Post JUTLAND - a british perspective

middle_watch · Post by **middle_watch** » Fri Jun 15, 2007 4:42 am

I came across an unpublished book apparently written by a Chief (or possibly Fleet Chief) Gunner on the Lion at Jutland, it is published on the web but I neglected to add it to my bookmarks and now cannot find it. He recounts how the Lion was nearly lost specifically due to the stockpile of ammunition in the hoist and his own disapproval of the practise. It is fairly well known that the Battle Cruiser Fleet gunnery was not as accurate as the Home Fleet, supposedly due to a lack of practise ranges and many speculate that speed of firing became a priority to compensate for that.

For my part I am continually amazed that Beatty came out of Jutland with a promotion, he should have been sent to take command of the RN rowing school or something. As commander of the battle-cruiser fleet it was his responsibility to get his ships target practise, even if it was only by releasing ships piecemeal, if he did indeed endanger his ships by demands for greater and greater salvo speed at the expense of standard safety procedures then he was criminally negligent and to cap it all the well published signalling errors of the battle-cruiser fleet point to plain incompetance at the highest level.

Off the soap box now, what is a fear nought scuttle? Is it something like the blow off plates used in modern ships? The ones that seemed to cause our American cousins so much humour that we had to paint the signs out while tied up alongside a public thoroughfare in Baltimore?

ingura · Post by **ingura** » Fri Jun 15, 2007 5:20 am

Werner · Post by **Werner** » Fri Jun 15, 2007 5:33 am

I wonder if the use of "Fearnought" applied to asbestos jumpers is a give away that asbestos may have been part of it's design.

FrancisMcN · Post by **FrancisMcN** » Fri Jun 15, 2007 6:31 am

Fear Nought is still in current Royal navy parlance as the word to describe the thick woolen material in the suits worn by the fire fighting teams for damage control. I would suspect in the Jutland context, this meant flaps of this material over shell and cartridge ports that allowed a form of anti-flash protection.

Francis Macnaughton

DavidM · Post by **DavidM** » Fri Jun 15, 2007 7:38 am

middle_watch wrote:I came across an unpublished book apparently written by a Chief (or possibly Fleet Chief) Gunner on the Lion at Jutland, it is published on the web but I neglected to add it to my bookmarks and now cannot find it. He recounts how the Lion was nearly lost specifically due to the stockpile of ammunition in the hoist and his own disapproval of the practise.

Similar comments appear in the Osprey NVG on Battlecruisers, though I can't remember if the author quotes a locateable source.

David

middle_watch · Post by **middle_watch** » Fri Jun 15, 2007 10:32 am

Fearnought is indeed the term for a fireproof suit, but my brother, then in the RAF, nearly died laughing when I let slip the term for a camoflage suit in the RN was "You can't see me suit." My mother too inspected my footwear in curiosity after I described them as Steaming Boots. Casting my mind back we did have some other odd terms for clothing, all official, it was what you asked for at Slops anyway:

Number Eights (fatigues)
Woolley Pulley (Wool Jumper)
Red Flash (Electrically conductive shoes)
White Front (square necked white T shirt)

Blow off plates were soft welded (or possibly soldered?) patches to relieve magazine pressure, we had them on the sides of the Ikara assembly room on Ikara Leanders, possibly elsewhere too but those were the only visible ones, but the term appeared to have some other meaning for the Americans, though what I don't know, I asked a Baltimore girl what it meant and she said it was the big final act of a show. Beats me.

Guest · Post by **Guest** » Fri Jun 15, 2007 1:46 pm

The term "Fearnought" dates to 1700s and originally referred to the thick wetted woolen blanket screens that protected the powder magazines of wooden sailing warships.

