Australian Capital Ship, 1938

[bengtsson]

In the ongoing talks over the Royal Navy's possible responses to a Far Eastern war with Japan, the Royal Navy looked at all it's options. Very few looked good, especially if any type of conflict was going on in Europe at the same time Japan made a move. The Australian and N.Z. governments showed alot of concern about the RN sending a battle fleet to Singapore as soon as possible after any outbreak of war.
Since the RN had few good options, they suggested the possibility of Australia funding a Capital Ship to be stationed in Australian waters. This was in the 1938 talks between the three governments. The new Capital ship would be used as a deterrent against raids in strength before the arrival of Britain's Main Fleet in the Far East. The Australian government declined the offer. But lets say they took the offer and decided to fund a Capital ship for use in Australian waters. What type of ship should have been built??

I would have wanted a second Ark Royal to be built as my Australian Capital ship. Matched with RAN and RNZN Heavy and Light Cruisers, one would have a fully functional Carrier Task Force. This would be useful against any raids that didn't bring Japanese Carriers with them. Ambush of IJN Surface raiding forces could be done a long range and the Carrier could avoid Japanese Carrier forces if they came down.

But since it was 1938 and most naval commands still were looking to the Battleship and they lacked hindsight like I have, they most likely would have rejected any Carrier and want some type of BB. So what type of Battleship would suit a lone role in Australian waters with the job of joining with the British main fleet as soon as it arrived in Singapore?
I'de think a Battle Cruiser with good speed and fuel capacity would be wanted. Speed to avoid heavy Japanese Capital ships, but with speed enough to catch and destroy any Japanese raiding forces like Heavy Cruisers. Maybe a modern version of Hood would do? Speed enough to avoid combat with superior forces would be a must. The RAN would thus field a large heavy gunned BC to operate with RAN/RNZN Cruisers.
Remember, this force is not meant to Battle it out with the Japanese Navy, just provide a counter to raids and join with Britain's main fleet when the time came.
Would the new Capital ship be built in Britain in the late 30s or would a contract with an American builder be possible.

Bob B.

[Werner]

A very large, lightly protected carrier would be the perfect consort for Australia and Canberra.

Of course, the best possible strategy would have been to transfer the bulk of RN submarines to Australia in 1940.

[chuck]

A very large, lightly protected carrier would be the perfect consort for Australia and Canberra.

To be sunk like the Hermes?

[Werner]

No, to be sunk like Hiryu or Zuikaku. The Pacific war needs large airgroups, not flight deck armor until Kamikazes are instituted. If you are going to wait until then, it really doesn't matter what carrier the Commonwealth fields because Kamikazes are a tacit admission by Japan that they have lost the war.

I seriously doubt whether anyone would call Hermes a "large light carrier".

The only truly satisfactory carrier for Pacific operations 1942-45 would be the USS Midway, CVB-41. Armored flight deck + air group size.

[chuck]

No, to be sunk like Hiryu or Zuikaku. The Pacific war needs large airgroups, not flight deck armor until Kamikazes are instituted. If you are going to wait until then, it really doesn't matter what carrier the Commonwealth fields because Kamikazes are a tacit admission by Japan that they have lost the war.

I seriously doubt whether anyone would call Hermes a "large light carrier".

The only truly satisfactory carrier for Pacific operations 1942-45 would be the USS Midway, CVB-41.

You are thrashing wildly.

We are talking about 1941. No single carrier has reasonable chance of sustained effective operation in defense of Australia no matter how large the air group. A single carrier with 2 cruiser escorts will succumb before the probable Japanese response to it just like the Hermes.

[Werner]

A Commonwealth carrier would greatly complicate Japan's already critically overcomplicated battle plans. It's mere presence would fragment and divert efforts away from the central thrusts against any USN offensives.

Hermes' air group was no more effective than Tone or Chickuma's. It's hardly worth discussing her in this context. Any British carrier designed for overseas work would have to be much larger, if for no other reason but to accommodate the additional bunkerage required for Pacific distances.

