"The Biggest Boondoggle"???

[bengtsson]

Werner had the idea that no missile or torpedo could survive the USN countermeasures. He read too many press releases from manufacturers.

The Submarine in my experience didn't have a huge problem getting into torpedo range of Carrier groups, even with their nuclear attack sub escort. Believe it or not, although a sub is the best ASW platform by far, they are no sure things against another boat. In today's world, the Submarine is not limited to close approach or definite fire control solution. A good bearing [very easy to get] and plot giving course and speed [not hard given a little time], then you can release say 3-4 anti shipping missiles from a very comfortable distance. If that fails, the slow silent approach has been proven to work over and over again. Only difference between exercises of this type and actual warfare, if that you find out whether the warheads go off as advertised. I think sonars work the same whether warheads are activated or not. Just calling it a war doesn't change anything about the Boats approach and launch. And yes, if you can take a close up photo of the Carriers whirling propellers under water. Then you can imagine sticking some torpedoes in him.

Bob B.

[Filipe Ramires]

Werner occasionally referred to close-in hardkill torpedo defences being developed, but how much of that is fact?

Basically you can trust mostly on conventional ECM's, your own escort ASW torpedoes or RBU's to destroy incoming torpedoes. What possibly Werner was referring and others as well is the lower hull mounted gun turrets using supercavitation technology in their shells...some sort of underwater CIWS. Drawings and studies have been made in the last decade but as you can imagine and taking into account the reducing investments in ASW technology such kind of weapons are still a bit far to come in the future. Ten years ago many people (including me) were dreaming that steady investment in these technologies (like supercavitation, electromagnetic propulsion, further stealth capability, long-range artillery, etc etc etc) would bring a major technology revolution in the next 2 or 3 decades in naval design and warfare. Some of these technologies have met some support and development but yet are still far behind the expected. Perhaps it was more simple when things were in paper rather then in reality. Other technologies, like ASW ones, have met very little support lately. Like Walt and Bob said...the USN ASW capability is far from being what it was once. And why all this is happening?? Because some politicians simply don't see any use for such techs and therefore move efforts to reduce further investments on them...or actually in any military technology. Apparently this breed of politicians think that they can solve future conflicts with simple kind words and a pen and a paper to sign the treaties. Didn't that kind of episode happened in the 30's??? The outcome was what we know today (1939-1945). Politicians are relying too much on diplomacy today. When it fails I want to see them rushing to solve the problem and they have no solution. Of course they will have a solution but at what cost?? How many lives are needed to be lost so that they can wake up from their pink-diplomatic dreams and face the reality???

[chuck]

I think sonars work the same whether warheads are activated or not. Just calling it a war doesn't change anything about the Boats approach and launch. And yes, if you can take a close up photo of the Carriers whirling propellers under water. Then you can imagine sticking some torpedoes in him.

Bob B.

Just calling it a war means the carriers now takes the possibility of the boat's approach seriously, will exert all their resources, ingenuity and skill, through every level of chain of command from theater commander to ship captain, towards keeping the carrier from the submarine and smoothing the carrier's path towards accomplishing the specific mission, and not give a wit about whether the submariner gets some ego boosting practice and be properly rewarded for a good approach. And the carrier has a much easier job with its 30 knot speed and 500 mile mission reach to accomplish its mission without even having to tangle with the submarine than the submarine has of approaching to within its own mission range, especially if the submarine has no serious external real-time intelligence while the carrier does, as would likely be the case in the world right now.

If you can take a close up photo of the carrier's whirling propeller in peace doesn't mean the carrier will be in the same frame of mind to let you do it in war.

[chuck]

Politicians are relying too much on diplomacy today. When it fails I want to see them rushing to solve the problem and they have no solution. Of course they will have a solution but at what cost?? How many lives are needed to be lost so that they can wake up from their pink-diplomatic dreams and face the reality???

Hmmm, You must be vacationing on a planet over 6 light years away from Earth. It appears that information about Iraq, traveling 6 years at speed of light, have not yet reached you.

[Dick J]

I would like to throw in a few things to be considered.

1. In the 1930's, all of the wargames expected a carrier to be totally incapacitated by just two bomb hits and sunk by anything more. WW-II proved the CV's to be far tougher than ANY pre-war estimates - and not just the armored deck types. Bombs and torpedoes rarely did as much damage as they had been expected to. As was mentioned, only when a CV is put on the bottom will we know how vulnerable they really are. Until then, it is just your best guess.

