider to develop.

Further, both Admiral's had achieved their primary objectives (to get their respective convoys through). The fact the Italians withdrew first allowed the British to gain the moral high ground which would come back to haunt the RM throughout the rest of the naval campaign.
After the River Plate affair the Italian's should have been wise to the British propaganda machine and not given battle unless they thought they could sink something important.

I repeat Britain never WANTED war (Chamberlin and Peace in our time etc) and was largely forced into declaring war against Germany.
Italy and Japan again made the opening gambit's and declared war against her first.
If Italy chooses to fight Britian in the school yard, she had better make sure he has a heavy-weight champion.
The fact her military forces were found wanting and resembled a medium-weight in so many areas is unforgiveable, especially for the many brave Italians who were asked to give up their lives.

Actually, Veneto was under way within a few minutes of loosing power. But she made it home. Would that Prince of Wales, which could still do 10 knots after her A-bracket hit, could say as much.

From what I remember having read she was dead in the water for 1.5 hours not a few minutes.
Comparing PoW's sinking is unrealistic her pumping arrnagements were inadaquate which is what mainly led to her demise and being hit again and again.
Also that first torpedo hit took out half of 5.25-inch batteries power, the list made others could not be brought to bear and also her steering was damaged.
Veneto's crew did not have to deal with such severe damage control.
I suggest after the PoW board of enquiry and the additions and changes made to KGV, DoY, Howe and Anson it would be unlikely the same catalogue of errorsa nd change of events would happen again.

Finally an important point you seemed to have missed is the Japanese were firing 24-inch 1,200lb warhead torpedoes at PoW whereas the British hit Veneto with an 18-inch 700-800lb warhead.
Thus the Japanese's warhead was much larger and should cause more damage.

The RN was still the largest navy in the world. The difference is if the RN looses six capital ships it is hurt, but England is still not in peril. If the RM looses six capital ships Italy is out of the war.

Thats a little over simplistic it depends on the ships and where they are based.
If the RN losses all her fleet carriers anywhere she is severly handicapped for any agreesive movements at sea.
She would find it almost impossible to get through convoys to Malta for instance.
If she lost 6 battleships well her fleet is so dispersed the very fact is highly unlikely the same goes for carriers.
If that was in home waters it would be a nightmare to defend the Atlantic convoys from large surface raiders with cruisers only at her disposal.
We have already seen what losing PoW & Repulse in the Far Eastern meant, Britain was left overwhelmed and naked at sea until the mid-war period in that threatre of operations.
If the RM lost all 6 of is capital ships it can still put its eggs into the submarine war basket.
Oh whoops we discussed that earlier she's already failed to give herself a good chance with that fall back option.

Further, her Veneto class can outrange and one on one out gun any British battleship in the Med apart from a Nelson.
What has she got to fear?
I state again she was given the tools to do the job to fight and win surface enegagements including some very fine cruisers.
Why was she afraid to grasp the opportunity by both hands?

Your point certainly applies to the Fascist leadership, but how is any of this a fault of or in the Regia Marina?

Because the RM is their to serve its facist government and of course its people both civilian and in the service itself.
It surely has wind for years what the governments intentions are in North Africa and the Med.
The fact it did not plan for these eventualities accordingly is the RM's fault, eeveryone is starved of funds in the inter-war period.
It's no excuse not to make the best of what you have got!

She had a full 11 months to prepare for war then!

You're contradicting yourself. Either Italy jumped in hastily or had time to prepare.

No I'm saying she had 11 months to prepare for her opening movements in the war.
She had years before that, when the Facists took power, to plan for what was needed to be done in order to give her a good chance of success in the perceived future conflict.
The fact she jumped in NOT adequately prepared at a time when she thought it suited her, further demonstrates how wholly unprofessional her politians, her ministers and her Navy were.
Compare how the DKM and RN adapted quickly in 1939/40 when they were not expecting war for anoher 3 years and the RM's folly becomes clearer.
Contigency plans were in place for those two nations.
Two obvious ones being to instigate convoys immediately and to start for both sides offensive minelaying in hostile waters.

Again, a double standard. It's acceptable for the RN to take extra measures or not accomplish what she could in peacetime when she finds herself in a war she's not prepared for, but it's not incompetence for the RM.