A modern, fully armored British fleet carrier would mount 40-50 aircraft. A lightly armored, or unarmored fleet carrier of the same vintage (Soryu or Yorktown) would mount 75-85 aircraft. TF37 (The British Pacific Fleet) mounted 300 aircraft on seventeen carriers, or about the equivalent of three Essex. That is a logistical handicap when compared with carriers designed for a Pacific War (like HMS Malta)

It's important to note that British flight deck doctrine decreed a much slower flight deck cycle, with aircraft stowed in the hanger, brought up and launched in small batches, landed and struck down below. A Pacific carrier would have to adopt American and Japanese practice of massed, rapid launch/landing cycles.

[bengtsson]

No, to be sunk like Hiryu or Zuikaku. The Pacific war needs large airgroups, not flight deck armor until Kamikazes are instituted. If you are going to wait until then, it really doesn't matter what carrier the Commonwealth fields because Kamikazes are a tacit admission by Japan that they have lost the war.

I seriously doubt whether anyone would call Hermes a "large light carrier".

The only truly satisfactory carrier for Pacific operations 1942-45 would be the USS Midway, CVB-41.

You are thrashing wildly.

We are talking about 1941. No single carrier has reasonable chance of sustained effective operation in defense of Australia no matter how large the air group. A single carrier with 2 cruiser escorts will succumb before the probable Japanese response to it just like the Hermes.

You've missed my point Chuck. Nowhere are we talking about defending Australia against the Japanese fleet. This Capital ship is only for countering Japanese raids. No combat with the Japanese Carrier fleet was invisioned. The RN suggested the Australian capital ship as a counter to raids and as a unit to join the British main fleet at Singapore. We are getting off the spirit of the original question here No RN officer expected this single ship to counter the IJN.

Bob B.

[Werner]

You've missed my point Chuck. Nowhere are we talking about defending Australia against the Japanese fleet. This Capital ship is only for countering Japanese raids. No combat with the Japanese Carrier fleet was invisioned. The RN suggested the Australian capital ship as a counter to raids and as a unit to join the British main fleet at Singapore. We are getting of the spirit of the original question here No RN officer expected this single ship to counter the IJN.

Bob B.

Precisely. As a "fleet in being", this Commonwealth ship would act like Tirpitz by pinning down units many times it's value in a defensive posture, weakening any Japanese offensive thrusts out of all proportion to the actual value it could do.

Raiding through the Solomons, New Britain and New Guinea, and then Batavia or Borneo at high speed this ship would dissipate much of the Japanese air force and carriers into protective "hunter killer" groups just as the few German raiders did to the RN's cruiser force.

[chuck]

Precisely. As a "fleet in being", this Commonwealth ship would act like Tirpitz by pinning down units many times it's value in a defensive posture, weakening any Japanese offensive thrusts out of all proportion to the actual value it could do.

Raiding through the Solomons, New Britain and New Guinea, and then Batavia or Borneo at high speed this ship would dissipate much of the Japanese air force and carriers into protective "hunter killer" groups just as the few German raiders did to the RN's cruiser force.

You mistake the meaning of "fleet in being". A fleet in being looses all usefulness if it actually engages, and opens itself to destruction in the process. Instead, fleet in being stays in a safe haven in which it can both avoid engagement and retain the future potential for engagements, forces the enemy to dispose himself in such as way so as never expose himself to being caught at a disadvantage should the potential engagement materialize.

We can assume the Australian defense strategy as formulated in 1938 to be in reaction to a war launched on Japanese terms at time of Japanese choosing, probably selected to take advantage of events favorable to Japan in the now clearly inevitable European war. In this case we can also assume the major threat from Japan would be a Japanese move, in force, to the seas just north of Australia while British fleet is largely tied up and US force not immediately disposed to move to the South Pacific. In this case fleet in being is essentially worthless.

[Mark Petersen]

Of course, the best possible strategy would have been to transfer the bulk of RN submarines to Australia in 1940.

Agreed. The most bang for the buck.

