Super Battleships and the progress of technology.

[chuck]

On the even of WWII, Japan and US were both committed to the construction of super battleships - Battleships which considerably surpass all previous battleships in every conventional measure of battleship strength: Weight of broadside, weight and thickness of armor, size of hull and magnitude of reserve buoyancy, etc. Germany and the Soviet Union too were committed to the construction of quasi-super battleships - Battleships that may not actually surpass all previous battleships in every measures of strength, but were nevertheless much larger than usual and very strong by any measure. Clearly these navies had envisioned that strong battleships would still dominate naval warfare for a very considerable amount of time, and success in battleship-battleship conflict would still be a critical element of naval success overall.

Had war neither broken out in the Atlantic nor the Pacific, and the end of supremacy of battleships were not so dramatically demonstrated by Taranto, Pearl Harbor, and the sinking of Prince of Wales, would these battleship projects, when completed, have eventually enjoyed a period when they would be considered arbiter of naval power, or would the natural flow of technology over the decade of 1940 have irresistibly impressed upon even the most closed minds the obsolesce of battleships even before they are finished?

[Mark Petersen]

All of the Super Battleships are evolutionary designs. Without the pressure of an ongoing war the evolution of technonogy proceeds at a much slower pace. This strictly my opinion but I think eventually the naval leaders in Japan and the US would of shifted over to the air operations side by 1950 or so. The power plants for naval aircraft had come a long way in the thirties with the driving force being being primarily air transport. The Pratt and Whitney R2800 was introduced in 1939. With 2000hp this was the engine that made the Hellcat and Corsair what they were. Similiar engines and outputs from Wright and Bristol designs would allow the development of airframes that could finally carry really efective amounts of ordinance. While the 16 or possibly 18 inch guns of on of these Super BBs could pretty well dominate its radius of action the aircraft of the CVs had much larger areas they could dominate. Plus, what is the cost of a CV versus a BB?

[Filipe Ramires]

Plus, what is the cost of a CV versus a BB?

I would like to put it in a different way, just to spice up a bit the topic, since it's also naval technology of the time we are speaking:
What's the price of a submarine versus BB or CV?
Submarine can sink both and only carrier can sink submarine (unless the submarine is dumb enough to allow itself to get close to a BB on the surface to be rammed).

[Guest]

I would be very surprised if the life time cost of a top drawer battleship exceeds those of a full sized fleet aircraft carrier plus her air group. Also consider that through 1945, no one really dares to send carriers into action without battleship escort. So the total equivalent cost of operating an aircraft carrier must include the cost of a battleship, plus an somewhat larger cost for the carrier and her air wing.

[Filipe Ramires]

So the total equivalent cost of operating an aircraft carrier must include the cost of a battleship, plus an somewhat larger cost for the carrier and her air wing.

Not to speak of at least of half a dozen escorts. Both carriers and battleships are too valuable and vulnerable ships to be sent on their own. Escorts are always required and even so in some ocasions that was never enough. A single submarine can do a lot of damage to such kind of task force (Wasp example for starters).

[Walt]

I think by 1939 the CV was well on it's way to becoming the master of the seas...
By the end of WW2 the Submarine had proved to be master of the seas...( and still is ).
Do I think these monsters would have been built? yes.. but they were obsolete by 1940 anyway..
Just my 2 cents. I love BBs and think they are awesome and have several in my collection..But History has shown that outside of shore bombardment and amphib support they were just big targets for aircraft and submarines.

[Werner]

Until nuclear power the submarine was nothing more than a mobile minefield.

1950s aircraft could have kept conventional submarines well away from a carrier task group except perhaps at choke points.

[Walt]

Until nuclear power the submarine was nothing more than a mobile minefield.

1950s aircraft could have kept conventional submarines well away from a carrier task group except perhaps at choke points.

