What-If LCS Flight II: Littoral Combat Ship Improvement

[carr]

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[Timmy C]

Thanks Bob, they must've mentioned it in the verbal brief then.

Before I forget re. the Absalons, they are armoured for 25mm rounds in certain areas, so are also not strictly civilian standards. This further complicates the answer as to how they were built for so cheap.

[carr]

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[Timmy C]

That's exactly right, isn't it? It's why I'm wary of using the Absalon as a stand-in point of comparison, as Bustos had proposed - there must be some factors extraneous to the design that allows for their allegedly low cost.

[SumGui]

The LCS program needs to go away.

The platforms cannot effectively escort anything, they cannot sweep mines (and this is not just a mission package problem - they cannot take shock and a '40 knot' vessel is completely inappropriate to sweep), they are too big to take on small boats, and they lack the ability to stay in a fight (not just lacking in damage resistance, but lacking in personnel).

They should be cancelled and sold off immediately, so we can buy an effective Frigate (escort, my current favorite for a basis to modify is the Japanese Akizuki or Takanami class), an effective littoral combat vessel (Absalon, F125 - essentially a 'light' LPD which can defend itself - these were called APDs in WW II...) a small combat vessel (right now my favorite is the Egyptian Ambassador class, but look to the Nordics for other great examples) and recapitalization of the MCM fleet.

The only thing the LCS has is helos - and while important - they add size to the MCM/PC mission, the '40 knots' is only needed in the PC mission, the modularity is really only useful in the 'light LPD' platform, they lack endurance for escort missions (crew and maintenance endurance - all endurance is not fuel), do not have weapons with any range to defend any vessels being escorted, troops put ashore, or itself against anything except a small boat - and even then, there better not be too many of them.

All of these non-compatible traits have ensured failure of the entire project.

They have the ability to defend nothing, they have the ability to threaten nothing. They are useless as a weapons platform. They are a liability which should be done away with immediately.

[Busto963]

As with comparing crew sizes, be cautious when comparing costs. ...

Good luck comparing costs between countries!

Great points!

The May 2013 CRS report addresses costs, but determining the *true* per-unit cost of an LCS is a challenge. We have research and development, military construction (buildings and facilities!), as well as the base hull rolled up into the procurement. And since the base hull is essentially worthless sans modules� Besides, even payment schedule (*when* payments are) affects �true� costs when billions dollar multi-year contracts are let (a dollar today is worth more than a dollar ten-years from now).

Another point regarding Absalom is the relative strength of the Danish ship building industry versus the health of the U.S. ship building industry. In this case, I think the Danes were able to leverage a lot more given the fact that they have, or at least had, a strong commercial sector with plenty of large merchant hull construction experiences, whereas the U.S. shipbuilding industry pretty much builds barges.

[Busto963]

The LCS program needs to go away� They are a liability ...

Agree

[Busto963]

All of these non-compatible traits have ensured failure of the entire project.

Hmmm.

I think that what really makes the LCS so impotent is the lack of onboard sensors commensurate with the primary mission set (MCM, ASW, and SUW (counter-swarm)). It is fantastic to expect a 3000 ton ship to do ASW or MCM without a sonar. The Navy erroneously assumed away all issues by expecting a helicopter, or �modules� (bits and pieces from shipping container) to do the job.

It is hard to believe that no one in the Pentagon, White House, or Congress challenged the LCS concept on the basis of zero platform sensors. ASW is hard with hull mounted *and* a towed array or variable depth sonar � who thought you can do it without these tools!

Someone will take me to task over MCM sonar, but, given the limited endurance of an H-60, which also failed to meet expectations as a significant MCM helicopter, and the yet to be fielded/proven MCM drones; this has proven to be a huge issue. You cannot hunt drifting mines, because they drift! You have to sweep! This was, and remains a threat in the PG and Straits of Hormuz. Many mines are simple and can be dealt with by some combination of acoustic, pressure, magnetic, or mechanical sweeps. And even with sophisticated mines, the expectation is (or should be) that the MCM �proof� swept channels by transiting them before high value assets like a CG or DDG. Since no minefield on land or sea can be guaranteed to be100% clear of mines, sonar gives you one last chance to detect a mine before taking casualties.

[SumGui]

As with comparing crew sizes, be cautious when comparing costs. Aside from the obvious things like exchange rates or subsidized labor, be sure that the degree of completion is the same. I know nothing about the Absalon but the contract price for the LCS of around $500M is only for the hull, essentially. All the electronics, weapons, sensors, computers, and most of the fittings are supplied from a separate government account line so the true cost of the LCS is $500M plus whatever the rest of the equipment costs. I've never seen the additional amount specified but a reasonable guess is $200M-$300M.

Good luck comparing costs between countries!

It will always be near impossible to compare costs directly, especially when the output (ships in this case) are not identical. In the US, the press likes to publish worst-case scenarios to generate more angst and get more people to read their article. As if adding program costs onto each vessel without doing the same to foreign comparisons wasn't enough...

