Why did the Central Powers ultimately lose the war?

[chuck]

In relation to the size of the ground, the troop density in the east is generally far lower in the east than in the west, and rail net is much more sparse. The situation in the east is more similar to traditional warfare where foot print of the forces are small in relation to the size of the battlefield, and cavalry really were more mobile than other force at both tactical and strategic level, and the ground offers much room to bypass the concentrated firepower of the infantry and artillery army to disturb the communications.

In the west,the density of troops are high, and the foot print of the forces are therefore large in relation to the size of the battlefield. The rail net is dense, and a troop of cavalry in attack is actually strategically less mobile than a troop of infantry sent to plug the gap. Unlike tanks, cavalry does not actually possess the capacity to concentrate enough offensive power to overwhelm a prepared force of infantry and actually open a breach in a dense field of formations. In this case there is little room for cavalry to maneuvers away from where they would be subjected to the concentrated attention of the other forces.

So I don't think the lessons of the Eastern front holds much for the western front. Trench or no trench.

[Werner]

The answer is likely no. In 1914 the Germans didn't have many submarines, and the bulk of such submarines as the Germans had still burned paraffin for surface propulsion.

No matter how inferior the submarine, there were almost no effective countermeasures against them in 1914/15, apart from ramming or a lucky gun hit. Look at the "Live Bait" squadron in September, 1914.

[JWintjes]

No matter how inferior the submarine, there were almost no effective countermeasures against them in 1914/15, apart from ramming or a lucky gun hit. Look at the "Live Bait" squadron in September, 1914.

On the other hand, the total number of submarines available was not exactly up to the necessities of unrestricted warfare. The boats available would certainly have made an impact, but I wonder whether it would have been great enough to have immediate - or near immediate - results.

Jorit

[Werner]

I would say had they attacked commercial shipping instead of military targets at the onset of the war, the effect would have been out of all proportion to the military effort involved. You simply could not insure your ship or cargo. It would have been a self-imposed embargo.

[JWintjes]

In relation to the size of the ground, the troop density in the east is generally far lower in the east than in the west. The situation in the east is more similar to traditional warfare where foot print of the forces are small in relation to the size of the battlefield, and cavalry has much room to bypass the concentrated firepower of the infantry and artillery army to disturb the communications.

In the west,the density of troops are high, and the foot print of the forces are therefore large in relation to the size of the battlefield. In this case there is little room for cavalry to maneuvers away from where they would be subjected to the concentrated attention of the other forces. Unlike tanks, cavalry does not actually possess the capacity to concentrate enough offensive power to overwhelm a prepared force of infantry and actually open a breach in a dense field of formations.

So I don't think the lessons of the Eastern front holds much for the western front. Trench or no trench.

Ehm, I don't think that's actually correct. The Bavarian attack at Lagarde showed that cavalry could actually break infantry that was, well, in place (if not emplaced). The common view - often repeated these days - is that Lagarde somehow made the Germans rethink their cavalry doctrine, but that's nonsense. The Bavarians charged against artillery and machine guns in a built-up area, and they knew fully well that this was probably the most dangerous thing one could possibly do. They lost a quarter of their personnel and more than half of their horses, but they carried the day. Obviously, that is something you cannot do every day, but then charging infantry is never something that comes without losses.

In fact, massed cavalry attacks would probably have disrupted the Allied attempt at getting to the coastal town first considerably - at least that was the thinking of the field commanders at the time. With, say, Calais and Dunkirk in German hands, the war would definitely have become really interesting...

Jorit

[chuck]

At the onset of the war, no one knew the war would last long enough to make commerce raiding worthwhile.

[JWintjes]

I would say had they attacked commercial shipping instead of military targets at the onset of the war, the effect would have been out of all proportion to the military effort involved. You simply could not insure your ship or cargo. It would have been a self-imposed embargo.

Hm, insurance is indeed a good point - particularly as the scare would probably have been as damaging as the actual, well, damage.