[bengtsson]

So maybe the capital investment for a BB or Carrier would have been better spent on a large Australian Submarine flotilla? Maybe, but submarines against a raiding cruiser force or the Japanese fleet in general would probably not amount to much. They are slow even on the surface and would cover very little sea area. How to know where and when the Japs are coming. As an anti shipping measure, it would take over a year to make a noticable dent in the Merchant fleet.
Remember, the RN was looking for some major help in protecting Australian shipping and shore facilities from Japanese raids. And then reinforcing the British far eastern fleet when and if it arrived. In no sense did any Royal Navy staff consider one Australian capital ship as a stand and fight element against a squadron of the IJN. They were not that foolish.
The Australians themsleves rejected the Capital ship idea on two counts.
1. They could afford to build one, but the support and docking facilities were beyond the budget.
2. The RAN thought if they did up the budget, they'de rather have more cruisers.

But the RN, desperate for more Capital ships to confront the IJN in due time, was hoping for the Australians to do like before WWI and provide the cost of a major front line capital ship. My thought was "What type whould best suit Australia's needs".

Bob B.

[chuck]

I don't think there is a single "ship" that would greatly aid in the defense of Australian water against japan in any but the most optimistic geopolitical scenario. Britain can't spare most of her submarine fleet, nor can Australia find the trained man power to maintain them in the short run. There is nothing Australia can do on the naval front that would be anything more than a few drops in a bucket against a full on assault from Japan. This discussion about what is the "best" ship for Australia is mainly a discussion about what color should the drops be.

If Australia has the money and resource to try and build any sort of infrastructure to support a capital ship or a fleet of submarines, she would be better off spending them on building a large and well-equipped forward base for the US pacific fleet. If she could persuade the US to base her fleet there, then that she could draw the US inextricably into direct defense of the continent against Japan. If she could not do this, then she should spend it on a viable aircraft fleet to make it costly for the Japanese to operate near her waters.

[chuck]

If we step back from "what would be the best ship" for Australian defence, and look at the other issue of, given the design work being done in the UK, and the availability of various guns, mounts, armor, design, etc, plus the contemporary thinking regarding naval war in 1938, what would Britain be most likely to be able pressure Australia into funding the construction of, that would also satisfy Britain for the moment. The answer is likely Vanguard No.2

Vanguard was in fact conceived and designed for the purpose discussed above - to act as the centerpiece of a fast, powerful surface raiding force that can outfight any Japanese force that is likely to be able to catch it. To be Britain's counterpart in the pacific for the Germany's Bismark. I suspect if so deployed, she would end her days just like the Bismark. But that is all unknown in 1938. Vanguard would be a powerful ship nearly on a par with the strongest battleship Japan is known to have, and according to then available information, faster than any capital ships the British thought the Japanese had. What is more is Vanguard would not stretch the already overstretched British armament industry like any other battleship design would. If Australia were to fund a second Vanguard, not only would Britain be ecstatic over acquisition of another battleship, but would also be deeply satisfied by the fact that, to her way of thinking in 1938, it would be precisely the right type of capital ship.

[RNfanDan]

To be sunk like the Hermes?

Hardly a good example. Hermes left Trincomalee without her airgroup. There were no aircraft aboard to even begin defending the ship against an attack. Under those conditions, even an Essex-class carrier would have gone sponge-diving in a hurry.

[chuck]

To be sunk like the Hermes?

Hardly a good example. Hermes left Trincomalee without her airgroup. There were no aircraft aboard to even begin defending the ship against an attack. Under those conditions, even an Essex-class carrier would have gone sponge-diving in a hurry.

The examples is to illustrate how a single carrier will end, not what particulars the carrier should have. From the perspective of 1938 or even 1944, a single Essex class, or any class, carrier operating alone but with all her air group will have gone sponge-diving in this scenario just like a Hermes. No carrier can hope to operate effectively over an entire engagement against a force of multiple carriers, perhaps over several days. The opposing force is vastly more flexible, able to simultaneously conduct all stage of air operation while holding large force in immediate reserve from its several decks. The single ship, in the best of circumstances, will get one shot. That shot is highly unlikely to be anything like decisive. Thereafter she is more or less done for. This is why no one in 1938, or 1944, will bet on a single carrier being an effective defense against an assault the Japanese will likely be able to throw against Australia.

Anything Australia invests in must for political necessity materially be able to help Australia defend herself in the case the British fleet can not arrive in time. By 1938 it was clear in London and Canberra, appearances not withstanding, that a symbolic British fleet will arrive very late, and an effective British fleet will never arrive at all, in the case of a Japanese attack during a general European war. A lone carrier is clearly not a plausible route for Australia.

