USN decision 1937

[Werner]

The three modernized Mississippi class and the "Big 5" (California, Tennessee, Colorado, Maryland & West Virginia taken together probably represent the most formidable battle line one could gather without the types and the numbers of battleships completed mid-war. (America's main enemies only built 4 battleships and 2 battlecruisers over the whole war).

Given this assumption, was the USN correct to build BB-55, 56, 57 & 58?

Would you want these four faster battleships or say 7 more Wichita and 7 more Brooklyn?

Your opinions please.

[Tracy White]

I'd have built more carriers.

[RNfanDan]

Given this assumption, was the USN correct to build BB-55, 56, 57 & 58?

In my ill-informed opinion: 55 & 56, yes; 57 & 58, maybe; subsequent BBs, no.

Hindsight notwithstanding, the North Carolinas seem well-justified at the time of their building. The others in the existing US Fleet were all of pre-Hood design (i.e., old school) and, though powerful, were slow and--except the New Mexicos--not modernized to the standards of Italy's Duilio or Britain's Queen Elizabeth classes.

The trouble with most navies of the day, were their powerful "Old Boy" lobbies, still wedded to the big gun. Until the USN had the opportunity to learn the lessons of Taranto, there was arguably not enough evidence to suggest that carriers could shoulder the workload alone, in any modern naval war.

Even the modernized New Mexicos were trumped by the then new foreign designs of KGV, Richelieu, and Veneto classes. The pressure for a modern US battleship design was strong and completely understandable.

Still, the USN was long aware of the potential of aircraft carriers and, as Tracy's comment suggests, the money dropped on BB57/58 could knowingly have been better spent on two or even three new carriers. Wasp was already too late to benefit from the unfettering of treaty tonnage restrictions, but it was not inconceivable that a second or even third Hornet refinement was a viable option.

However, the SoDaks were intended from their inception to be a group of more than two--as evidenced by the lead vessel's design as a flagship--and it's hard to get your weekend team to stop in the middle of the fifth inning and switch to playing football, so the momentum carried through to 59 & 60 before anything could be done about a fifth and sixth Yorktown.

This is not anything I'm prepared to argue strongly, as my fluency in USN subjects is even less than Wikipedia level, but there you have it!

[rtheriaque]

Had the USN not built BB59, a 4 year old boy would not have spent a night in wonderment aboard her during her service as a museum ship, thus, I'd likely not be here today!

So, yes, it was the correct decision!

[Werner]

OK, well I was wondering about the "slippage" of capital status to cruisers, but we all still seem to feel the big battleship is too important!

I left out carriers because they really were too young a technology to place all your eggs into in 1937, and like the battleships were limited by treaty. As I recall, the cruisers are limited by tonnage, but not numbers and a little "tweaking" of the treaty which might have extended the battleship holiday could easily have pushed the cruiser tonnage back to 10,000.

[Tracy White]

Cruisers ain't my bag, but I'd be interested in seeing some sort of "effectiveness chart" comparing AA cruisers and BBs in fleet effectiveness. That would affect my decision if we were to limit the discussion strictly to BBs or cruisers.

I just wonder IF the big guns were more effective than the medium ones in shore bombardment, or if there was little difference in hindsight. For some of the Guadalcanal campaigns having a fast BB or two in the mix was good, but otherwise it would be interesting to see if the fleet would have been better off building more CAs earlier on in lieu of the later BBs.

[Werner]

I don't know for sure what the real differences for shore bombardment might be, but as you know, the October 14 bombardment of Henderson by Haruna & Kongo has always been called "THE bombardment" by the Marines.

[phil gollin]

In 1937 unless one is both a technilogical genius and almost a clairevoyant SP ???) then you are not including radar in your plans other than the most crude sets.

Given that Battleships are very important, if nothing else because they "trump" any other surface ship that might turn up. This was exactly the argument had in 1937 when the Admiralty was discussing the Japanese refusal to adhere to the London Naval Treaty. They wanted more cruisers and noted just how little of the overall naval budget went on Capital ships compared with the smaller vessels and naval establishments - but that they couldn't afford to totally ignore capital ships. There were earlier discussions between 1928 to 1935-odd which, based on the lowest Capital ship tonnage (17,000 or 18,000 tons ????) examined what was the smallest sensible and balanced design to secure pretty much assured victories over Treaty (10,000 tons) 8-inch cruisers.