The general downside of unrestricted sub warfare around England was of course a possible disruption of the flow of goods towards the Netherlands and neutral Scandinavia, which was the most profitable way of evading the blockade.

Jorit

[JWintjes]

At the onset of the war, no one knew the war would last long enough to make commerce raiding worthwhile.

No, but we should credit the German High Command with realizing in February 1915 that the war was not to be over by Christmas 1914...

Jorit

[JWintjes]

As I mentioned Lagarde, I might just as well post A. Hoffmann's evocative painting:



Jorit

[chuck]

Ehm, I don't think that's actually correct. The Bavarian attack at Lagarde showed that cavalry could actually break infantry that was, well, in place (if not emplaced). The common view - often repeated these days - is that Lagarde somehow made the Germans rethink their cavalry doctrine, but that's nonsense. The Bavarians charged against artillery and machine guns in a built-up area, and they knew fully well that this was probably the most dangerous thing one could possibly do. They lost a quarter of their personnel and more than half of their horses, but they carried the day. Obviously, that is something you cannot do every day, but then charging infantry is never something that comes without losses.
Jorit

And the Bavarians were effectively finished. They carried the day, but had this occurred during the race to the sea, the enemy would now carry the next day. Enemy reinforcement would almost certainly arrive sooner by railroad than the cavalry formation can retreat or reform.

To make this worthwhile, they must retain the cohesion and strength to operate not only through the penetration of the first infantry formation they come up against, but also every other infantry formation in a dense field of infantry formations crawling up north. Here whether there is room for cavalry to proceed by bypassing infantry formations becomes infinitely more important than whether they actually had any non-zero chance of breaking one infantry formation.

[JWintjes]

And the Bavarians were effectively finished. They carried the day, but had this occurred during the race to the sea, the enemy would now carry the next day. Enemy reinforcement would almost certainly arrive sooner by railroad than the cavalry formation can retreat or reform.

Not if you throw several regiments into the fray. The first thing you learn about how to use cavalry in a conflict is that when you decide to do the dangerous thing and throw it against enemy infantry, you have to do it in a decisive way. That's not what they did at Lagarde - which essentially was a piecemeal action in the bigger scheme of things.

To make this worthwhile, they must retain the cohesion and strength to operate not only through the penetration of the first infantry formation they come up against, but also every other infantry formation in a dense field of infantry formations crawling up north. Here whether there is room for cavalry to proceed by bypassing infantry formations becomes infinitely more important than whether they actually had any non-zero chance of breaking one infantry formation.

I readily agree that it would not have been easy, or happened without considerable losses. But all that was needed was simply throwing the Allied infantry off track and buying some time. This massed cavalry could possibly have done, not to speak of the needs of having suitable recce elements around.

Jorit

[Filipe Ramires]

My take and votes for this basically go to the first two options. Though I am not expert in land warfare me thinks that Germany alone could have take France alone or pretty much alone in a fight. Had unrestricted submarine warfare started earlier in the war and in proper numbers Britain would not have the capability of moving most of her Expeditionary Force to the Continent. If there was a time that unrestricted submarine warfare would have worked well that would have been in WWI when there was little or no capability to fight off submarines until only in the end of the war. Regarding the second option it is pretty much the following of the first one. There is no better weapon (both in finance way or in effectiveness) then the submarine or small torpedo boat flottillas to harass convoys of troop ships on their way to Europe. Lord "Jacky" Fisher was a great big defender of that kind of doctrine before the war and I quote the man:

"Fancy 100.000 helpless, hudded up troops afloat in frightened transports with these invisible demons known to be near ... nothing conceivable more demoralising.".

A proper blockade force operating in the Channel would have pretty much reduced the efforts of Britain to put troops and supllies ashore in France earlier in the war giving time to the German Army to move on and progressively and eventually defeat the French forces.

