Nimrod upgrade to get the axe?

[Werner]

Original URL: http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/03/27 ... hop_maybe/

MPs: axe Nimrod subhunters to balance MoD budget
By Lewis Page
Published Thursday 27th March 2008 13:07 GMT

As the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) confronts yet another looming annual budget shortfall, Parliament's Defence Committee has issued its 2008 report into British military kit procurement. The oversight MPs say bluntly that it is time for the MoD to start axing major equipment programmes, rather than spreading its cash ever-thinner across too many projects. They give a strong hint that the troubled Nimrod MRA4 subhunter plane should go.

In particular, the report considers several of the big headline purchases underway now, and those planned for the immediate future. The MPs examined the Nimrod MRA4 subhunter plane, the A400M turboprop transport, the Type 45 destroyer and the F-35 stealth jumpjet, all of which are under construction now. They also reported on the plans to build two new aircraft carriers for the Royal Navy (Future Carrier) and to replace much of the Army's current combat vehicle fleet (Future Rapid Effects System).

Overall, the Nimrod MRA4 seemed to come out worst in the MPs' view. This is not surprising, as the Nimrod project is now running more than seven years late and has ballooned in cost from �2.2bn to �3.5bn (for now) - while the number of planes has simultaneously dropped from 21 to 12. Thus the per-plane price has almost tripled, to a horrifying �292m apiece. Even worse, there are a lot of people asking whether the British forces genuinely need a fleet of huge expensive submarine-hunting aeroplanes right now.

According to the MPs:

• The Ministry of Defence ... states that the �major programme showing cost growth at present continues to be Nimrod [MRA4]� ...
  
  Since the [MoD purchasing bureau] Chief Operating Officer, Mr Gould, told us that the problems being experienced on the Nimrod MRA4 programme were not considered unusual ... and that �it was predictable�, we are deeply concerned that they nevertheless seem to have come as such a surprise to the MoD ...
  
  The Nimrod programme has experienced further slippage in 2007-08 of 3 months.
  
  We hope that the new Minister for Defence Equipment and Support will look closely at this programme and consider whether it is ever likely to deliver the capability our Armed Forces require in the timescale needed. If it is not the MoD should withdraw from the programme.

In other words, just bin it. Much of the acquisition cost has already been paid, but huge sums would be saved down the road in running and support costs. It would probably be possible to close down a large RAF base, for example.

The current, ancient Nimrod MR2s wouldn't be much missed. They are working hard above Afghanistan right now - despite the fact that they aren't the safest planes around - but the jobs being done aren't such as to call for quarter-billion-pound airliners full of specialist submarine tracking gear. Comms relay, electronic intercept and surveillance can be done by cheaper planes - or even by hugely cheaper unmanned jobs, without risking flyboys' lives.

The only other project which the MPs see as a possible candidate for the chopper is the plan to build two big new aircraft carriers for the Royal Navy. These, however, have top-level political protection - they are to be built in a yard within sight of Gordon Brown's constituency seat - so their axing would appear unlikely.�

[MartinL]

The role currently being carried out by Nimrod MR2 in Afghanistan is one which was not originally envisaged but it has been pressed into service because of a lack of an alternative.

The fact that we do not have anything more appropriate to carry out the missions currently being carried out does not mean that Nimrod is the best platform, it is just the best platform we have. Forming a key element of the RAF's ISTAR capability it has been covered seperately due to the nature of the programme.

Putting Wescam turrets on Nimrods of course provides a long range electro optical capability in Afghanistan but using the Nimrod also means we have to haul MAD, sonar buoy launching equipment, maritime surveillance radar and harpoon launch rails etc. It acts as a target acquisition platform and as an aerial communications hub or rebroadcast station because of its comprehensive communications fit.

They are at the end of a long transit flight, flying from the Middle East and although Nimrods do have excellent range the time on station numbers available mean that the fleet is being overused and stretched.

Able to carry out its traditional maritime roles but also command and control and electronic intelligence roles MRA4 will be a very capable but extremely expensive asset whose numbers are planned to be very low, 12, meaning their continued use will be problematical if required to cover more than one or two geographical areas. Because of the airframe, any losses will be practically impossible to replace.

The MRA4 is a classic example of a procurement failure and lessons should be learned from this incredibly expensive programme.

Following the loss of a Nimrod MR2 over Afghanistan there are continued doubts about the aircraft's long term reliability and safety.

The original missions of the Nimrod and its predecessor, the Avro Shackleton, was protection of transatlantic shipping lanes against the Russian surface and submarine threat, especially in the Shetland - Faeroe's - Iceland - Greenland gap and to protect the Royal Navy ballistic missile submarines from Russian attack submarines.

Nearing deployment and with vast sums already invested it would be a difficult decision to cancel but that must be an option given the small numbers that will be available and the more or less impossibility of getting any more should losses be incurred.

It is recommended that an analysis of the long term viability of the platform be carried out, looking at the option of participating in the US Orion replacement programme or a combination of UAV's and other manned aircraft, for example the proposed A330 signal/electronic intelligence system.

If we can get better capability, sustainability and long term value for money then the courage must be found to cancel the programme....

sometimes what looks a bad move is for the best.

[Werner]

With an AIP or diesel submarine a smaller country's weapon of choice, how does the UK plan to prosecute maritime missions in the absence of these assets? If, for example, Iran threatened to close the Straits of Hormuz, would it suffice to rely on the USN to protect British interests?

Anti-submarine patrol is not the only reason maritime patrol exists. For example, when Ethiopian Air 961 water landed in the ocean in view of bathers, the first asset of any government to respond was a USN P-3 which had been returning from Darfur.