No again I disagree this WAS a war Italy was planning for whereas the RN was never intending to take on 3 opponents at once.
She was expecting to have to take on the French & Royal Navy in the Med.
The fact the Vichy French packed their bags and went for holidays left the Italians with an even more favourable opportunity than they had hoped for.
Only one potential enemy to contest North Africa and the Med over.
One which was heavily tied down with the Atlantic struggle and the Battle of Britain.
One who's industry and infrastructure which was taking a heavy pounding from the German aerial bombing etc.
The RM's incompetence was 2 fold:
1) To incorrectly plan for a naval war with the Royal Navy in the Med.
2) To incorrectly adjust technically, doctrinally and tactically as the naval war progressed, lessons became self-evident and apply those changes rapidly or at all.
You have already mentioned radar correctly, but what about ULTRA.
What about learning quickly enough that high-level aerial bombing was next to useless and dive-bombing and massed topedo attacks from several vectors were much better.

I don't think anyone would argue that Italy was an electronics leader. Giulielmo Marconi's company was, after all, in England.
Still, I wouldn't count the RM as backward given the later deployment. At Denmark Strait, Suffolk had radar and Norfolk did not.

By coincidence one of Marconi's main premises is about 10 miles from my house, but thats another matter.
I'm sorry I would count the RM that entered the war very backward:
1) A lack of a naval air arm and too much given over to high level bombing.
2) A lack of aircraft carriers - The French developed Bearn in 1927 what made the RM so reluctant?
I can understand their thinking about being always close enough for land based aircraft, but they were planning to face a navy partly based at Gib, Alex and Malta thats quite a vast distance and a mobile aircraft force would be a major tactical ace up their sleeve.
Apart from a small floatplane carrier why did they not at least make 1 small aircraft carrier inter-war to evaluate the possabilities?
3) Poor inter-service inter-operability something which would dog her and Japan for the entire war.
Further enough simply wasn't done quickly enough to rectifiy the problems when they became glarringly obvious.

Similarly, the newly rebuilt Renown didn't have radar for her action with Scharnhorst and Gneisenau off of Norway. Her lookouts sighted the Germans at 10 miles.

No not enough sets could be produced quickly enough and also the Royal Navy's warships were more active that any other warships from other fleets.
Finding time for major refits and A an A's was always a headache especially when from mid-1940 she was so stretched.

Cheers
LB

[Laurence Batchelor]

Dear Mr Rich,
I believe that the biggest problem that the Italians had from mid 1940 to the end of 1942 was one Admiral Cunningham. He wouldn't go away. Every time they left the house, this terrier would rush up and start biting them in the ankles. and it never seemed to be on a lead. It must have driven them crazy.
Admiral King; as I understand it, received, "ye order of ye boote", and quickly.
Coastal Convoys; had that been instituted, then Cunningham would have gotten down on his knees and said, "Thank you God for this wonderful gift".
Keep writing Mr Rich. All good fun.

Alan also don't forget Vian, who gets overshadowed by Cunningham which is understandable, who wouldn't!
In my opinion Sirte was possibly the finest defensive naval engagement at sea during the war.

Further it was amazing what good pilot/navigator training and a few Stringbags could achieve.

[Lesforan]

Laurence,

I agree with your point about Malta. If the Axis (Italian) effort had been focused on Malta, its fall would have effectively cut the Med in two. Malta could have been Italy's equivelent of Gibraltor. Make it strong enough, and the RN copuld have been bottled up in the Eastern Med Sea, access limited to the Suez Canal.

The Italians did attempt to produce carriers, to the point of developing aircraft to fly off them. A few more months lead time would have meant these carriers (liner conversions) going onto service. Conversely, if the ships could have been preserved from the Germans, they could have been quickly finished and used to augment the RN carrier force.

[Walt]

I would say, initially at least, Italy shared a common problem with the USN in the Pacific. An unexpected airstrike disabling their battleship force at anchor in home port.

Rather surprising that this event escaped mention in this thread.

True.. but what is surprising that attack seemed to "take the wind out of their sails" instead of giving the Italians a War Cry..like PH did to the USN.
Regardless of their impotence as a Navy I still think they had some great looking ships..and a very professional Submarine Service.

[Laurence Batchelor]

Laurence,

I agree with your point about Malta. If the Axis (Italian) effort had been focused on Malta, its fall would have effectively cut the Med in two. Malta could have been Italy's equivelent of Gibraltor. Make it strong enough, and the RN copuld have been bottled up in the Eastern Med Sea, access limited to the Suez Canal.

The Italians did attempt to produce carriers, to the point of developing aircraft to fly off them. A few more months lead time would have meant these carriers (liner conversions) going onto service. Conversely, if the ships could have been preserved from the Germans, they could have been quickly finished and used to augment the RN carrier force.

Hi Les,

I'm aware of the wartime liner conversions, but like Japan they were too little too late.
I was speaking more inter-war where Italy only commissioned a small seaplane tender Giuseppe Miraglia in the 1920s and did not order Aquila until 1941 - thus nearly a 20year gap!

