Australian Capital Ship, 1938

[chuck]

In fact, offering to host a major naval base for the US was one of the veiled threats Australia made against Britain in 1920 in an attempt to loosen the Anglo-Japanese alliance. The major reason that such an offer was not actually made in the late 1930s, when it made even more sense for Australia, was the knowledge that doing so would be essentially an public announcement of no confidence in British power, which would likely result in a unzipping of the whole British colonial interests east of Suez and an irreparable rupture between Britain and Australia. At the same time there is no warranty that the US would actually take up the offer, thus leaving the possibility that such an offer would leave Australia hanging.

[RNfanDan]

Hardly a good example. Hermes left Trincomalee without her airgroup. There were no aircraft aboard to even begin defending the ship against an attack. Under those conditions, even an Essex-class carrier would have gone sponge-diving in a hurry.

No carrier can hope to operate effectively over an entire engagement against a force of multiple carriers, perhaps over several days. The opposing force is vastly more flexible, able to simultaneously conduct all stage of air operation while holding large force in immediate reserve from its several decks. The single ship, in the best of circumstances, will get one shot. That shot is highly unlikely to be anything like decisive. Thereafter she is more or less done for.
...A lone carrier is clearly not a plausible route for Australia.

Without granting the veracity of your argument, if the choice of a modern, soon-to-be-proven warship type (which emerged from the war as the new "queen of the seas") was an unacceptable choice for Australia then surely, any other surface ship would have been an even poorer option. NO single ship unit-for-unit, even in 1938, could have been better than a carrier.

In fact, the existence of a RAN carrier might well have caused Japan to recast their opening-move plans in the Pacific. This is not to say that Japan would not have regarded the US Navy as its primary threat, nor that they would not have attacked Pearl Harbor; however, the presence of major units in the south when including a carrier would have presented a far greater threat to Japan's initial push southward, particularly in conjunction with British and Dutch support units present.

Japan could not have afforded to ignore this--thus, establishing the effectiveness of an RAN carrier's presence, a key point of the original post. Handled properly by the RAN, that single ship could have changed everything in the western Pacific.

[chuck]

Without granting the veracity of your argument, if the choice of a modern, soon-to-be-proven warship type (which emerged from the war as the new "queen of the seas") was an unacceptable choice for Australia then surely, any other surface ship would have been an even poorer option. NO single ship unit-for-unit, even in 1938, could have been better than a carrier.

I said the best thing Australia can do to enhance her defense in 1938 is to convince the US to base pacific fleet near by, not to build any big ticket naval ships for herself.

In fact, the existence of a RAN carrier might well have caused Japan to recast their opening-move plans in the Pacific. This is not to say that Japan would not have regarded the US Navy as its primary threat, nor that they would not have attacked Pearl Harbor; however, the presence of major units in the south when including a carrier would have presented a far greater threat to Japan's initial push southward, particularly in conjunction with British and Dutch support units present.

Due to the fact that these details would have been unknown in 1938, It would be unfair to bring up how crummy British carrier aircraft were, and how relatively ineffectual British carrier practices were, in comparison to IJN, and thus how relatively effortlessly even 1 or 2 sea-plane conversion carriers of the IJN, not at all involved historically in the pearl harbor strike, could probably take out an Ark Royal clone. But it is relevant to point out that RN's carrier doctrine is not developed along IJN and USN lines, and there is no vision of carrier acting as center piece of a independent strike force. Where would a carrier viewed as a fleet auxiliary fit in in defense of Australia?

Japan could not have afforded to ignore this--thus, establishing the effectiveness of an RAN carrier's presence, a key point of the original post. Handled properly by the RAN, that single ship could have changed everything in the western Pacific.

People build big ticket items to defend themselves against their enemies, not to distract the enemy for the benefit of potential allies knowing it probably wouldn't be enough to help themselves.