Not to start another pissing contest but tonnage statistics etc in WW2 do not lie.. ( both Allied and Axis Submarine statistics). Loses due to "surface action" pale in comparison, not even on the same chart let alone scale.
Plus the advent of the Guppy & nuke programs of the 50s and Nuke armed torpedos in the 50s would support the status the submarine achieved by 1943 up until present day....This would explain all the hub bub about ASW development in the 50s and 60s.. It was a major priority for ever capitol Navy..it still is..Nothing was or is more feared than a submarine. It was a cheap and quick fix to the Sea power balence some navies were and are experiencing
Mobile minefield?? I would give the Submarine a little more credit.....Werner you surprised me.

[Guest]

Until nuclear power the submarine was nothing more than a mobile minefield.

1950s aircraft could have kept conventional submarines well away from a carrier task group except perhaps at choke points.

Not to start another pissing contest but tonnage statistics etc in WW2 do not lie.. ( both Allied and Axis Submarine statistics). Loses due to "surface action" pale in comparison, not even on the same chart let alone scale.
Plus the advent of the Guppy & nuke programs of the 50s and Nuke armed torpedos in the 50s would support the status the submarine achieved by 1943 up until present day....This would explain all the hub bub about ASW development in the 50s and 60s.. It was a major priority for ever capitol Navy..it still is..Nothing was or is more feared than a submarine. It was a cheap and quick fix to the Sea power balence some navies were and are experiencing
Mobile minefield?? I would give the Submarine a little more credit.....Werner you surprised me.

WWII submarine's primary effects were on merchant shipping. All the hub bub about ASW in the early 1950s were because we know we would likely need the same degree of Atlantic shipment in the case of war with Soviet Union, the Soviets has full access to late war German technology which the Germans didn't have time to benefit from, but which post war tests show war time ASW to be incapable of handling. After 1950s the prospect of nuclear power and sub launched ballistic missiles changed the picture so it can no longer be compared to our hypotheical 1940 scenario.

Now let's look at what happened in 1940s. What would have happened if Britain too believed in the supremacy of submarines and stopped building battleships? British ASW fleet would have been smashed by a handful of German battleships. British submarines would have had no effect on German submarines, and German submarines, untroubled by all the British ASW vessels that have been sunk by German 15" and 8" shells, would overspread the ocean, thumbed their noses at the massive British submarine investments, and strangled Britiain in 6 month.

[Werner]

I think the chances of a 19 knot submarine attacking a surface action group travelling at similar speed, with air cover, and modern asw conveniences like W-A and ASROC rely on the submarine laying at the point of engagement for days waiting for the surface group to arrive.

The US success in the Pacific had a lot to do with the organization and bureaucracy which supported it, the complete and utter confusion which inflicted the Japanese ASW organization, and lastly the skill of the captains and crews. There were plenty of better submarines, they just were not designed for a Pacific war.

[chuck]

If the submarine can sustain 19 knots for an hour or two underwater, then she would be a serious threat to any WWII battle group. WWII battle groups cruise at 15 knots or so. To regain the relative immunity enjoyed by surface groups conferred by the difficulties suffered by a slower moving ship attempting to intercept a faster one, surface groups would then have to cruise at 26-27 knots, which is almost flat out and unsustainable for any prolonged period, which reduces fuel range by as much as 75% and which is likely to leave any escort in the dust, or wake.

A submarine that can cruise on the surface at 15 knots and sustain an underwater burst of 19 knots for 1 hour will have dramatically constrained the possible scope of operation of any WWII surface group.

[Werner]

My understanding is that TF58 steamed at 19 knots except during refueling and to or from Ulithi.

No electric boat could start with a radar contact 12-16 miles at any angle except to directly toward it and progress underwater for more than an hour at full speed to a firing point.

Meanwhile, you have three rings of ASW unless you're going to be satisfied with a destroyer.