[Guest]

The Aquila conversion is somewhat questionable. Apparently torpedo defense was to be provided by 2 side blisters filled with concrete.

[bengtsson]

Dear Mr Rich,
I believe that the biggest problem that the Italians had from mid 1940 to the end of 1942 was one Admiral Cunningham. He wouldn't go away. Every time they left the house, this terrier would rush up and start biting them in the ankles. and it never seemed to be on a lead. It must have driven them crazy.
Admiral King; as I understand it, received, "ye order of ye boote", and quickly.
Coastal Convoys; had that been instituted, then Cunningham would have gotten down on his knees and said, "Thank you God for this wonderful gift".
Keep writing Mr Rich. All good fun.

Alan also don't forget Vian, who gets overshadowed by Cunningham which is understandable, who wouldn't!
In my opinion Sirte was possibly the finest defensive naval engagement at sea during the war.

Further it was amazing what good pilot/navigator training and a few Stringbags could achieve.

Sirte more than any action showed up the difference between Royal Navy manned Surface warships and those of the Italians. If ever there was a chance to "Make hay while the sun shined" for the Italian Navy it was at 2nd Sirte. It's often overlooked that it was not just a BB attempting to get at a Malta convoy, the BB had a fine force of Cruisers along with her who should have carried the battle to the RN light crusiers and given the BB a green light to take the convoy out with gunfire. In other words the Italians made poor use of their cruisers who ship for ship should have been able to fight Vian. Italian DDs ,if serving their role, should have engaged the RN destroyer attacks at a safe distance from the BB, again freeing her up to use those big guns on the convoy. I don't mean to say that Italian success would have been a sure thing had they been more agressive, but I do mean they had a chance had they been.
Barents sea was a close second to Sirte for defence of convoy.

Bob B.

[Dick J]

The Italians did attempt to produce carriers, to the point of developing aircraft to fly off them. A few more months lead time would have meant these carriers (liner conversions) going onto service.

Not to hijack this thread, but I have always wondered why the Italians chose the liner to convert rather than the Impero, the incomplete Littorio class BB . As a BB, Impero was never completed, and would not have been even if Italy had continued their war for longer. Post war, had circumstances permitted further BB's, it would have been in Italy's interest to build to a new design incorporating war experience. Therefore, why preserve Impero incomplete? What a waste of resources. Converted to a CV, this hull would have already incorporated high speed and full torpedo protection. (Discounting arguments on the effectiveness of that torpedo defense systems from both sides of the issue.) The uptakes were centrally located, permitting easier diversion into a single island funnel. Conversion would have been only from the deck up, rather than having to rebuild the hull first, giving a fair amount of that lead time you talked about. Any thoughts?

[Guest]

It wouldn't be the first time Italy preserved an incomplete battleship hull though an entire war with the intention of finishing her after the war.

[Laurence Batchelor]

Sirte more than any action showed up the difference between Royal Navy manned Surface warships and those of the Italians. If ever there was a chance to "Make hay while the sun shined" for the Italian Navy it was at 2nd Sirte. It's often overlooked that it was not just a BB attempting to get at a Malta convoy, the BB had a fine force of Cruisers along with her who should have carried the battle to the RN light crusiers and given the BB a green light to take the convoy out with gunfire. In other words the Italians made poor use of their cruisers who ship for ship should have been able to fight Vian. Italian DDs ,if serving their role, should have engaged the RN destroyer attacks at a safe distance from the BB, again freeing her up to use those big guns on the convoy. I don't mean to say that Italian success would have been a sure thing had they been more agressive, but I do mean they had a chance had they been.
Barents sea was a close second to Sirte for defence of convoy.
Bob B.

I think also the wind was against the Italian's that day, both in a literal and metaphorical way

[Guest]

I suspect Italy declared war believing that is all she had to do to ride German coattails to victory. At first she only fought the big boys because the final victory, still thought to be inevitable, was late in coming. While waiting for it she didn't want to be thought of as a non-belligerent by default and thus loose her seat in the victory parade.

[Laurence Batchelor]

Can somebody add any information on the amount of 'pushing' and pressure the German high command put on Italy to use their superior aerial and naval forces in the Mediterranean?
They seemed to me to be most angered their ally could not achieve any major headway and of course had to go and help them out in North Africa, Sicily and divert U-boats into the Med.

[bengtsson]

Can somebody add any information on the amount of 'pushing' and pressure the German high command put on Italy to use their superior aerial and naval forces in the Mediterranean?
They seemed to me to be most angered their ally could not achieve any major headway and of course had to go and help them out in North Africa, Sicily and divert U-boats into the Med.