In general, do you think Australia can ring any sort of assurance from Britain that a carrier built on a British slip, taking up valuable British armor and ship building capacity, equipped and trained using British resource, will not be sucked into British war efforts in Europe and will always be available at Australia's beck and call? Can Australia build her policy on faith that one entire set of stars will completely align to bring the carrier to Australia at the moment when Japan might choose to start a war, and then an entirely different set of stars will completely align so the way this carrier will operate will dovetail with the plans of the Japanese, and then a third set of starts will also completely align to ensure that when engaged, the tactical luck will be with the Australian carrier so it will do some good before it is sunk?

[bengtsson]

I'm debating whether I should take the bait or not I know how the fish feels when I have that worm floating in the current past his hungry little face. How hungry am I?

Okay, why is having an additional heavy warship, BB or Carrier bad for the RAN? Perhaps it is so, as Australia decided not to do it. Tell me more about building naval strength as the cause of losing a war [at sea]. Note, if you build nothing you lose by default.

I have seen alot of debates where Carriers are argued against on all sorts of grounds. Germany shouldn't have had any Carriers because they would never figure out how to land planes on them. Australia shouldn't have a Carrier because someone might try and sink it. I sense anti-Carrier bias out there . I still want an Ark Royal if my job is defending the sea lanes off of Australia and as an addition to the RN Far Eastern fleet. Even the USN might have been happy in 1942 to shelter a RAN Carrier at Pearl if need be.


Bob B.

[chuck]

Okay, why is having an additional heavy warship, BB or Carrier bad for the RAN?

Because it cost resource and money that Australia could put to better use, like building a fleet base for the US pacific fleet.

Note, if you build nothing you lose by default.

Unless building something would not materially have effected the outcome, but would have taken up resource that could have effected a better outcome if devoted to something else.

Even the USN might have been happy in 1942 to shelter a RAN Carrier at Pearl if need be.


Bob B.

Little good would that do Australia in many of the defense scenarios the Australians must have been running through in 1938.

[bengtsson]

In that event, a whole lot of Battleships and Heavy Cruisers should never have been built. And I agree they should never have been built.

Bob B.

[chuck]

I am not sure if I see the logical connection. We are talking about the particular defensive needs of a single very sparsely populated nation, with low industrial capacity and little naval and military infrastructure, an no powerful ally close at hand, against the No.3 naval power in the world. The conclusion arising from that does not translate to general contest between densely populated and extensively industrialized powers with deep naval and military infrastructures.

[Werner]

1. The USN demonstrated it can provide bases for itself when and where it needs them. The Cockatoo dockyard is enough heavy repair for the phase 1942-3.

2. The Japanese possess a very powerful navy with immense obligations at the start of a Pacific war. Any Australian naval power is going to demand many fold it's size in defensive ships to be deployed in the Dutch East Indies and the Kra Peninsula. An analogue is the immense army tied down in North China and Manchuria solely to counter a possible thrust by the small force the Soviet Union kept across the border 1942-3.

3. The ability to threaten Brunei and other fuel heads in 1942 would easily be worth the construction costs.

4. Such a force would need to sortie from time to time as did the German fleet in Norway to make the threat real.

5. A carrier could strike Brunei 100 hours after leaving Northern Australia. Withdrawal into land-based air cover would occur just as quickly and with a minimum of exposure to Japanese land-based air, especially if the strike is planned to use bad weather fronts.

[RNfanDan]

I said the best thing Australia can do to enhance her defense in 1938 is to convince the US to base pacific fleet near by, not to build any big ticket naval ships for herself.

And investing Australian money in the building of a base for another nation's navy, on the chance that nation will be allied with Australia if and when any prospective war should come, is somehow less implausible than investing in an aircraft carrier to reinforce their own fleet?

Frankly Chuck, Yamamoto's plan for the USN to behave the way he predicted they would at Midway, faced a better chance of realization than your theory.

That is

[chuck]

And investing Australian money in the building of a base for another nation's navy, on the chance that nation will be allied with Australia if and when any prospective war should come, is somehow less implausible than investing in an aircraft carrier to reinforce their own fleet?