[Filipe Ramires]

If we stick with the original topic and not go along the technology existing in the 50's and 60's with wide influence of what happened in WWII we have a completely different situation. Having no war starting at all in 1939 we have no proper ASW school other then basic sonar and DC school. Yet, the submarine had proven during WWI how menacing it could be against either merchants or warships.
I see that many people around prefer to give more credit to CV's and BB's in war when in fact the submarines sunk, in both Atlantic and Pacific, more ships of any kind other then any other weapon at all. The submarine of that time was made for one thing only and that thing is to sink ships and like History tells they were the best for the job. Just like Walt said, put results of both air and surface actions against ships together and they don't get to the levels of submarine actions at all in the Pacific. About 60% of the Japanese Fleets were decimated only by submarine actions going the rest to air attacks, surface actions and other causes. I just sense the very same old school around that was trying to deny the aircraft carrier the superiority over the big gun...and now both join together to take out the credit of the submarine.

[ar]

I completely agree Walter.

"Stay with the bastard til he's on the bottom".

Johnny Walker; 24 U Boats.

I could not resist.

[Laurence Batchelor]

Super battleships would still be seen as the Daddy's in anyones fleets.
This is because it takes big slaps in the face for such shifts in naval thinking to occur.
In WW2 it takes Taranto, Pearl Harbour & the Sinking of Force Z to prove that the best strike weapon at sea is the carrier and no longer the big gun.
Unless some world navy had some sort of visionary Admiral with clout/power who could foresee warfare at sea and predict the course it would take then these same navies will still continue with the tried and tested methods.

The question of it they would be obsolete before they were built, well to stir the hornets nest you could say anything made after Argus was completed was obsolete.
It was just a matter of time to perfect aerial bombing, torpeding, mass aerial attack and the doctrine and technolgy to be perfected to use such weapons.

To Walt & Filipe you cannot say the submarine is master from just the numbers of sinkings in WW2.
You analysis has to go to a deeper level than that!
You have to start to understand and see what the submarine can actually acheive in ANY seaborne encounter with ANY potential enemy, be them other submarines, aircraft, escorts or big fat juicy capital ships or merchants.
The submarine just doesn't have the flexability in WW2 that the aircraft does.
It's best at patrolling and sinking merchant ships on its own or via wolfpack saturation if the convey is escorted.
Lets perhaps put it another way, could 3 submarines achieve what 3 USN carriers did at Midway?

I seem to recall us having a debate about this before on more than one occasion.
Try to think about aircraft in the Atlantic in 1944/45 now you will start to understand why airpower at sea is the Daddy in this hypothetical scenario or in real history of war at sea in the late 20th century.
Only with the advent of ICBM's, nuclear propulsion (therefore becoming a 'proper' submarine) and with the development of submairne launched Tomahawks does finally the submarine get to the same threat level as aircraft at sea.

Filipe if we have no proper ASW school without WW2, isn't it right to assume we have no wolfpack tactics?
We loose all the operational experience gained by the German Navy, USN, RN, Italy, IJN etc etc across the worlds oceans in their submarines.
Won't that make the submarines still around in the late 1940s not using homing torpedoes?, poor underwater endurance and still going in for nightime surface attacks with their deck guns?
They will still be slower submerged, and any cheap built escort can out-run or out-turn them etc etc.

Interms of cost effectiveness the submarine is the best thing afloat, thats why most weaker navies always try and have them in their fleets.
However if a navy has enough money to facilitate the necessary support structures (fleet escorts, airwing etc) they always try and build their Navies around airpower as its the most flexible power projection at sea.

[chuck]

It's not whether the submarine could sink a lot of ships. It's can a nation relying on the sea for necessary movement of goods hope defeat the Uboat menace without first achieving absolute surface superiority? I think the answer is clearly no. So long as nations that rely on sea transport must maintain surface superiority, then other nations can clearly gain something by challenging that surface superiority through a surface force of its own.

Ultimate reduction of naval war to a war mainly of submarines is impossible.

[Filipe Ramires]

To Walt & Filipe you cannot say the submarine is master from just the numbers of sinkings in WW2.

History speaks for itself...submarines sunk more then anything else in both WW's.

The submarine just doesn't have the flexability in WW2 that the aircraft does.

Don't they? Care to tell me what planes were off Tokyo Bay or off New York in 1942? Well, submarines were there. Planes don't have 5000 miles range...submarines do. How's that for flexible?

Lets perhaps put it another way, could 3 submarines achieve what 3 USN carriers did at Midway?

