Rubbish? Financial considerations and the state of the fleet played ABSOLUTELY no part?
Let me direct you to Moretz�s The Royal Navy and the Capital Ship in the Interwar Period, pp. 225-227:
My emphasis with the bolding. Moretz goes on, but those passages would be superfluous to the point there. The questions are why couldn�t British superiority be guaranteed by numbers, and why were British ships deficient in long-range gunnery? Could the finances available for modernization, especially increased elevation, be at play?The steady, evolutionary nature of the Service�s tactical doctrine during the period is most clearly demonstrated by the eventual acceptance of a night action by heavy ships. Throughout most of this period, the Navy eschewed the concept of seeking of a night encounter amongst heavy ships, and this reluctance was confirmed by the many tactical exercises conducted:
164. Experience gained in night practice confirms that the general principles governing the conduct of heavy ships at night as laid down in the Battle Instructions. No development has arisen to weaken the following conclusions: -
(i) Night actions between heavy ships are usually not desirable.
(ii) If we cannot count with certainty on engaging the enemy at daylight the following morning, strategy must decide whether the risk involved in fighting at night should be accepted for the sake of immediate battle.
(iii) The risks involved in pursuing after dark a beaten and disorganized enemy, will probably be slight in comparison with the advantages gained by denying him the opportunity of reorganizing his forces.
(iv) A vigorous attacj on the enemy vessels sighted offers the best chance of success.
By 1938, the Service had embraced the idea of engaging in a fleet action at night. The acceptance of night-fighting by the Service has at times been explained by the wartime experience of officers such as Chatfield, Fisher, Godfrey, and Drax. With their promotion to the senior ranks of the Navy, they were able to overcome the conservative dogma which held that such encounters were able to be avoided by heavy ships. This is, at best, only a partial explanation. The decision to not only accept battle at night, but, in fact, to seek it, was established at long last because British naval supremacy could no longer be maintained by numbers alone and night fighting seemed tailor-made for a Naval Service composed of effectively trained long-serving professionals. (This last point was more problematic, as the number of night-firings held was, at times extremely limited. For 1930, the Atlantic Fleet conducted but one.) Moreover, the rubric that it favoured the weaker naval power at the expense of the stronger, as chance played a greater determinant, while true, no longer seemed to apply. At best, Britain, would probably only be equal to an adversary in future war, and could, indeed, be the weaker force.
The last point was confirmed in a series of fleet exercises that sought to develop the necessary tactics to allow the British fleet to successfully engage an enemy force that enjoyed an advantage in long-range gunnery. With only Nelson and Rodney able to engage ships beyond 30,000 yards, and with US, Japanese and German ships known to enjoy such an advantage in gunnery, and the results were disquieting, to say the least. In April 1933 the Mediterranean Fleet tested the hypothesis in exercise. �R.R� Red Fleet, consisting of five battleships, and enjoying a slight advantage in speed, but limited to firing its main armament to a range of 23,800 yards, engaged Blue Fleet, a force of four battleships, able to fire to 32,000 yards. Both fleets were equal in cruiser and destroyer forces, and while Red was able to dispose of Blue�s cruiser force in short order, the engagement of the opposing battlefleets brought grief to Red. It is worth reporting the summary of the action at length:
The assessment concluded by advising that:11. The two battlefleets came into sight at 36,000 yards, and at 32,000 yards Blue fired a few rounds. Red cruisers and destroyers then attempted to cover their battlefleet with smoke, but this did not prevent Blue from deploying at a range of 29,000 yards and bringing a four-ship concentration on to the Red Revenge�
12. Discounting the effect of Blue gunfire under these conditions, Red held his course for another twelve minutes, and then swung round to close at a maximum rate. After 40 minutes, under fire, he was able to open his foremost turrets at 23,700 yards but in this interval Revenge was destroyed.
13. With the range down to 22,000 yards, Red turned to a parallel course to open his �A� arcs. Blue promptly turned away together to open the range, leaving only his after turrets bearing, but Red followed at once. By this manoeuvre Blue had opened the range 800 yards, but as Red was in pursuit, to advantage was to gained by further retirement, Blue turned back determined to close quickly to decisive range.
In the following year, 1934, an expanded exercise, �Z.J.� was conducted, by the combined Mediterranean and Home Fleets on the question. This time, of its five battleships, Red Fleet was allowed to whose maximum range exceeded 32,000 yards. They faced an equal number of battleships enjoying the advantage of long-range gunnery. If anything the results were even more disconcerting. Red Fleet lost two battleships outright, two others were disable to 50 per cent and 25 per cent respectively and Resolution was damaged, but slightly. Blue Fleet�s losses included the sinking of Nelsonand damage of 50 per cent and 25 per cent to Malaya and Barham.Unless the fleet with the shorter range guns has a large advantage in speed, or visibility is limited, the use of smoke appears to be essential in order to avoid damage, which may be serious, when closing a well-handled fleet armed with longer-range guns.
You�ll also note that the �wartime experience� of the officers in question does not include the period from 1919 to 1939. So I�ll stick with my �rubbish� and conclude that there were no naval actions between 1919 and 1939 succinctly indicating a need for night fighting.
Danny DON'T "waterline"...!
Heck in 1941 the Kido Butai was possibly the best naval air strike force, possibly one of the best collection of elite aviators around in fact. Best torpedoes bar none.