It's not like it would take a wholesale realignment of US strategic outlook to ally itself with an Australia openly threatened by Japan. It is clear that in a general war UK can not do much to help Australia. The key for a good Australian defence is to ensure that when the chips are down, the US would be sufficiently entangled with Australia to feel compelled to overcome a few modest objections she might otherwise have to throwing in her lots completely with Australia early on. The main reason why it is not unreasonable to suppose US would be happy to be thus entangled is it is not an minority opinion in the US that US would have to fight Japan some day anyway. Another reason is the fact the one aim of the US, despite the alliance, had always been to slowly dismantle the British empire anyway, and the US wouldn't necessarily be happy even if the UK could by some chance come to Australian defense and thus cementing Anglo-Australian bond. However, in reality, modest objections such as short-term domestic political expediency and completely inappropriate disposition of forces could possibly prevent the US coming in on Australian side to save Australian bacon. It is therefore the Australian imperative to help the US overcome these potential inconveniences. Hence the base plan.

The difference between the base plan and the plans to add a carrier and a couple of cruisers is the naval base plan, if it should work - admittedly it may not work - will from the perspective of 1938 give almost as complete an assurance of Australian security from Japan for the foreseeable future as can be imagined by overcoming ahead of time the obstacle to US coming into the war on Australian side early on. The fleet reinforcement plan, on the other hand, will give Australia not only no assurance of security, but not even a really meaningful increase in security, even if it works perfectly, which, given its reliance on Britain for completion and the impending European war everyone know is coming, we and the Australians, and the British, know it wouldn't. So the fleet plan still depends on the goal of the base plan being achieved if it were to have any chance of actually saving Australia from Japan, rather just make the Japanese more vengeful.

Besides I would say the chances that US would respond positively and base large elements of the pacific fleet either in Australia, or in Philipine but with substantial presence and logistic tail in Australia, is at least as large as any chance that an Australian naval force capable of impeding a detachment of IJN would actually not be sucked into Britain's European war just before Japan strikes.

Frankly, Dan, you are not in Yamamoto's league when it comes to basic odds calculation, are you?

[Sauragnmon]

Well, my two pennies on this stack would go similar to this...

The Austrailian administration rejected the capital ship proposal because of docking. This could be answered by conversion of liners into carriers. That in itself could provide some merit, being that it's more cost efficient than ground-up carrier construction.

Thus, the thought comes to the principle of a true capital ship, not a carrier. Carriers, even in the treaty text, were defined seperately as Carriers, anything else being a Capital Ship in general. Thus, the question arises. What would the Austrailians seek for a capital ship. If they're going to get into the principle of docking establishments, they could go two ways. A, something akin to the Panzerschiffe, roughly the size of a cruiser, but with more punch than a cruiser, because it would not stretch the docking requirements. This would be able to keep pace with the cruiser groups, it would be more than enough to deter raiders, and could retain a purpose when the RN task force arrived. B, they could go for a purebred capital ship, get big or go home, and commission a fast battleship, not unlike a modernized hood or perhaps a G3-esque design. Realistically, the core tenet would be speed and protection, it would have to be fast enough to keep pace with the cruisers, and protected enough not to be a waste of money. If you're going to build One capital ship, might as well make it worth the money. By 1938, the Deutschland Class had proven some of their ability, so it could have been a probable idea.

[chuck]

I don't think Panzerschiff really is superior in combat power to Washington class A cruisers like the Takao, and on top of that Japan had 4 battle cruisers with which to hunt down any Australian panzerschiff. The probable disposition of Japanese in a future war is unknown in 1938, so Panzerschiff would not be an attractive option for Australia.

It seems unlikely that any Australian capital ship would be built to a unique design. Since the ship has to be built in Britain and utilize British armament and infrastructural resources, any Australian capital ships would likely be a member of a class of ships already under construction for Britain. In this case the most likely class would be the Vanguard for reasons mentioned above.

[bengtsson]

It seems unlikely that any Australian capital ship would be built to a unique design. Since the ship has to be built in Britain and utilize British armament and infrastructural resources, any Australian capital ships would likely be a member of a class of ships already under construction for Britain. In this case the most likely class would be the Vanguard for reasons mentioned above.

