Why did the Central Powers ultimately lose the war?

[JWintjes]

An interesting discussion evolved the other day at lunch:

What was the reason why the Central Powers did ultimately lose the war? More precisely, why did - on various occasions - during the first part of the war events did not take a decisive turn for the Central Powers? We - perhaps rather arbitrarily - stopped at around 1916, thereby leaving out both the impact of the USA and possible effects of the collapse of Russia. The usual answers were forwarded right down to Schlieffen's infamous right wing.

Being, as always, the odd man out, I offered the lack/misplacement of suitable cavalry assets in 1914 and the failure to pull off a proper Doggerbank-type engagement (as planned) in 1915 or early in 1916.

What do you think? Out of interest, I added a poll where you can have two vote each.

Jorit

PS: Don't wonder about the last option - I'm assessing term papers right now...

[chuck]

The reason why central powers failed to succeed was simply because they succeeded in failing.

[chuck]

Okay, taking it a little more seriously.

I think what you are looking for is something along the lines of "what could central powers have done differently that, had it been done differently, would have been unanswerable by the allies?". But what you are asking is simply "Could central powers have made better decisions?", without addressing the capacity of allies to answer them, and without crediting the allies with a parallel increase in decision making quality comparable to what the central powers would have needed to make their own better decisions.

[Werner]

What happened to the choice of gritting their teeth and pursuing an early and thorough program of unrestricted submarine warfare?

Sure, they would have risked the ire of the Americans before 1917, but on the other hand Amercan troop transports would have been sunk aplenty.

[JWintjes]

The reason why central powers failed to succeed was simply because they succeeded in failing.

Somehow I knew this was coming...



Jorit

[JWintjes]

Okay, taking it a little more seriously.

I think what you are looking for is something along the lines of "what could central powers have done differently that, had it been done differently, would have been unanswerable by the allies?". But what you are asking is simply "Could central powers have made better decisions?", without addressing the capacity of allies to answer them, and without crediting the allies with a parallel increase in decision making quality comparable to what the central powers would have needed to make their own better decisions.

Well, you point at a general problem regarding the methodology of virtual history - obviously, something "unanswerable by the allies" is really, really difficult to find. The way we went about it was simply looking at what happened and where certain decisions led to eventual failure.

Let's take the cavalry thing as an example - the disposition at the beginning of the war was something the Allies had neither influence over nor precise knowledge of. Had there been more cavalry - or had it been better positioned - it would simply have added considerable weight to the German attempts without really offering the Allies an opportunity to do something different.

Jorit

[JWintjes]

What happened to the choice of gritting their teeth and pursuing an early and thorough program of unrestricted submarine warfare?

Sure, they would have risked the ire of the Americans before 1917, but on the other hand Amercan troop transports would have been sunk aplenty.

Good point - I tried to cover that with the first option, but will add unrestricted sub warfare to the poll.

The question is, though, whether German submarine technology would have really been up to unrestricted warfare in 1914/1915.

Jorit

[JWintjes]

Ok, sorry Chuck, I think I killed your votes by adding the unrestricted sub warfare thing - feel free to change your faulty opinion...

Jorit

[chuck]

I have my doubts about whether cavalry could have made any decisive difference in the west. What the Germans needed was 4 extra corps of mainly infantry to extend the main front line to the north to cover Paris during the swing to the south.

[chuck]

What happened to the choice of gritting their teeth and pursuing an early and thorough program of unrestricted submarine warfare?

Sure, they would have risked the ire of the Americans before 1917, but on the other hand Amercan troop transports would have been sunk aplenty.

Good point - I tried to cover that with the first option, but will add unrestricted sub warfare to the poll.

The question is, though, whether German submarine technology would have really been up to unrestricted warfare in 1914/1915.

Jorit

The answer is likely no. In 1914 the Germans didn't have many submarines, and the bulk of such submarines as the Germans had still burned paraffin for surface propulsion.

[chuck]

Ok, sorry Chuck, I think I killed your votes by adding the unrestricted sub warfare thing - feel free to change your faulty opinion...