[chuck]

There is also another issue to consider. I don't know the strengths and locations of the reserves available to the French. If the French had reserves, they might well decide to commit them directly from the west to plug gap next to the sea should there be serious danger of their forces near the front losing the race to the North sea. If one has reserves, one would like to hold it back to exploit opportunities. But if the Germans threaten to outflank the French left near the coast, that would be the time to use the reserves. This would need to be considered in any hypothesis regarding the effect of a German victory in the race to the sea.

Basically, the war in the west has a singular trait that needs to be addressed. It is not merely that trench warfare made static defences very hard to overcome. There is another factor in play favoring the defense even before trench warfare took hold. That is once forces have reached initial staging area, from then on the side on the defensive, falling back on its own rail network, enjoy mechanized mobility through friendly rail system. The side on the offensive, however, is walking. So attack is not mechanized, defense is.

In the race to the sea, the frontal forces are walking, but reserves can be committed by rail. So one should not overemphasize the advantages to be gained should one side or the other gain an apparently lead in the actual race. Because where as the lead must be earned on foot, it can be squashed by mechanization.

[chuck]

me thinks that Germany alone could have take France alone or pretty much alone in a fight. [/i].

The French were not alone. There were the Russians whose involvement cost the Germans 2 full corps. The French attacks at the onset of the war then pinned down 2 more German corps in the South. Even without the British intervention, I suspect the German western offensive in 1914 would have failed for these 4 corps.

Once trench warefare took hold, I suspect France alone on land could hold off Germany alone for a very considerable time, especially if German navy did not have free reign in the North Sea.

[Filipe Ramires]

Once trench warefare took hold, I suspect France alone on land could hold off Germany alone for a very considerable time, especially if German navy did not have free reign in the North Sea.

With a proper blockade policy, the ones defended and feared by Fisher, Germany could have got an equal position in the North Sea comparing to Britain and France. The capital surface ship was mostly a show off product to balance the forces...it was pretty much expensive and useless during most of the war. Efforts should have been moved more to produce submarines in mass production.

[Werner]

Once trench warefare took hold, I suspect France alone on land could hold off Germany alone for a very considerable time, especially if German navy did not have free reign in the North Sea.

With a proper blockade policy, the ones defended and feared by Fisher, Germany could have got an equal position in the North Sea comparing to Britain and France. The capital surface ship was mostly a show off product to balance the forces...it was pretty much expensive and useless during most of the war. Efforts should have been moved more to produce submarines in mass production.

Absolutely. Against the premier naval power, unconventional weapons are the only tactic with a hope.

Deprive France of the BEF and maybe a proportion of it's food from Africa and and the West, and I can imagine the French suing for an armistice in 1915. Heaven knows they had enough political factions for many to see a short term gain from turning on Clemenceau. By the French Army's own reckoning, there were around 30,000 executions a year for desertion. This does not speak to a unified home front.

[JWintjes]

There is also another issue to consider. I don't know the strengths and locations of the reserves available to the French. If the French had reserves, they might well decide to commit them directly from the west to plug gap next to the sea should there be serious danger of their forces near the front losing the race to the North sea. If one has reserves, one would like to hold it back to exploit opportunities. But if the Germans threaten to outflank the French left near the coast, that would be the time to use the reserves. This would need to be considered in any hypothesis regarding the effect of a German victory in the race to the sea.

Most of the French reserves were thrown into the battle for Paris, so that by the time of the dash for the Channel there was not much there for additionally plugging the gap - which is why the window of opportunity opened for the Germans in the first place.

Basically, the war in the west has a singular trait that needs to be addressed. It is not merely that trench warfare made static defences very hard to overcome. There is another factor in play favoring the defense even before trench warfare took hold. That is once forces have reached initial staging area, from then on the side on the defensive, falling back on its own rail network, enjoy mechanized mobility through friendly rail system. The side on the offensive, however, is walking. So attack is not mechanized, defense is.

While I have disagreed with you above I find this general line of reasoning very compelling - with the major caveat that 1) you need sufficient forces in the first place and 2) your rail network needs to be able to support that; there is a line running from Paris to Calais, but once you come to control Ypres that's pretty much useless - and you can't go directly to Ypres from Paris if I remember correctly.