2. Today's torpedoes are NOT that much more powerful (if at all) than the WW-II types. They ARE better at detonating below the keel, and that is why they are more effective. WW-II attempts to detonate there were significantly less than successful. However, I am not aware of any under-the-keel tests actually being conducted on a maneuvering target. Again, only a CV on the bottom will prove the effectiveness. Until then, this is just another best guess.

3. Post WW-II, the CV was considered to be dead until the Korean War showed that they were the best source of tactical air support in that conflict. The Air Force had lost all their bases within tactical range and it was not considered politically correct to "save" South Korea by nuking it. While it is true that there are no significant navies to fight, the CV's real mission has been power projection ashore ever since 1950. That mission has NOT gone away.

[bismarck builder]

guys
i guess the only way to prove how effective the sub driver is or the carrier screen is to fire torpedoes with out the warheads at the bird farm after all a photo just means that the sub driver was close not that he had any fish left
gary

[Walt]

In modern SS warfare the Conventional Torpedo is basicly an anti submarine and shorter range weapon due to it's range and design.. The CVs and task force groups will be targeted with "field grade" nuke torpedos or subrock weapons as they have been for the past 45 years and most recently sub launched VLR weapons for which there is little to do except make your peace with your creator. Of course the Sub would be an easy kill once the action started but the SS will always have the good fortune of surprise, and choice of when and where to strike putting the CV and her group at their mercy.
If I was the ruler of a Country I would put all my defence money into submarines and fast medium range surface craft that have long range strike abilitys. Exchanging a Submarine for a CV is a great deal in anyone's war plans.

Someone mentioned the USN's own submarine screen that a CVN task group has. This is true. But the screen is not nearly as effective as it was because of the longer ranges a CV can be hit by a enemy sub.. It's a big Ocean and finding a boat on the prowl is still like looking for a needle in a haystack. And harder still when the Boat doesn't want to be found.
Especially a deep diving super quiet rather fast Battery powered DBF boat with little or no IR signature or thermal discharge to betray them to satallite or ASW searchs, that has state of the art ECM and other Counter measure equipment that is now available to them. These DBFs are relatively cheap and easy to maintain and to man for most smaller Navies of the world. It puts them into the big leagues of CVN and SSN hunters.
Having talked with a few active SSN operators the later senerio is their biggest worry today. The PLA has recently demonstrated how easy this is done..well within the ranges of their boat's "conventional" weapons. As an ex US Navy Submariner I was impressed by their feats as well as embarrased and concerned.

[Devin]

I'm with Bob B., while I've never been a fan of the bubblehead realm, I have to admit that EVERY time we did wargames, subs got into the carrier screen. I can't count how many times we'd be on the mid-watch, the lookouts would report a flare launch next to the carrier (one landed on Forrestal's deck once and started yet another fire), and then the captain would be in combat screaming at the sonar techs. True, getting a sub in proximity does not guarantee a kill -- see WWII torpedo performance -- but it sure helps.

The simple fact that I think most people forget, and what I did not realize until I put some hours sitting in CIC and running the drills is this: in a "world war" real-life situation, modern warships are not expected to survive. Period. In an actual hot and shooting war, a ship in a combat zone has very little life expectancy. The mission is the goal; after the carrier gets that initial strike off, anything else in the way of combat and survival is gravy. The same for the screening ships. As far as the US Navy goes, the priority is Mission, then Ship, then Crew.

[Jack Ray]

Speaking of exercises, does anyone have any idea how effective ASW is in exercises? Are sub hunting techniques effective?

Jack

[Walt]

Speaking of exercises, does anyone have any idea how effective ASW is in exercises? Are sub hunting techniques effective?

Jack

Jack,I do believe that they are very effective..as a reaction not a proactive defence unless given prior warning of a aggressor subs proximity.

Due to the nature of the hunt the Submarine usually always knows where it's hunter is. Unless of course it's another Sub.. Then it's much like blindman's bluff.. Both become the hunter as well as the hunted. The passive nature of a submarines counter measures and offensive weapons systems is also it's advantage. The hunter is most usually in a "Active" search mode giving the hunted much warning and location etc. SSN's by their design are expendable.. It's the damage they can render a surface target before they are discovered or located that make's them so darn bad... During several hunt and kill exercises I experienced while I was on a boat we always got in the first punch and most othertimes several more shots before being cross haired by a ASW operator.. That is plenty in a real time situation.
The modern SSN is light years ahead of anything I had experience with as well as it is for today's ASW, but the advantages still lay with the Hunter. And I'll wager that today as it was in the past the Submarines worse nightmare is another Submarine. And a CVN's best friend as well as biggest fear is a frendly or bad guy Submarine:big_grin:

[Filipe Ramires]

Hmmm, You must be vacationing on a planet over 6 light years away from Earth. It appears that information about Iraq, traveling 6 years at speed of light, have not yet reached you.

