chuck wrote:I don't completely agree. Halsey was intent upon engaging Ozawa's carrier force with his battleships at Leyty gulf. The reason why task force 58 seemed to decisively establish the dominance of carriers is because there is no comparable carrier force to oppose it. In such circumstances there is no strong reason to call on battleships, even though Halsey was still trying to call on his battleships anyway. It seems to me that, had there been an opponent who could deploy a carrier force of competitive quantity and quality, including effective CIC directed, radar assisted carrier fleet air defence, then it is well possible that taskforce 58 and the notional opponent would exhaust their air powers against each other without inflicting decisive blow upon each other, and giving rise to opportunity for skillful deployment of accompanying battleship forces to decide the issue.
That's not an accurate reading of the chain of events. First of all it was TF38. The 3rd Fleet operations order (probably written by "Soc" McMorris) specified a surface action group ("SAG"), commanded by ComBatPac, Willis A. Lee (CTF 34). Given the uncertainties of communication until 1980, Halsey could decide whether to detach the SAG or not. He wanted the BBs to shell the carriers, trusting the rear guard to McCain (3 CVs), who was returning from Ulithi, and Oldendorf's battleships. I do not believe he made an error based on the available information.
Nimitz wrote a series of "battle lessons" which stressed the Japanese tendency to spread their resources too thin and with too many missions. They also stressed the Japanese tendency to consistently fail to follow up a victory. Halsey was applying Nimitz' doctrines as one might expect. US victories occur when the US presses a Japanese failure without waiting to consolidate gains. Halsey was hoping for a "knock-out punch" against the remaining Japanese offensive power, which does not include surface warfare groups in his mind. Remember, intelligence said Japan will have a half-dozen (or more) new fleet carriers in short order. Halsey sees them as the single way Japan can recover the strategic offensive.
If Kurita had been 100% successful given the resources he had, he would not have been able to expel the Americans from Leyte, and their damaged SAG would have been decimated on withdrawal. I don't see how Halsey exposed the war effort. A few mostly empty transports would be neither here nor there.
If an unfriendly power had attempted to impose on America the mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war.
-- "A Nation at Risk" (1983)