[Busto963]

It will always be near impossible to compare costs directly, especially when the output (ships in this case) are not identical. In the US, the press likes to publish worst-case scenarios to generate more angst and get more people to read their article. As if adding program costs onto each vessel without doing the same to foreign comparisons wasn't enough...

In the Security Assistance world (Foreign Military Sales) the killer is always maintenance and repair parts.

No one seems to understand that you need to train maintenance crews, buy tech manuals, budget for tech assist visits and overhauls, paying a share to key manufacturing lines open, in addition to spare parts if you want your stuff to work.

Imagine that...

[SumGui]

It will always be near impossible to compare costs directly, especially when the output (ships in this case) are not identical. In the US, the press likes to publish worst-case scenarios to generate more angst and get more people to read their article. As if adding program costs onto each vessel without doing the same to foreign comparisons wasn't enough...

In the Security Assistance world (Foreign Military Sales) the killer is always maintenance and repair parts.

No one seems to understand that you need to train maintenance crews, buy tech manuals, budget for tech assist visits and overhauls, paying a share to key manufacturing lines open, in addition to spare parts if you want your stuff to work.

Imagine that...

Yep - I have some friends who occasionally rail about the cost of maintenance or replacement military equipment (don't worry, I love a heated debate...) and I ask how old their car is.

1994 (DDG-51)? 1962 (KC-135)? 1975 (CVN-68)?

Most people here on the west coast don't even live in houses as old as some of the equipment still in use.

[carr]

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[Busto963]

To be fair to the Navy, the original concept was that the LCS would simply support and operate a host of off-board, networked sensors whether for ASW or MCM. Thus, the LCS didn't need sensors since the sensors would be contained on/in remote vehicles and disbursed throughout the battlefield by the myriad remote, unmanned vehicles. The LCS would stand well out of range of any danger and let the networked sensors and "weapons" do their job. The fallacy, of course, was that NONE of the conceptual off-board sensors/weapons existed, all were flights of near-science fiction, and none yet exist as they were originally envisioned. In summary, the concept was fine, the technology was imaginary!

Agree.

My concern remains that MCM and ASW are volume search problems, and the solution to the search and detection problem relies upon sensors: in numbers, effectiveness, and deployment. TACTASS is orders of magnitude more effective than a sonar buoy or drone. Ergo you have to deploy a huge number of these networked sensors to equal a highly effective platform mounted one. Ideally you combine the large platform sensor (better still, large numbers of platforms) with masses of networked smaller sensors.

I again express my amazement in that no one looked at effectiveness (FOM), projected sweep rates, and other critical issues of these hypothetical sensors. As soon as people start talking about UUVs that move slower than manatees and mounting sonars the size of basket balls, someone should have started asking hard questions about feasibility. This is a problem first year operations research students should be able to handle.

To mix metaphors a bit, the Navy created the parameters of a disaster and then painted themselves into the corner with every subsequent decision and are now reaping what they've sown (how's that for crappy prose?).

Sadly accurate.

Is this a segue to a LCS version 2.0 discussion [separate thread], or should the topic (and the platform) die a slow painful death?

Last call?

[carr]

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[Busto963]

Is this a segue to a LCS version 2.0 discussion [separate thread], or should the topic (and the platform) die a slow painful death?

This is (or started as) the LCS 2.0 thread by David (am I misunderstanding your question?).

Modifications to the current LCS would be 1.x - I assumed that LCS 2.0 would be a completely new design.

[carr]

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[SumGui]

LCS 'should be' (yes this means my opinion...) a much smaller platform closer to the Streetfighter concept.

Self deployability and helicopter facilities were probably the primary drivers which caused a balloon in size (see my comments from my experience with the Cyclone class PCs...).

They should be much smaller, and operate in groups (Squadron of 6 in two groups of three) assigned to a forward operating base or tender (a converted LSD-41 may work, an Absalon-like vessel may be sufficient to support a half squadron of 3) where the aviation resides and is passed forward to the smaller vessels, and maintenance and support also reside (after all, where does a one hit ship go once they have to withdraw due to taking that hit?).

These vessels should not operate alone, the concept is that they work together to support each other.

Three examples of the 'proper' size:

Visby - maybe a little too big still due to the Helo facilities, but that could allow for on-board drones and a platform for helos from other platforms to leapfrog.

Ambassador Mk III - good blend of size to capability

Hamina - a smaller option which may be able to fill most of the roles

LCS should not concern itself with deep water/open ocean ASW (that is a Frigate job), or MCM (that is a specific platform, look to the Nordics again...)

[navydavesof]

I think Dave sort of gave up on the idea of making anything useful out of the LCS. The so-called export versions of the LCS, while more useful than the original, still have serious shortcomings as evidenced by the total lack of serious interest from any foreign buyers.

Bob is pretty close. Instead of killing my interest in it, it has made me think about how the two designs could be used to meet the requirements set forth in the Proceedings article Bob has cited many times. I think in theory the problems can be worked out while keeping them small enough to be LCS ships and not ballooning them into proper "frigates" or larger (no 8" gun or huge amounts of VLS or anything like that).