The British 1937 capital ship INFORMAL discussions (more nearly just discussions) varied between approx 28 to 31 knots, KGV like armour and 6 to 9 16-inch. What was considered important was armour and minimum 28 knots (preferably more) - the speed and armour was regarded as a higher priority than an absolute armament.

The Queen Elizabeths were regarded as too slow but otherwise very good when modernised and the Battlecruisers useful for raider hunting. Only Nelson and Rodney were thought of as acceptable without modernisation, but they were too slow (but faster than the USN ships).

The long range planning capital ship replacement programme would have produced a good fleet by 1945 - but that was without any input from the Z-plan. And even without the Z-plan, increased German U-Boat production might have scuppered the plans.

Now, with a technological genius and a clairvoyant (sp ???) then the KGVs were good enough, but more modernisation of existing capital ships and better AA would have helped.

.

[Werner]

Based on the industrial resources available (shipways, steel plants, armament factories), was the "Z" plan really viable based on the other modernization the Nazis promised the military? They were still simulating tanks with bicycles, and they just promised Joe citizen (Johann?) a "people's car".

When I look at the various "circle" plans the Japanese put forward, the difference between what is proposed and what is possible is stark. Was Germany really in a different world?

[Ron Smith]

BB's 55 and 56 were considered great economic recovery projects at the end of the Depression. From that viewpoint alone 55 and 56 were worth it. As design evolution 55-60 provided great lessons learned for future ships, the vibration causes and solution for 55 and 56 still apply today. Attaching 56 to the British Home Fleet for a period helped get us the loan of HMS Victorious in 1943 when we were down a few fleet carriers, another point in 56's favor politically. 59 hammered Jean Bart during Torch, a worthwhile action. 55 through 60 all performed later in the war as fast, heavy and stable AA platforms. Finally there is the morale boost of "Those beasts are part of *my* fleet."

[SumGui]

Keep in mind this descision was while we were under limitation treaties, which I believe didn't end until 1939.

We couldn't just build more of whatever we want - CVs especially. We were out of tonnage after Yorktown and Enterprise, which is why Wasp was a smaller carrier (she was specifically sized to use up the rest of our treaty tonnage, CV-5 and 6 were 'medium' treaty sized for what was thought to be effective use of the treaty tonnage - proven quite correct). Once we could build outside of that treaty, we immediately built what is basically a repeat Yorktown (Hornet) while the next design (not limited by treaty) was drawn up - Essex.

Remember that BBs were still political statements of power, and the old guys who approved and funded ship building still thought they meant alot on the world stage (you know - if we look strong maybe they won't pick a fight with us). Taranto hasn't happened in 1937 - that was in November 1940.

Also, the designs that would have been available were not as advanced - second generation treaty CAs were still packing 5"/25 singles (at best) for secondary weapons - they would have been great targets for the Japanese aircraft. Wichita and Brooklyn's designs were availible - but remember there was almost a six year gap in between Wichita and Baltimore being laid down (28Oct35 and 26May41). The Brooklyn/Cleveland gap was nearly as big - 12Mar35 and 1Jul40.

We can all look back and say the money would have been better spent on Carriers and their escorts - but we are looking back at what happened in WWII after this descision, they were looking forward but were based in not-so far off the past where one battle line at Jutland ended major fleet operations all at once for an entire war.

[JWintjes]

Based on the industrial resources available (shipways, steel plants, armament factories), was the "Z" plan really viable based on the other modernization the Nazis promised the military? They were still simulating tanks with bicycles, and they just promised Joe citizen (Johann?) a "people's car".

When I look at the various "circle" plans the Japanese put forward, the difference between what is proposed and what is possible is stark. Was Germany really in a different world?

In a word, no.

Actually, Japan was - thinking of peacetime construction within a timeframe well beyond 1939/1940 - much more capable of producing any significant strengthening of their naval forces than Germany. German naval construction, and indeed any major arms construction effort, beyond 1939 would have been immensely hampered by the fact that the Reich was pretty much bankrupt by 1939.

You can arm infantrymen with little budget. You can't build a battleship force with that.

Jorit

[Werner]

Based on the industrial resources available (shipways, steel plants, armament factories), was the "Z" plan really viable based on the other modernization the Nazis promised the military? They were still simulating tanks with bicycles, and they just promised Joe citizen (Johann?) a "people's car".