Actually I wouldn't mind taking my holidays in some tropical planet light years away but again even Space Race investments are a bit down today!!! The situation on Iraq I am well aware but we are speaking of a kind of saturation war or occupation of hostile territory...classic in any late or post war occupation of enemy territory. Military want and are needed in Iraq for certain...politicians are not that certain and like this professor and their own kind think they would drop Iraq in one minute notice if they could. Keeping a war is never a good thing for a politicians career...it is actually political suicide...regardless the costs that it might have. What's going on in Obama's mind regarding Iraq or Afghanistan or any other potential conflicts looming up in the horizon!?!?!?!

[Filipe Ramires]

1. In the 1930's, all of the wargames expected a carrier to be totally incapacitated by just two bomb hits and sunk by anything more. WW-II proved the CV's to be far tougher than ANY pre-war estimates - and not just the armored deck types. Bombs and torpedoes rarely did as much damage as they had been expected to. As was mentioned, only when a CV is put on the bottom will we know how vulnerable they really are. Until then, it is just your best guess.

Akagi was crippled by one single bomb hit according to the latest studies.
Ark Royal was sunk by one single submarine torpedo.
Wasp turned into pyros when hit by two submarine torpedoes...nearly impossible to save.

Weapons might not be that dangerous but what good is a ship without proper damage control parties; with the flight deck pierced by one bomb and therefore without further capability of landing or taking off operations; with her vitals damaged to the point that not even the best damage control parties can save her. There are cases in WWII that carriers took a lot of punishment and survived...other cases just show how very little is needed to take a carrier to the bottom.

2. Today's torpedoes are NOT that much more powerful (if at all) than the WW-II types. They ARE better at detonating below the keel, and that is why they are more effective. WW-II attempts to detonate there were significantly less than successful. However, I am not aware of any under-the-keel tests actually being conducted on a maneuvering target. Again, only a CV on the bottom will prove the effectiveness. Until then, this is just another best guess.

True about moving or even evading sitting duck targets. However, one thing is to be hit, nearly at waterline level, by one torpedo...you can still do some damage control and with proper counter-flooding correct the listing of the ship. The ship is disabled in any case. Any warship taking a torpedo hit is off the fleet for repairs...it is unwise to keep a torpedo hit ship around. A ship taking a torpedo hit below the keel, depending of course of what kind of ship it is, it will most likely break in two...with that scenario little can be done by damage control parties. Perhaps a carrier will not break in two but again it will be disabled and off from operations and to spend quite a few weeks in a dry-dock for repairs. WWII torpedoes were meant to punch holes on the sides of the ships and let the water in and therefore going to the bottom with the extra weight. Torpedoes today not only do that but inflict far more dangerous structural damage. Structural damage kills the integrity of any surface ship or submarine.

3. Post WW-II, the CV was considered to be dead until the Korean War showed that they were the best source of tactical air support in that conflict. The Air Force had lost all their bases within tactical range and it was not considered politically correct to "save" South Korea by nuking it. While it is true that there are no significant navies to fight, the CV's real mission has been power projection ashore ever since 1950. That mission has NOT gone away.

With this I completely agree like I said in a previous post of mine. Carriers can do things that a submarine cannot therefore they are still the best means for conventional power projection.

[bengtsson]

Walt might agree with this. One reason the Carrier's own submarine screen and also the surface screen has SO much trouble detecting the attacking submarine is because the area around the Carrier group is as noisy as a Rock Concert. I mean underwater of course. In sonar Noise = lack of sonar performance. Now the attacker likes noise, lots of lovely noise! That is how he manages time and again to penetrate ASW screens. Myself, I have missed Soviet Subs due to the snapping shrimp. These little buggers sound like very loud frying bacon. Believe it or not, that is often time all it takes to foil passive sub sonar if a silent boat is near by. And a conventional boat on batteries is pretty silent.

Bob B.

[chuck]

Walt might agree with this. One reason the Carrier's own submarine screen and also the surface screen has SO much trouble detecting the attacking submarine is because the area around the Carrier group is as noisy as a Rock Concert. I mean underwater of course. In sonar Noise = lack of sonar performance. Now the attacker likes noise, lots of lovely noise! That is how he manages time and again to penetrate ASW screens. Myself, I have missed Soviet Subs due to the snapping shrimp. These little buggers sound like very loud frying bacon. Believe it or not, that is often time all it takes to foil passive sub sonar if a silent boat is near by. And a conventional boat on batteries is pretty silent.