Jorit

My opinions may be faulty, but they are correct.

[JWintjes]

The answer is likely no. In 1914 the Germans didn't have many submarines, and the bulk of such submarines as the Germans had still burned paraffin for surface propulsion.

I guess you're right on this one. I could see the Germans making a meaningful attack on British troop transports, probably involving both submarines and light surface craft, though.

Jorit

[JWintjes]

Ok, sorry Chuck, I think I killed your votes by adding the unrestricted sub warfare thing - feel free to change your faulty opinion...

Jorit

My opinion may be faulty, but they are correct.

Well, let's hope it's not as defective as your grammar...



Sorry, couldn't resist. Blame it on my students - some apparently think that punctuation marks are mainly good for decorating the text....

Jorit

[chuck]

some apparently think that punctuation marks are mainly good for decorating the text....

Jorit

Have they another use?

[chuck]

The answer is likely no. In 1914 the Germans didn't have many submarines, and the bulk of such submarines as the Germans had still burned paraffin for surface propulsion.

I guess you're right on this one. I could see the Germans making a meaningful attack on British troop transports, probably involving both submarines and light surface craft, though.

Jorit

You mean in the English channel??

[JWintjes]

I have my doubts about whether cavalry could have made any decisive difference in the west. What the Germans needed was 4 extra corps of mainly infantry to extend the main front line to the north to cover Paris during the swing to the south.

Perhaps I should clarify.

I can only agree that with that many extra infantrymen the battle of the Marne may well have taken a different turn. However, I can't see where these 4 corps would realistically have come from.

The cavalry really becomes an issue after the failure on the Marne and during the dash for the Channel - here concentrating the cavalry might have given the Germans slightly more momentum than they had. And in fact the cavalry was actually there, but it was generally badly used - you didn't need regiment-sized operations on the Alsacian front.

What is highly interesting is that if you look at the available literature on the subject, most of the commanders who wrote their memoires immediately after the war claimed cavalry to have been evidently without any use right from the beginning of the war. Reading through some of these 1920s books makes you think that already in 1914 everything was set for wholesale mechanized warfare.

But if you look into the signals traffic in 1914, then pretty much everyone is positively screaming for cavalry, which never seems to be available in adequate numbers. Sometimes it seems that it's the very same people who desperately want cavalry in 1914 and who after 1918 write about how everybody but the thickheads around the Kaiser knew how utterly obsolete cavalry was at the beginning of the war.

Funny.

Jorit

[JWintjes]

some apparently think that punctuation marks are mainly good for decorating the text....

Jorit

Have they another use?

What about making reading the rabble one has handed in as a term paper easier for the fool-tempered person who's assessing it?



Jorit

[chuck]

But if you look into the signals traffic in 1914, then pretty much everyone is positively screaming for cavalry, which never seems to be available in adequate numbers. Sometimes it seems that it's the very same people who desperately want cavalry in 1914 and who after 1918 write about how everybody but the thickheads around the Kaiser knew how utterly obsolete cavalry was at the beginning of the war.

Funny.

Jorit

Perhaps 4 years of war experience told them that the cavalry for which they had screamed 4 years before would have made no difference?

[JWintjes]

I guess you're right on this one. I could see the Germans making a meaningful attack on British troop transports, probably involving both submarines and light surface craft, though.

Jorit

You mean in the English channel??

Yes. If I'm not mistaken, there were actually plans for doing so. It would probably have been costly, but the rewards were potentially enormous.

Jorit

[JWintjes]

Perhaps 4 years of war experience told them that the cavalry for which they had screamed 4 years before would have made no difference?

Don't think so - in fact, it seems as if three years of trench warfare had too great an influence on their thinking.

Cavalry in any case was not obsolte at the beginning of the war. Cavalry was totally useless in trench warfare, but that was nothing new under the sun - already 1866 or 1870/71 had told that lesson. Whereever there was the space for cavalry to operate properly, it could be highly successful. The history of cavalry operations on the Eastern front has not been written yet (some people are currently into that), but in general it's probably safe to say that cavalry was of considerable importance in the East.

Jorit