Yes they could. For some reason both navies had quite a number of submarines ahead of their fleets in that battle. Nautilus got a "dud" hit on Kaga and I-68 finished off Yorktown.

Try to think about aircraft in the Atlantic in 1944/45 now you will start to understand why airpower at sea is the Daddy in this hypothetical scenario or in real history of war at sea in the late 20th century.

Well, aircraft didn't prevent much from 1939 to 1942 to the sinking of hundreds of ships by submarines and if we are going to speak in the terms of the topic itself, having WWII never taken place, the ASW school for planes would have been created much more slower when the submarine had proper experience since WWI.

Filipe if we have no proper ASW school without WW2, isn't it right to assume we have no wolfpack tactics?

Not really, wolfpacks come before air power gets any decent impact in ASW terms. Do recall that Doenitz was a U-boat commander in WWI. Decent ASW school is an answer to wolfpack tactics not the contrary.

Won't that make the submarines still around in the late 1940s not using homing torpedoes?, poor underwater endurance and still going in for nightime surface attacks with their deck guns?

Homing torpedoes were an answer against the escort problem therefore a war lesson, and the use of the deck guns was not that widely used in WWII as you can imagine. Torpedoes made most of the work.

They will still be slower submerged, and any cheap built escort can out-run or out-turn them etc etc.

If it haves the ability of detect them, track them and the proper weaponry to sink them. On the other hand the submarine just needs to be at periscope depth and send a couple "up to the throat" torpedoes against the escort.

Interms of cost effectiveness the submarine is the best thing afloat, thats why most weaker navies always try and have them in their fleets.

Cost effectiveness I couldn't agree more. How many submarines can you built with the resources for a BB or a CV? About being mainly used by only weaker navies...I disagree...more the thing of used by those open-minded to more effective modern ways of naval warfare. For some reason Germany and the USA did bet a lot on their submarines during the war because it was simply effective against enemy ships. Germany lost the war because ASW war lessons got improved ASW technology which together with proper intelligence at some point (1944) the Germans were loosing more submarines to ships sunk. The USN, also having in benefict code-breaking, used the submarine as the main great-range weapon to disrupt enemy sealines with the success we all know and which no other ships could have perform so well.

However if a navy has enough money to facilitate the necessary support structures (fleet escorts, airwing etc) they always try and build their Navies around airpower as its the most flexible power projection at sea.

I'll give credit to that indeed. CV's and BB's have the range and natural ability of projecting power inland of which the submarine haves very little other then the capability of landing small teams and near-useless coast shelling. They were not made for that, apart from some excentric prototypes in History, they were made to sink ships only.

[Filipe Ramires]

It's not whether the submarine could sink a lot of ships. It's can a nation relying on the sea for necessary movement of goods hope defeat the Uboat menace without first achieving absolute surface superiority? I think the answer is clearly no. So long as nations that rely on sea transport must maintain surface superiority, then other nations can clearly gain something by challenging that surface superiority through a surface force of its own.

That's what happened in the early stages of WWII. Royal Navy had a clear surface superiority against the Kriegsmarine... eventually in some areas 10 to 1. By that betting on submarines was the only way to bring the odds even and the losses were much higher to the Royal Navy rather then to the German u-boats.

Ultimate reduction of naval war to a war mainly of submarines is impossible.

True, submarines can't land 60.000 troops in Normandy but they can put quite a bit of attrition across the Atlantic therefore reducing the means used later to land in Normandy.

[Laurence Batchelor]

History speaks for itself...submarines sunk more then anything else in both WW's.

Still too simplistic an arguement!
Numbers are not a true measure of effectivess, many more submarines were built than carriers.
Their roles were entirely different.
Submarines mission was to sink enemy warships or merchant ships.
Often this tactic was forced on the 2 Navies (DKM & USN) who used this weapon most effectively, the USN because their battlefleet had been nailed and it took time for them to build and develop their airpower.
Airpowers mission was to dominate and control the battlefield
in this case the sea, air and land.
History doesn't speak for itself it is written by the victors and merely interpreted by scholars or armchair historians, often without an appreciation of the circumstances/contexts these mere numbers were accumulated.