Bob B.

A spherical sonar array pick sound up by its direction, the same with a submarine's towed array sonars. The directional resolution of the multi-hydrophone directional sonar is such that noise from one direction will not seriously obscure noise from another. Direction sonar would not be much bothered by white noise in the water so long is the white noise is coming from one direction and the submarine from another. So a ship or a submarine on the perimeter of a task group will be able to listen for a submarine coming in from the outside of the task group despite the louder noise coming from the task group itself.

Regarding the diesel submarine's silence, a diesel submarine can't go very far while silent, and the high underwater speed quoted for modern SSK is a short duration burst speed that could not be kept up for more than 20-30 NM. The real range of silent mobility of a SSK is very short compared to the distance at which a carrier's airgroup can strike. So unless the opponent is so lucky as to place a diesel right in the path of a carrier, the diesel boat can be as silent as she wish, she simply lacks the mobility to stand a high chance of intercepting the CVBG.

[chuck]

Akagi was crippled by one single bomb hit according to the latest studies.

Akagi's latest studies consist of one (1) study by one very opinionated person who wrote the "shattered sword". His research on the internal layout of Japanese carriers, upon which he based so much of his theory, consisted at least in part of buying a 1/700 scale plastic model of Japanese carriers and reading the sketch diagrams that came with its instructions. So reliable did he regard this source of evidence that he even reproduced that diagram, properly credited to the plastic model manufacturer, in his book, as evidence.

Ark Royal was sunk by one single submarine torpedo.
Wasp turned into pyros when hit by two submarine torpedoes...nearly impossible to save.

So what? They were both fairly small carriers roughly comparable to heavy cruisers in full load displacement. Consequently their underwater damage resistance should be expected to be about the same as that of a heavy cruiser. And indeed their performance is right in line with what one expectes from a heavy cruiser of about 18,000 tons.

We can also extrapolate from their performance, and performance of other warships of the era, roughly how many total torpedo hits on both sides ships with of different full load displacements, outfitted with WWII standard damage control, can on average be expected to survive.

15,000 tons 1-2 torpedoes

30,000 tons: 3-4 torpedoes

40,000 tons: 6-7 torpedoes

50,000 tons: ~10 torpedoes

70,000 tons: >15 torpedoes

From this we might extrapolate that a modern super carrier of about 100,000 tons can withstand many torpedoes hits indeed.


As to ships being broken in halves by underkeel explosion, keep in mind that all the spectacular photos of target ships broken in half are on ships with light construction and longitudinal framing. In other words ships whose hull is built like an airplane fuselage, with all the load paths on the ship's skin. All modern cruisers and destroyers are built like this. But heavy carriers? AFAIK, they are still built with transverse framing with multiple internal load path, rather like battleships. In this case I see no reason at all why they would be particularly susceptible to massive structure failure resulting from an moderate sized underkeel explosion.

[bengtsson]

Amazing! And here we didn't even know that Carrier task groups were invulnerable to submarine attack. Funny that that wasn't taught at either Submarine Sonar School or Surface Sonar School at the Fleet ASW School in San Diego

Bob B.

[Gone Asiatic]

Amazing! And here we didn't even know that Carrier task groups were invulnerable to submarine attack. Funny that that wasn't taught at either Submarine Sonar School or Surface Sonar School at the Fleet ASW School in San Diego

Bob B.

The OOUUTTRRAGE!

The Fling was a great place for a beer or two, as was the Lost Paycheck across the street.

[chuck]

Amazing! And here we didn't even know that Carrier task groups were invulnerable to submarine attack. Funny that that wasn't taught at either Submarine Sonar School or Surface Sonar School at the Fleet ASW School in San Diego

Bob B.

For the sake of your morale, they had to protect your ego from being trampled upon by reality.


Okay, let's not argue from extreme positions here. What I am saying is the difficulties involved in any other power using a plausible submarine force to prevent US carrier task force from carrying out most missions is very large, and large enough to make one assume that the carrier will remain effective as both an instrument of peacetime policy and as instrument of various levels of war for long enough to justify building new carriers.

I said nothing about whether the US submarine fleet, equipped with far more nuclear submarine than anyone else, and benefiting from a unique system of global operational intelligence assets and global communication network, can not inflict serious casualties upon a US carrier task force.