But again, in principle the point is indeed valid - actually, Reichswehr defence planning in the 1920s circled around that.

In the race to the sea, the frontal forces are walking, but reserves can be committed by rail. So one should not overemphasize the advantages to be gained should one side or the other gain an apparently lead in the actual race. Because where as the lead must be earned on foot, it can be squashed by mechanization.

In theory yes. However, due to the small distances involved (mind you, we're talking about a three hours' drive on the motorway, 40 minutes if Werner is behind the wheel... ), any significant lead by the Germans would probably have resulted in the fall of Calais and Dunkirk.

Jorit

[JWintjes]

Once trench warefare took hold, I suspect France alone on land could hold off Germany alone for a very considerable time, especially if German navy did not have free reign in the North Sea.

With a proper blockade policy, the ones defended and feared by Fisher, Germany could have got an equal position in the North Sea comparing to Britain and France. The capital surface ship was mostly a show off product to balance the forces...it was pretty much expensive and useless during most of the war. Efforts should have been moved more to produce submarines in mass production.

Hmmm, I don't like this idea of the High Seas Fleet being merely a fleet-in-being. It was used that way for much of the war, but it could have been used differently - if you look at the planning behind Doggerbank you clearly see that the main idea behind bombarding coastal cities was trying to pull inferior forces out to the sea in order to ambush them with the van of the fleet. Now, this failed several times for various reasons, mainly because the HSF was not used aggressively enough. But imagine one successful engagement, resulting in most if not all of the RN battlecruiser force being wiped out, even if at the price of a number of German capital ships. The potential impact on British politics would have been enormous - in 1914/15, the pre-Kitchener years, we're still in the timeframe when there is some political dissent about the war in general.

Of course, it could also have served to stiffen the British resolve. Then again, it would have set German morale skyrocketing and made a redirection of the British war effort necessary (invasion scare etc etc). So in all, an awful lot to gain from these capital ships - unless you keep them swinging at their moorings...

Jorit

[JWintjes]

With a proper blockade policy, the ones defended and feared by Fisher, Germany could have got an equal position in the North Sea comparing to Britain and France. The capital surface ship was mostly a show off product to balance the forces...it was pretty much expensive and useless during most of the war. Efforts should have been moved more to produce submarines in mass production.

Absolutely. Against the premier naval power, unconventional weapons are the only tactic with a hope.

Deprive France of the BEF and maybe a proportion of it's food from Africa and and the West, and I can imagine the French suing for an armistice in 1915. Heaven knows they had enough political factions for many to see a short term gain from turning on Clemenceau. By the French Army's own reckoning, there were around 30,000 executions a year for desertion. This does not speak to a unified home front.

Although I agree in principle, slight correction is necessary here: the official number is something around 600 for the whole war. It almost certainly is too low, but not by a huge margin - after the mutinies in 1917, arguably one of the worst crisis the French army faced, less than 50 men were actually shot, even if over 500 were sentenced to death originally.

Jorit

[ar]

I know the definitions of the word "virtual", and the definition of the word "history". So I ask, please define the phrase "virtual history". THank you.

Okay, taking it a little more seriously.

I think what you are looking for is something along the lines of "what could central powers have done differently that, had it been done differently, would have been unanswerable by the allies?". But what you are asking is simply "Could central powers have made better decisions?", without addressing the capacity of allies to answer them, and without crediting the allies with a parallel increase in decision making quality comparable to what the central powers would have needed to make their own better decisions.

Well, you point at a general problem regarding the methodology of virtual history - obviously, something "unanswerable by the allies" is really, really difficult to find. The way we went about it was simply looking at what happened and where certain decisions led to eventual failure.

Let's take the cavalry thing as an example - the disposition at the beginning of the war was something the Allies had neither influence over nor precise knowledge of. Had there been more cavalry - or had it been better positioned - it would simply have added considerable weight to the German attempts without really offering the Allies an opportunity to do something different.

Jorit