For instance, what makes sense to me is that, like laid out in the article, there would be times where they would have to operate in pairs. The ASuW version would have to accompany the mine warfare version. The ASuW version could provide counter battery fire while the MW version did its business. These are all things I am going to have to elaborate on later...

Ex: ASuW version:
Fort Worth with a 5" gun and 8 VLS forward, 32 Mk41 VLS with 16 on either side of the hangar, two 76mm guns on the forward most part of the helo deck, two Millenium Guns, and both SPQ-9B and TRS-3D acting as counter-battery radar to direct the 5" in CB fire. As carr has mentioned, the Sea Cobras would work very well with the ASuW role, and a Shadow UAV detachment would do wonders for greater situational awareness and target spotting and designation.

ASW/MineW:
The LCS-2 type design has the size to accommodate and store the Mh-53, but not the strength. It may somehow be able to be re-enforced enough to where it could accommodate the MH-53s needed to sweep for mines, it's own VLS suite, etc.

Personally, the only use I can see for the LCS is to remake them as specialized, single purpose vessels...Even then, they would require total makeovers to be marginally effective. They would probably make interesting concept models but wouldn't be very practical in the real world.

The single purpose part I agree with 100%. That is what I think we should wind up with. However, the MCM job really seems like it's having to stay with the wooden-hulled Avenger-type ships.

If we want a combatant-type MCM we might only need to look to the wooden-hulled German Gepard-class missile craft. Replacing the Exocet launchers with criss-cross Harpoons and moving the RAM (or other CIWS) forward, they may indeed have the above deck area to embark various sensors and be able to launch unmanned vessels from the stern or over the sides.

It's worth looking into for my fellow WIFers.

Anyway, back to real ASW for me, guys. Have a good day!

[SumGui]

Ex: ASuW version:
Fort Worth with a 5" gun and 8 VLS forward, 32 Mk41 VLS with 16 on either side of the hangar, two 76mm guns on the forward most part of the helo deck, two Millenium Guns, and both SPQ-9B and TRS-3D acting as counter-battery radar to direct the 5" in CB fire. As carr has mentioned, the Sea Cobras would work very well with the ASuW role, and a Shadow UAV detachment would do wonders for greater situational awareness and target spotting and designation.

I'd lean towards the OTO LW 127/64 for the higher rate of fire and Volcano for your 5" mount.

How would you load out those 40 cells? My first thought is Quadpack ESSM forward, with four cells on each flank also carrying ESSM, leaving 24 cells open.

Could be LRASM, or additional Whiffing could let you put a Naval version of a MLRS rocket in quadpacks for shore fire support. The SDB version of the weapon under development may have utility for anti-ship against small targets, and a bomblet payload may be good against a grouping of small boats or even to a lot of small topside damage (sensors, exposed crew and equipment damage). Already covered in other threads that I think the USN should get down with Naval versions of MLRS. Sorry beating the dead horse here...(Hi, my name is Dan, and I have a Quadpacking problem. This is not my first meeting...)

Anti ship missiles? Harpoons anywhere? NSM would be a good fit for this platform, does not require quite as much weight on a per-round basis as Harpoon.

ASW/MineW:
The LCS-2 type design has the size to accommodate and store the Mh-53, but not the strength. It may somehow be able to be re-enforced enough to where it could accommodate the MH-53s needed to sweep for mines, it's own VLS suite, etc.

LCS-2 needs some VLS forward - how many would fit? If ESSM could be shipped forward, a secondary gun may be able to go on the hangar roof in the location occupied by SeaRam currently (I know, below deck arrangement would have to be changed). That could be a second 57mm or both could switch to 76mm - not sure. If not, Millennium guns on the aft hangar corners, perhaps?

Again, the footprint of NSM may allow some to be shipped without much impact.

One other larger change - it is my understanding that the Flight deck is over-sized for a CH-53. What if the deckhouse/hangar were carried farther aft, using the gained space for VLS/SSM/Smaller caliber guns. While a 53 (or any other manned helo) would take the 'new' whole deck, there would probably still be space on a flight deck that size for two drone operations at a time. The weight of this modification may slow the vessel, but I think there is some speed to spare....

Great, now I'm looking for LCS-2 kits to modify...I'm never going to get ONE of these Whifs actually built without some ADD meds...

The size of the aviation facilities and large flex space are LCS-2's strongest points, but it does need to better defend its 'airfield'.

[Busto963]

Fellas,

This is a WIF topic, but if the point is to build a LCS 2.0 for the USN it might help to focus on the original mission set:

"The LCS�s originally stated primary missions are antisubmarine warfare (ASW), mine countermeasures (MCM), and surface warfare (SUW) against small boats (including so-called �swarm boats�), particularly in littoral (i.e., near-shore) waters."

These missions do not call for major caliber guns, GMLRS or other cool stuff.

If the point is to take the existing LCS program and build something useful out of the proverbial sow's ear - cheers!