Don't they? Care to tell me what planes were off Tokyo Bay or off New York in 1942? Well, submarines were there. Planes don't have 5000 miles range...submarines do. How's that for flexible?

Well I seem to remember the Doolittle raid early on in the Pacific war, is that close enough for Tokyo for you?
Lack of aircover over New York is due to a lack of the necessary resources not because aircraft could not forefil this role.
Interms of flexabilty, could submarines sink Yamato & Musashi with the expenditure that aircraft did?
Could they attack at the range they did as quickly and effectively as aircraft could?
Infact whats more likely to even pinpoint them, yep its definately recon aircraft, can cover much greater distances in a shorter time.

Planes can down aircraft at any altitude.
They can attack land targets which submarines of the day could not reach.
They can bomb the industry of war, oil depots, airfields etc.
They can land an entire army through airborne assault.
Tell me can submarines can be the spearhead of the invasion of Crete?
Aeroplanes are far more flexible as there POWER PROJECTION can reach the air, the land and in the surface of the sea and underwater (but by late war in that case).
Submarines can only really affect the sea battlefield, though with with great success.

Yes they could. For some reason both navies had quite a number of submarines ahead of their fleets in that battle. Nautilus got a "dud" hit on Kaga and I-68 finished off Yorktown.

Again you miss the point of the question could 3 submarines sink 4 IJN carriers in the same manner as 3 USN carriers did.
The answer is NO, they cannot, they would be lucky on their own to detect the IJN fleet at all.
They would have to be so widely spaced that the likelyhood would be that only 1 might encounter the fleet and then its hit and miss if they can get into a firing position and sucessfully hit and sink 1 carrier let alone 4!
Aircraft on the other hand can scount far and wide and attack via torpedo and bombs in a mass saturation strike.
How long would it take to mass these same 3 submarines into the same position so they could all attack at once?
Aircraft again such a more potent weapon if one knows how to use it properly!

Well, aircraft didn't prevent much from 1939 to 1942 to the sinking of hundreds of ships by submarines and if we are going to speak in the terms of the topic itself, having WWII never taken place, the ASW school for planes would have been created much more slower when the submarine had proper experience since WWI.

Whos saying aircraft did in the early war years?
They are not their in sufficient numbers to stop the submarine menace which goes largely unchecked.
It takes time to build the MAC ships, to develop aircraft such as liberators with the necessary range, to develop aerial dropped depth charges and hom ing torpedos and to ofcourse build escort carriers and dedicated escort vessels.
Once this is done air power deminishes the threat of the submarine forcing its technological development pathway to make it more effective underwater where it can try and hide from air power and surface escorts from ramming, guns depth charges etc etc.
Also to make it faster so it can runaway from pursuing escort hunting groups or make it more silent to again improve non-detection.
If 1 aircraft encountered 1 submarine on the surface, which is likely to come off the winner if they both stick around and fight?

Not really, wolfpacks come before air power gets any decent impact in ASW terms. Do recall that Doenitz was a U-boat commander in WWI. Decent ASW school is an answer to wolfpack tactics not the contrary.

No no you miss understand what I was getting at.
Donitz has no war in which to prove it works!
Up to 1939 its still just his pet theory he's been trying to convince the DKM high command about during the 1930s.
So in this hypothetical late 40s scenario submarines using mass attacks is still something untried and unproved.
WWI submarine doctrine will still be the way most navies will still be thinking as they've had no chance to test out new ideas in real wartime conditions.
and in turn for that to stimulate the new technical developments.

Homing torpedoes were an answer against the escort problem therefore a war lesson, and the use of the deck guns was not that widely used in WWII as you can imagine. Torpedoes made most of the work.

Yes so we agree any late 1940s submarine without WW2 will be lacking all these extra goodies, brought on by the war stimulus.

If it haves the ability of detect them, track them and the proper weaponry to sink them. On the other hand the submarine just needs to be at periscope depth and send a couple "up to the throat" torpedoes against the escort.