This is true. It would, for many reasons, be a copy of an existing RN class. That is why I say a simple repeat of Ark Royal. If a BB was wanted it could get interesting. I don't know if Britain had space for adding another BB hull anytime soon. But if so, a simple purchase of a King George V class BB, with Britain adding a 6th ship to the class. A new version of Hood would be nice, but take longer and cost more. Still that would be nice, the speed would give her more value.
It's true that Britain realized that her only prayer in the Pacific was to bring the USA along. Her policy was to try at all costs to bring the USA in. The Australian capital ship suggestion was pure desperation on their part. With war coming in Europe and the IJN being as strong as it was, Britain would have had to give up all but Australia and NZ right from the start. And they did. Her position in the pacific was hopeless without the USN. Her main goal was to get the USN to station her BattleFleet at Singapore. The USN would have none of that, they refused all attempts to be talked into basing capital ships at Singapore.

Bob B.

[Werner]

Did the UK (under whom these ships would be counted) have the tonnage under the London Treaty? Certainly no battleship could be laid down before 1936. The RN gave notice of it's suspension of the London Treaty in late 1939, and the USN was adhering to the treaty well into 1940 (see the first designs for CL-55 as an 8,000 ton cruiser, for example).

Was there sufficient treaty tonnage to lay down an Australian carrier?

[chuck]

Did the UK (under whom these ships would be counted) have the tonnage under the London Treaty? Certainly no battleship could be laid down before 1936. The USN was adhering to the London Treaty well into 1940 (see the first designs for CL-55 as an 8,000 ton cruiser, for example).

Was there sufficient treaty tonnage to lay down an Australian carrier?

A British 1938 battleship would fall under the Second London Treaty. Second London Treaty takes effect in 1936 and imposes no total tonnage limitations, only individual qualitative restrictions. Second London Treaty reduced the individual qualitative restrictions on battleships and cruisers inherited from washington treaty. Battleships were still allowed to be 35,000 tons, but caliber is reduced from 16" to 14". Maximum cruiser displacement was reduced from 10,000 tons to 8,000 tons, and cruiser caliber limit, already reduced from 8" to 6" by the first London treaty, were kept as it. When Japan refused to sign the second London Treaty, an escalator clause was added that permitted battleship displacement to increase to 45,000 tons and caliber restored to 16", on the theory this will allow the treaty signatories to build ships that would match the strongest ships Japan was likely to build.

The only overall tonnage agreement in place after 1936 was the Anglo-German agreement which limits German total tonnage in most categories to 35% of RN tonnage, and Anglo-Soviet agreement which similarly limits Soviet Tonnage in the Atlantic, Mediterranean and Black sea to a certain percentage (Which I don't remember off the top of my head) of RN tonnage, but does not restrict total Soviet tonnage in the pacific. Britain, US and Italy has no treaty cap on their total tonnage. Japan and France were no longer party to any naval limitation treaty at all.

In theory Britain was free to build her heart out so long as whatever she builds is under 35,000 tons and 14" before 1938, and 45,000 tons and 16" after 1938.

[Werner]

If the RAN were to order a 23,000 ton carrier, I wonder if they would accept an "off the shelf" RN design. It seems to me they would demand additional bunkerage far and beyond what was fit to existing RN carriers for operations in the Mediterranean or North Sea.

Ark Royal had a range of 7,600 miles at 20 knots. Victorious' range was 11,000 miles at 14 knots. For comparison, Essex' range was 20,000 miles at 15 knots. The British units also had very small supplies of aviation stores and fuel, a sore point for their 1945 Pacific operations.

I am sure the Australian Admiralty would look to the designs of the likely enemy as well as friendly advice from their American counterparts and incorporate these lessons if at all possible. The result might have looked like a cross between American and British practice.

Such a ship would also require a squadron of Tribal sized destroyers as consort, as well as a couple of Didos, perhaps manned by the RNZN.