When I look at the various "circle" plans the Japanese put forward, the difference between what is proposed and what is possible is stark. Was Germany really in a different world?

In a word, no.

Actually, Japan was - thinking of peacetime construction within a timeframe well beyond 1939/1940 - much more capable of producing any significant strengthening of their naval forces than Germany. German naval construction, and indeed any major arms construction effort, beyond 1939 would have been immensely hampered by the fact that the Reich was pretty much bankrupt by 1939.

You can arm infantrymen with little budget. You can't build a battleship force with that.

Jorit

So, I can say with some confidence that building modern battleships was kind of a waste of time, and an equivalent tonnage of treaty cruisers would have been much more worthwile?

It seems to me the British had been pushing to devalue the capital ship to cruiser size since the early 1930s, quite rightly. I wonder how chasing the Bismarck would have turned out with a half-dozen more cruisers instead of King George V and Prince of Wales.

Of course, my initial remarks were only intended for the USN. The more I study the situation in the late '30s, the more convinced I am that those eight battleships of the US Battle Fleet were so far in advance of contemporary battleships that their only risk was a concentration of modern battleships or an air attack.

[chuck]

Actually, Japan was - thinking of peacetime construction within a timeframe well beyond 1939/1940 - much more capable of producing any significant strengthening of their naval forces than Germany.

German steel production was 3.5 times that of Japan's in 1939. Germany had comparatively little existing naval force to consume naval budget while funding a naval expansion, Japan has a very large and expensive existing fleet to maintain while funding any naval build up. Germany had reliable peacetime access to much of basic raw materials needed for large naval expansion. Japan needed to import almost all of her raw material from abroad, and much of it from those who do not wish to see Japan strengthened and had relatively low exposure to Japanese economic pressure.

I can't say if given the competing demands of the army and national economy whether Germany could exceed Japanese surface naval power in total during the 1940s, but I think it is reasonable to assume Germany can support large new construction programs than Japan.

[Werner]

Actually, Japan was - thinking of peacetime construction within a timeframe well beyond 1939/1940 - much more capable of producing any significant strengthening of their naval forces than Germany.

German steel production was 3.5 times that of Japan's in 1939. Germany had comparatively little existing naval force to consume naval budget, Japan has a very large and expensive existing fleet to maintain while funding naval build up.

But I think a lot leans on shipyard capacity and skilled workers. They were also required by the peace treaty to demolish their shipbuilding and armament factories.

Remember the size of the Weimar Army and the limitation on mechanical equipment, artillery and so forth. Their giant army had to be built from scratch. As I recall, the occupation of the Rhineland was accomplished on bicycles.

[JWintjes]

German steel production was 3.5 times that of Japan's in 1939. Germany had comparatively little existing naval force to consume naval budget while funding a naval expansion, Japan has a very large and expensive existing fleet to maintain while funding any naval build up. Germany had reliable peacetime access to much of basic raw materials needed for large naval expansion. Japan needed to import almost all of her raw material from abroad, and much of it from those who do not wish to see Japan strengthened and had relatively low exposure to Japanese economic pressure.

That's all fair and well, but the problem is that at the end of the day someone has to pay the bill. And German economy, while potentially highly capable, had one fundamental weakness - it did not have the necessary financial power behind it to keep it going.

The main challenge Germany faced in 1939 was not one of being able to build one Bismarck or one Graf Zeppelin or perhaps two of them. It was one of going bankrupt, hard and fast. The system had embarked on a policy of handing out goodies to the civilian population that itself was difficult to sustain financially in best of times. In crisis-stricken Germany it was next to impossible from the outset. Add to that the costs of rearming the army, and you already arrive at what's pretty much a train wreck.

I can't say if given the competing demands of the army and national economy whether Germany could exceed Japanese surface naval power in total during the 1940s, but I think it is reasonable to assume Germany can support large new construction programs than Japan.

Well, Hjalmar Schacht didn't think so in 1939, which is why he resigned. His understanding of German finances during the years prior to the war certainly was better than mine, after all it was he who devised the instruments of keeping up the financial effort needed to sustain the regime.