I can't say off hand Laurence. But I do seem to remember that actions leading up to Matapan were brought about mostly due to heavy German pressure. At least one book I read made that claim. The Italians were not very enthusiastic about heavy forces trying to interdict the British convoys to and from Greece. My reading on the subject of the Italian Navy from their own perspective makes clear that the RN Carrier force, small as it was, was a big factor in many cases of the Italians choosing not to persue a more agressive stance when the RN forces were in a postion to be brought to action.
I like Matapan as an example of what great use even a single Carrier with a small air group can be.
On the subject of Italian ASW efforts, I read in an article in the journal Warship that the Italians had no real active sonar system/asdic system until they were sold some German sets that were put on the new ASW Corvettes. Italian ASW ratings also went to German training establishments to learn the new sets operations.

Bob B.

[1Big Rich]

What is rhetorical about it ?

You want facts to disprove your opinion, yet provide no facts to support it.

Really, Phil, I thought were about serious historical debate. If you can�t support your opinions with facts, that�s fine. We can still debate opinions.

And that has some sort of relevence ?

Just this: The RN�s U-class were ideal boats for the Mediterranean. I think you or I would be hard pressed design a better boat for the environs even given hindsight. And yet they STILL found the Med a very dangerous place, thirteen of them being lost there (another half dozen lost in the North Sea, but I digress).

No. The whole point was that the Italians didn't build new ships (merchants and escorts) and didn't use their coastal shipping in North QAfrica. That is why I criticise the Italian Navy. They failed. One doesn't criticise the Western Allies for losing their logistics war because they built new escorts and merchant ships to the detriment of other programmes. Ignoring the requirements of the naval logistics war is something due criticism

I agree (you may consider this a sign of the Apocalypse). However, the Western Allies had the capacity for both merchant and naval programs. (Especially after Pearl Harbor; 27 shipyards opened in 1942 in California alone, but again, I digress.) Italy did not. And that lies at the feet of the Fascists, not the RM. I can�t fault the RM for getting the 212 merchantmen caught outside the Med, or for the state of the Italian economy. Involvement in Spain and Abyssinia hurt the RM, caused more of the budget to go to the other services and distorted the Italian economy. Those are Fascists policies, not those of Supermarina.

Besides, Italy�s ~3m GRT merchantmen were bringing raw materials to the Italian economy. Once the ends of the Med are closed to them, that raw material pipeline narrows precipitously. The RN was in a much better position

Who said it had to be a war of attrition ? There were plenty of opportunities for both small and large objectives which were totally within the grasp of the Italian armed forces, apart from their duties in support of the army. The general mediterranean historians have looked at the Italian opportunities and wondered why they didn't take them. The idea that the Italians should "hold onto her capital ships" rather than actually fight the war is a joke. If your attitude to war is that we won't bother fighting it then it is condemning oneself to lose.

It is hardly surprising that the ordinary historian finds it easy to criticise the Italian command if they had the attitude you claim.

What else is it when one navy is the largest in the world, can pull reinforcements in from other theatres and has the supply to not only build replacements but also repair damaged ships and the other navy does not? While neither nation could easily afford losses, the RN was in a much better position to absorb them the RM.

Allowing the Italians to pick and choose instead of actually concentrating on trying to win the war means they are not competent to run the navy.

My reading leads me to believe navies pick and choose their battles all the time, as well as when it�s prudent to break off of those battles. I�ll point to Cunningham at Calabria again for an example of the RN doing so.

Where have I said such things ?

Everywhere. One cannot call the Nemean Lion a tom cat, the Hydra a gardener sake or the Stygian Stables a closet without diminishing Hercules. The same applies here.

Why do you think that the Italian naval high command have a right to throw the war away without criticism ?

Where have I said such things? I didn�t say they were beyond criticism. But I do understand why the admirals and commanders on the spot acted as they did. Absolute reliance on English speaking sources inevitably leads to your conclusions. I think you need expand your library with some opinions from the other side. Not that they�re perfect either, but you have to get to the other side if the truth lies somewhere in the middle�

You somehow think that bringing up individual RN actions somehow has a bearing on the criticism of the Italian Naval high command - why ?

Isn�t that what you�re doing? The individual RM actions have a bearing on the criticism of Supermarina?

The point is this: The men who taught and mentored the likes of Fulgosi, Mimbelli and de la Penne then placed them in positions to do the things that they did could not have been so stunningly incompetent as you contend, just as the men who trained and mentored King and placed him in his position with regards to that night should not be called incompetent either.