I am not even saying that a third power, equipped with plausible submarine fleet and supporting assets, have no chance of inflicting serious casualties upon US carrier force.

What I am saying is US carrier forces, equipped with supporting assets no available or expected, stands a much better chance of being able to accomplish it mission against a hostile third power equipped with a plausible submarine force and supporting assets in the near future.

[bengtsson]

Amazing! And here we didn't even know that Carrier task groups were invulnerable to submarine attack. Funny that that wasn't taught at either Submarine Sonar School or Surface Sonar School at the Fleet ASW School in San Diego

Bob B.

The OOUUTTRRAGE!

The Fling was a great place for a beer or two, as was the Lost Paycheck across the street.

Hey man! I was in the Navy for almost 4 years before I reached legal drinking age! The bars were off limits for us kids. Got arrested for underage drinking 3 weekends in a row while doing my year and a half at sub sonar courses at Fleet ASW School. Had friends buy us bottles at the liquor stores on Rosecrans street and either threw them over the fence to collect later or drank up on the hill overlooking NTC. Anyway you cut it, the San Diego Police and the Barracks MAA both took our being hammered very seriously


Chuck. I agree, getting at a USN Carrier Force is no easy task. I only maintain it can be done, and has been done by our own submarines. I can't speak for foreign sub forces. Passive sonar is indeed directional, very much so. My point is that there are vulnerable areas, and the closer you get the louder and more disturbed the water. It is always far, far easier for the sub to know where the Carrier group is and to plot where it is going. Making ambush alot easier. There is a reason the USN went to using our own Nuclear Subs as Carrier escorts. That was the proven ability time after time of USN subs getting inside the ASW screen.

I also see the advent of the sub launched super sonic anti shipping missile as a "Game Changer". Attacks from over the horizon are now possible, and on limited fire control data. Simply my opinion that But it isn't my Navy any more, getting in close to deliver a torpedo isn't the only option.

Bob B.

[Walt]

Walt might agree with this. One reason the Carrier's own submarine screen and also the surface screen has SO much trouble detecting the attacking submarine is because the area around the Carrier group is as noisy as a Rock Concert. I mean underwater of course. In sonar Noise = lack of sonar performance. Now the attacker likes noise, lots of lovely noise! That is how he manages time and again to penetrate ASW screens. Myself, I have missed Soviet Subs due to the snapping shrimp. These little buggers sound like very loud frying bacon. Believe it or not, that is often time all it takes to foil passive sub sonar if a silent boat is near by. And a conventional boat on batteries is pretty silent.

Bob B.

A spherical sonar array pick sound up by its direction, the same with a submarine's towed array sonars. The directional resolution of the multi-hydrophone directional sonar is such that noise from one direction will not seriously obscure noise from another. Direction sonar would not be much bothered by white noise in the water so long is the white noise is coming from one direction and the submarine from another. So a ship or a submarine on the perimeter of a task group will be able to listen for a submarine coming in from the outside of the task group despite the louder noise coming from the task group itself.

Regarding the diesel submarine's silence, a diesel submarine can't go very far while silent, and the high underwater speed quoted for modern SSK is a short duration burst speed that could not be kept up for more than 20-30 NM. The real range of silent mobility of a SSK is very short compared to the distance at which a carrier's airgroup can strike. So unless the opponent is so lucky as to place a diesel right in the path of a carrier, the diesel boat can be as silent as she wish, she simply lacks the mobility to stand a high chance of intercepting the CVBG.

The whole premise of the modern SSK is defensive in nature. To patrol and defend coastal waters against other boats as well as skimmers..It's the weapons and weapons systems carried by the SSK that have the speed, range, accuracy and wallop to trash a CV from way...way down range. As a result of recent tests of loaned SSKs by the USN they are now seriously considering them for our own use. As for a Submarine's ability to mask itself, decoy and confuse it's hunters with various types of ECM, and decoys, speed and stealth you would be surprised what they have available to them to to initiate a first strike situation.
In a major engagement on the high seas today the winner will be the one who was quickest on the trigger. After the attack is launched by the Attack Submarine there will be plenty of noise to mask a high speed departure. In a match up of a CV and her escorts against one or several attack boats the Surface vessels are in deep trouble. The CV still has a major and important purpose in our Navy's inventory, especially in support of far off regions of the world that need support either in a humanitarian or amphibious operation. Power projection against a modern Navy that has a modern submarine force SSK or SSN is no longer one of them. Like the BB before them the CV has become a "BFT" big Fat target.