[bengtsson]

Lets also remember World War I. Prior to that war, the British managed to convince the Australian government to pay for the building of a Battle Cruiser, NZ got brought in as well. In any case, The Battlecruiser Australia was the result. This ship proved valuable in preventing any German raiding in Australian/NZ waters and later ended up with the Grand Fleet BC force. Hardly a waste of money in the 1914-18 war.
I look at the Royal Navy suggestion that Australia again consider funding a Capital ship as a back door way of adding a capital ship to Britain's very stretched Navy. To gain a perspective of the RN and it's Far Eastern situation, read Marders Volume one "Old Friends New Enemies". Very informative book.
If you look at the Australian capital ship in the context of Australia/NZ and Royal Navy relations, the idea makes alot of sense. I think the point is being missed here. This ship was meant to appeal to the Australian government as a proof against any raiding of Australian waters and coast by Cruiser size or indivdual capitalships of the IJN. The idea that Japan could discount US reaction and scale a full attack on Australia was rejected out of hand as doomed to failure. The US would never let Australia be invaded in force. No one in Australia or the UK ever considered building an Australian Capital ship as a defence against invasion, only a defense against raiding force. These are big waters down there and one ship could easily avoid large IJN raids like what happened to Darwin. Remember these were 1937-8 naval talks, not 1941-42.
If Australia had built a BC or a Carrier, I fail to see it being anything but a major plus for the Royal Navy, if worse came to worse she could sail to where ever the RN Far Eastern Fleet gathered. In fact, this was the plan.

I'll take a second Ark Royal thank you
Nobody ever lost a war by adding strength to it's overall naval power.

Bob B.

[chuck]

Nobody ever lost a war by adding strength to it's overall naval power.

Bob B.

Not true.

[RNfanDan]

Nobody ever lost a war by adding strength to it's overall naval power.

Bob B.

Not true.

I agree with Chuck--in fact, the opposite is true, proven as recently as the within last 7 decades.

[Werner]

The rise of the German High Seas Fleet led to a British policy of opposing Germany. Prior to that, Britain was neutral, or slightly in favor of German policy abroad. They even assisted German colonial activities prior to 1900.

[chuck]

If Australia had built a BC or a Carrier, I fail to see it being anything but a major plus for the Royal Navy, if worse came to worse she could sail to where ever the RN Far Eastern Fleet gathered. In fact, this was the plan.

Bob B.

It is most certainly a major plus for the Royal Navy, which is why Britain was pressing for it. It is not so clear that it would have been the best use of Australian resources for the purpose of enhancing Australian defenses against Japan, which is why Australia resisted it.

If you read a little more in depth about Anglo-Australian-Japanese trilateral relationship, you would find that prior to WWI, Australia was actively competing with Japan to be the pillar of imperial British defense in the far east. Britain was clearly seen as being able to except her will against any challenger in the far east, and both Australia and Japan wanted to cling to Britain, and to benefit at each other's expense from a British alliance. At the time Britain needed to withdraw her far eastern resources to deal with Germany in Europe, and Japan, being a much larger country and a budding industrial power starting to be capable of standing on her own as a major naval power, clearly had more to offer Britain and won the competition despite Australia's traditional ties with Britain and willingness to fund a battle cruiser. During all of WWI Japan expanded her commercial and trading interests at the expense of Australia (and other European powers). The relationship between Australia and UK was actually approaching a rupture point by the end of WWI as a result of Anglo-Japanese alliance. Throughout the inter-war period, Britain is perceived in Australia (and in Japan) as becoming increasingly weak and increasingly incapable of holding her own in the far east in all but the most favorable circumstances. And Australia was increasingly concerned with what to do should war come to the far east and Britain could not deploy a major fleet to the far east. Or that British fleet in the far east can only be strong enough to protect India. Operation in conjunction with a power British far eastern fleet stationed in Singapore increasingly became seen as a best scenario that is unlikely to materialize. A major fleet unit that would operate with and enhance the strength of the main British fleet is seen as increasingly unlikely to benefit Australia.