Thats not her mission though if presented with a convoy infront of her, its to sink merchant ships!
By sinking an escort she immediately gives away her position, and if there is enough escorts, even ones with early ASDIC (as in this non-WW2 scenario) they will be rolling a few tons of TNT her way.

Cost effectiveness I couldn't agree more. How many submarines can you built with the resources for a BB or a CV? About being mainly used by only weaker navies...I disagree...more the thing of used by those open-minded to more effective modern ways of naval warfare. For some reason Germany and the USA did bet a lot on their submarines during the war because it was simply effective against enemy ships. Germany lost the war because ASW war lessons got improved ASW technology which together with proper intelligence at some point (1944) the Germans were loosing more submarines to ships sunk. The USN, also having in benefict code-breaking, used the submarine as the main great-range weapon to disrupt enemy sealines with the success we all know and which no other ships could have perform so well.

Where did I say only being used by weaker navies? You misread me there!
I said weaker navies wish to built their fleets around them.
They have limited budgets so it makes sense to get the best weapon system at sea their smaller budget can afford.
It doesn't mean they get the best weapon system at sea (thats airpower of course! ), merely the best they can afford!

I think it was Italy who had the 3rd largest submarine fleet in the world in 1939, pity they couldn't get 1 carrier operational in the Med in WW2 that would would have been worth 30 of their submarines!
Look what the RN achieved with just 1 fleet carrier operating in the Med for large parts of the war.
Look at what they couldn't achieve in Crete when most of Forminable's airwing was knackered.
Thats how pivotal 1 carrier can be! 1 submarine just never could influence a war campaign in such a strategic way.

I'll give credit to that indeed. CV's and BB's have the range and natural ability of projecting power inland of which the submarine haves very little other then the capability of landing small teams and near-useless coast shelling. They were not made for that, apart from some excentric prototypes in History, they were made to sink ships only.

...and thats their flaw! which aircraft do not suffer from, although admitively the outlay is much more.
Air supremacy over the battlefield is the first objective of any military commander, this lesson has been learnt the hard way since mid-ww2.
His first objective is not to make sure he can sink as many merchant ships as possible, over a long range, with submarines.

That's what happened in the early stages of WWII. Royal Navy had a clear surface superiority against the Kriegsmarine... eventually in some areas 10 to 1. By that betting on submarines was the only way to bring the odds even and the losses were much higher to the Royal Navy rather then to the German u-boats.

Thats not correct. The was a tiny number of U-boats for the RN to hunt in the early war part, whereas Germany had the largest merchant fleet in the world to prey on!
No wonder one side had it easier to achieve results.
You and Walt need to understand there is a clear distinction between sinking largely defenceless merchant ships and warships!
If I was to list most of the key capital ships sunk by enemy action in ww2 would we find air power had the most?, surface engagements? or submarines?
That would be a better take on effectiveness than your mere numbers analysis.

The German Navy failed to develop a Naval Air Arm capabilty quickly enough during the late 1930s.
This meant that with war upon the Kreigsmarine in 1939 (and not 1944 when they had planned) that submarines and a war against trade was all they could hope for at sea.
They were forced to fight the war this way, it wasn't merely by choice!
This disparity though was largely offset by her overwhelming strength in the air.

True, submarines can't land 60.000 troops in Normandy but they can put quite a bit of attrition across the Atlantic therefore reducing the means used later to land in Normandy..

How many fully laden troop ships were sunk in the Atlantic, Indian Ocean or off the coasts of North Africa, Sicily, Salerno, Normandy or the South of France.
I rest my case!

[Dave Wooley]

I will stick my neck out on this one a say that the submarine was indeed the main naval weapon of WW2 . It nearly brought Britian to its knees and in the case of Japan the USN submarine force achieved what the U-boat did not . I base this on the premiss that naval air power did not have the same direct impact on the civil population, supply and war production as that of the submarine . Therefor as a strategic weapon of blackade as apposed to a theatre weapon like the carrier the submarine could be seen as the much more effective naval vessel .
Dave Wooley