Jorit

[chuck]

It's hard for me to debate whether German capacity for peacetime naval rearmament would be constrained to a level below those of Japan purely by chronic financial instability. I am not certain I see the source of Japan's relative financial might during that same period. Japan neither controlled major resources, nor had her industry made major inroads into the world's value added good market, nor were Japan any sort of financial hub or financial services powerhouse in those days. And Japan had been spending 1/3 of her entire national budget on her fleet for years. But I would observe that between 1938-1945, Germany managed to complete 800,000 tons of combat submarines. This far exceeds the total tonnage of warships of all types completed by Japan during the same period, and in fact represents over half of entire tonnage of all Japanese warships that took part in WWII. This is despite the fact that Germany was simultaneously engaged in by far the most costly land war in history, and Germany's industrial exertion to meet the needs of the land war in Russia far exceeded Japan's industrial support for her land forces.

[JWintjes]

It's hard for me to debate whether German capacity for peacetime naval rearmament would be constrained at a level below those of Japan purely by chronic financial instability. But I would observe that between 1938-1945, Germany managed to complete 800,000 tons of combat submarines. This far exceeds the total tonnage of warships of all types completed by Japan during the same period, and in fact represents over half of entire tonnage of all Japanese warships that took part in WWII. This is despite the fact that Germany was simultaneously engaged in by far the most costly land war in history, and Germany's industrial exertion to meet the needs of the land war in Russia far exceeded Japan's industrial support for her land forces.

Chuck,

now you're comparing apples with oranges. After 1939 all financial restraints went out of the window, not the least so because the successes up to 1941 allowed the Reich to fill its coffers again.

But we were talking not about war construction, but about peacetime programs. And here money may not be the only key, but it certainly is one of the keys. When you don't have any, things tend to get difficult rather sooner than later when you can't pay the bills.

Once again - it is one thing to simply build tanks or ships in times of war. Even that was not easy in wartime Germany, as the leadership quite explicitly avoided switching to a pure war economy well into the war (second half of 1943) and tried to keep up a semi-peacetime situation within the country. But it's fairly easy because you can tell everyone "wait until Endsieg". You cannot do this in peacetime. Here, you ultimately face the need to pay for you bills or you erode confidence into your currency. Which is what happened with the Reichsmark before the war - in an international context it was worth next to nothing at the onset of the war.

Incidentally, a financial crisis in 1939/1940 may well have led to the downfall of the regime - which could be one reason why they tried to shy away from real war economy for such a long time.

Jorit

[chuck]

Why do I no longer have the ability to edit my own posts?

Let's compare apples to apples then. Perhaps Germany was in a perilous financial situation in 1939. But I do not see any possible source for Japan's implied relative financial strength during that same period. Japan had been spending 1/3 of her entire national budget on her fleet for years. Japan had neither controlled major resources, nor made major inroads into the world's value added good market, nor transformed herself into any sort of financial hub or financial services powerhouse. Her colonies were relatively small and poor things. Where was the source of her strong financial position? Against this there is certainly a lot of expenses to be charged against the 2/3 of her national budget that remains after the Navy had taken its cut. Japan may not have been giving as many goodies to her population as the Germans, but 1 million of her army had been engaged in a protracted war with China over vast geographic areas for several years, and how does the expense of that compare to building Strength through Joy cruise ships?

[JWintjes]

Why do I no longer have the ability to edit my own posts?

Let's compare apples to apples then. Perhaps Germany was in a perilous financial situation in 1939. But I do not see any possible source for Japan's implied relative financial strength during that same period. Japan had been spending 1/3 of her entire national budget on her fleet for years. Japan had neither controlled major resources, nor made major inroads into the world's value added good market, nor transformed herself into any sort of financial hub or financial services powerhouse. Her colonies were relatively small and poor things. Where was the source of her strong financial position? Against this there is certainly a lot of expenses to be charged against the 2/3 of her national budget that remains after the Navy had taken its cut. Japan may not have been giving as many goodies to her population as the Germans, but 1 million of her army had been engaged in a protracted war with China over vast geographic areas for several years, and how does the expense of that compare to building Strength through Joy cruise ships?

Ah, sorry, I guess I wasn't exactly clear on one point - of course I readily agree that Japan was far, far away from being any kind of financial (or other) powerhouse. No doubt about that. But even that put it still into a better position than Germany in 1939 - as you so fittingly say, it's about relative financial capabilities. If I have nothing at all and you have 1 on a scale of 1 to 1000, you still have much, much more than I have.

Jorit