[bengtsson]

If the RAN were to order a 23,000 ton carrier, I wonder if they would accept an "off the shelf" RN design. It seems to me they would demand additional bunkerage far and beyond what was fit to existing RN carriers for operations in the Mediterranean or North Sea.

Ark Royal had a range of 7,600 miles at 20 knots. Victorious' range was 11,000 miles at 14 knots. For comparison, Essex' range was 20,000 miles at 15 knots. The British units also had very small supplies of aviation stores and fuel, a sore point for their 1945 Pacific operations.

I am sure the Australian Admiralty would look to the designs of the likely enemy as well as friendly advice from their American counterparts and incorporate these lessons if at all possible. The result might have looked like a cross between American and British practice.

Such a ship would also require a squadron of Tribal sized destroyers as consort, as well as a couple of Didos, perhaps manned by the RNZN.

I noted early on the possibility that Australia could go to US ship Builders if the British were overstretched in the Capital ship department. The problem is of course the compatibility with the RN supply system.
This brings us to the British worries in the Pacific and the reason for desperation when looking over the Pacific situation. Aus/NZ were nearly as important to the Empire as the Home Islands. But with Japan rising and Britain looking to be in a desperate struggle with Germany, the Pacific Dominions were hanging out to dry. How to help them, defend them and keep them in the fold??
A thinking person could see the obivious pull that a rising USA would have on AUs/NZ. For many reasons they were unlikely to want to switch to an America alliance. But temptation must have been strong. With a stroke of the pen, the Aus/NZ governments would have solved their defence problems. Just a thought. I don't know if this was ever considered. An Australian might be able to tell us

Bob B.

[chuck]

Actually, while the British Empire remained largely intact, Australia and New Zealand were never anywhere near as important to Britain as Egypt, India or Persia, or even Malaysia and Singapore, let lone the British Isles. It is questionable weather the US really would build a capital ship for Australia when the US industry was as fully committed to building a 2 ocean navy as was possible in peacetime. Also, in return for building a capitol ship for Australia, the US would undoubtedly demand concessions from Australia in terms of its relationship to Britain that would probably not go down well in London at all at the time. It is vital to keep in mind that US was not an ally of the British Empire, formally or interest wise. US was merely an ally of Britain in her struggle against Germany and possibly Japan. US would very much like Britain to prevail against Germany, to keep far eastern portions of the British Empire out of Japanese hands, keep central Asian portion of British empire out of Russian hands, but would also very much like to take all of British empire out of Britain's hands, although not so urgently. All the Anglo-American Bonhomie aside, London and Washington were both very much aware of this profound underlying conflict as long as British empire lasted and Britain wished the Empire to last much longer. Full peacetime Anglo-American alliance that existed after WWII would never have been possible had it not become clear in Britain, and the US, that British Empire was completely moribund and would slough away in due time.

[Ibz]

Would transferring an existing RN Warship to the RAN have been an option, perhaps freeing up tonnage for the RN to use on brand new ships elsewhere within the limits of the applicanle treaty?

Would modernizing ,for example off the top of my head, Royal Oak of been of any benefit?

Royal Oak was probably too slow to operate effectively in conjunction with the RAN cruisers but there might have been other ships suitable?

Ibz

[bengtsson]

In my readings on this subject, it comes across pretty clearly that Britain was simply looking to put some type of naval force at Singapore or in Australian waters to deter Japan from going to war with them at a time when Britain was going to be at full stretch in home waters and the Medit. All 4 "R"s were meant to go to Singapore at some point. I think the Australian capitial ship was meant to be a brand new vessel. A repeat of what was done leading up to WWI when Australia and New Zealand were built at their expense. As I said before, I see it as a 'backdoor way' to get Australia to pay for a capital ship. To deter Japan was the goal, but it was grasping at straws. Still,having a modern capital ship to deter surface raiding in Australian/NZ waters would require a FAST capital ship. Slow speed would be of no use. The plan was for any Australian Capital ship to join with RN fleet units coming out to Singapore or to fall back on Ceylon if need be.
Bob B.