[chuck]

Exactly how does an E-3 "respond" to the crash of the B767? Make moral boosting flybys?

Of course it is sufficient to rely on the US for ASW in Indian ocean. The US seeks legitimacy for its dominant military position by exerting stabilizing influence to the advantage of those who would otherwise challenge us at various levels. Stabilizing influence is laudible. But the entanglement of using stabilizing influence to legitimize primacy is that the sole superpower can't ever afford to let its ability to maintain stability fail. The moment it fails anywhere there would follow a steep erosion of its influence across the world everywhere. So for the time being, when American continues to seek to maintain dominant military presence everywhere, everyone else can rest assured that the US has no choice but to foot their entire overseas defensive needs in all the important places. It doesn't matter if Britain didn't choose to be able to twitch in response to an Iranian submarine sinking a British tanker. The greatest casualty in the unretaliated sinking of a British tanker by an Iranian submarine would be American influence. So why should Britain loose any sleep over whether American will defend Britain's tankers?

[Werner]

I believe they dropped life rafts and emergency supplies, in addition to relaying position and status to ships in the area.

I also recall an incident where a sail race boat was in trouble, and kept company with an RNZAF P-3 for over a day until an Australian ship could arrive.

[chuck]

I believe they dropped life rafts and emergency supplies, in addition to relaying position and status to ships in the area.

I also recall an incident where a sail race boat was in trouble, and kept company with an RNZAF P-3 for over a day until an Australian ship could arrive.

These are all very incidental and comparatively insignificant fringe benefits of a big ticket military item. Hardly would one opt to purchase a $2 billion ASW plane in order to avail himself of the 1 in 20 chance that the particular plane would one day keep a yachtsman alive or signal the location of a civilian air crash. In any case a glossy painted C-130 derivative would probably do as well for much less money. You purchase these sort of things because you perceive a need to sink submarines and no one else will do it for you.

Britain probably thinks there is an excellent chance that the US could be prevailed upon to sink any submarine that Britain really deemed to be in need of sinking, hence the need for this plane is not so apparent.

[Werner]

The real problem with ASW is you need assets everywhere the enemy MIGHT be.

It is one of the last games of military chess, finding a needle in the haystack.

There are quite a few here, like Walt, who will probably argue that the submarine is the ultimate naval weapon. If they are correct, we need more of these airplanes, not less. The alternative, hunter-killer submarines and surface ships make the cost of these aircraft trivial.

Britain is scrapping the Nimrod in a probably hopeless effort to save her two carriers. The two carriers, to be built primarily in Prime Minister Brown's constituency represent his personal politics as well as a flourish of British patriotism at a time when she is losing much of her unique qualities to an amorphous mess known as the EU.

All that tradition, valor and honor, a closed book? The last chapter written. Hard to believe.

[Guest]

I believe they dropped life rafts and emergency supplies, in addition to relaying position and status to ships in the area.

I also recall an incident where a sail race boat was in trouble, and kept company with an RNZAF P-3 for over a day until an Australian ship could arrive.

Just to clarify, a number of sail boats in distress have been located and assisted by RAAF P-3s in the Tasman Sea and the Southern Ocean. During one such incident a P-3 was able drop supplies directly to (on top of) an injured sailor. Losing the Nimrod or its capabilities means losing more than just long range ASW. Retiring and replacing an aircraft because its old and tired, thats a good move. Simply retiring the, valid, capability with the aircraft seems pretty shortsighted.

[Werner]

Precisely. We need a new Nobska House meeting to define maritime threats and missions for the next 50 years.

It appears to me that new, sophisticated export submarines will be an important asset to be deployed against the major powers during the interval, especially if fuel allocation becomes an imposed climate change policy.

No Sosus, Caesar or other nets mean the submarine is as comfortable in mid-ocean today as it was a hundred years ago. To destroy a sub you will either have to chase the "flaming datum", or have maritime patrol assets everywhere you expect submarines to be.

[chuck]

Just to clarify, a number of sail boats in distress have been located and assisted by RAAF P-3s in the Tasman Sea and the Southern Ocean. During one such incident a P-3 was able drop supplies directly to (on top of) an injured sailor. Losing the Nimrod or its capabilities means losing more than just long range ASW.

Absolutely, anybody in their right mind would regard dropping supplies on top of a few dozen sailors on sail boats in distress to be an overwhelmingly convincing reason for maintaining an expensive fleet of sophisticated ASW aircraft that will likely cause tens of billions over their lives. Incidentally, many of the people in the same right frame of mind do not seem to think spending a similar amount of money to enhance dikes and flood control measure in order to forestall the need to drop supplies on top of thousands of land bound citizens is worthwhile at all.

[Werner]

Chuck, we get the point. We're discussing maritime patrol and ASW in the context of the post-cold war environment of fewer detectors and more truly effective submarines in the hands of third-tier and rogue powers.

The "rescues" were just an illustration of how ubiquitous and useful these aircraft were, even in unexpected missions.

There is no free lunch here. As Asian powers buy or build Swedish AIP submarines, as Latin powers buy German submarines, as Gulf States buy Russian submarines, there are serious implications for the next 20-30 years that cannot be patched quickly. We need a responsibly-sized maritime patrol force adequately trained for the task and with modern, useful equipment.

The downside if we fail is that ONE power with ONE submarine can close a commerce choke point during a decisive period, causing political consequences out of proportion to their investment.

... unless we accept the much earlier argument that deeply submerged submarines are actually observable from space using some technology or mathematics which were heretofore obscure.