Laurence Batchelor · Post by **Laurence Batchelor** » Fri Jun 15, 2007 2:57 pm

I go along it was not lack of armour protection to blame for the loss of the Battlecruisers at Jutland.
I believe it was a pig-headed ignorance of safety via gambling on rapid-fire to win a major fleet action in WWI.
Boy did the pan set ablaze in the Royal Navy's faces and they got their noses burnt, literally with that gamble!

Ingura get a copy of this journal article I have, it provides great evidential backing to the rapid-fire explanation:-

"Our Bloody Ships" or "Or Bloody System" ? Jutland and the Loss of the Battle Cruisers, 1916"
By Nicholas A. Lambert Journal of Military History 62 (January 1998) pp29-56.

Guest · Post by **Guest** » Fri Jun 15, 2007 3:01 pm

Laurence Batchelor wrote:I go along it was not lack of armour protection to blame for the loss of the Battlecruisers at Jutland.
I believe it was a pig-headed ingnorance of safety for gambling on rapid-fire to win a major fleet action in WWI.
Boy did the pan set ablaze in the Royal Navy's faces and they got their noses burnt, literally with that gamble!

Ingura get a copy of this journal article I have, it provides great evidential backing to the rapid-fire explanation:-

"Our Bloody Ships" or "Or Bloody System" ? Jutland and the Loss of the Bayyle Cruisers, 1916"
By Nicholas A. Lambert Journal of Military History 62 (January 1998) pp29-56.

It was the armor, come on. If there had been enough armor, the safety gamble would have never been a gamble at all. The only argument against this would be: was it practical to armor the ship's ammunition train sufficiently to make it impervious at normal battle range.

Laurence Batchelor · Post by **Laurence Batchelor** » Fri Jun 15, 2007 3:23 pm

We have no evidence the magazines were ever penetrated by german shells!
Therefore deck armour for vitals is irrevalent.
We do however have evidence for shells penetrating British turrets easily!

What it was was open hatches/scuttles etc and shells and cordite charges piled high in the gangways.

This trail of breadcrumbs meant one spark at the breach of the guns could travel all the way down the loading trays, into the shell and charge handling rooms and then along and into the magazines!
Shocking!

If you meant more armour on the turret barbettes or the faceplates, turret roofs themselves then I agree with you!
Get the article, read it and you will start to hear from extracts of the gunnery staff who were actually working down there!

Guest · Post by **Guest** » Fri Jun 15, 2007 3:44 pm

I did mean the turrets themselves and the barbettes. However, I also meant deck and belt. Even if the belts and decks were not penetrated, I think evidence points to their being penetrable, and thus vulnerable and only spared by luck.

Laurence Batchelor · Post by **Laurence Batchelor** » Fri Jun 15, 2007 4:31 pm

So that has no bearing on the RN losses at Jutland then.
The Royal Navy needed to learn what went wrong and fix it sharpish!

Fixing all the folly's that went with a Rapid-fire policy helped in part to save Tiger or was it Lion I forget, its in the article above.

If people do not have free access to academic journals like I do, I might be willing to scan this for you as its very worthwhile your reading time and my efforts!

Guest · Post by **Guest** » Fri Jun 15, 2007 4:59 pm

middle_watch wrote:
For my part I am continually amazed that Beatty came out of Jutland with a promotion, he should have been sent to take command of the RN rowing school or something. As commander of the battle-cruiser fleet it was his responsibility to get his ships target practise, even if it was only by releasing ships piecemeal, if he did indeed endanger his ships by demands for greater and greater salvo speed at the expense of standard safety procedures then he was criminally negligent and to cap it all the well published signalling errors of the battle-cruiser fleet point to plain incompetance at the highest level.

But he did his job during the battle admirably.
1st He succeeded in leading the high sea fleet towards the Grand fleet, then he succeeded in outmaneuvering Hipper so the German battlecruiser could not observe the deploying Grand fleet as the High sea fleet raced into the trap. It was Beatty who placed the high sea fleet on the headsmen's block. The fact that the executioner wasn't successful wasn't his fault.

Sacking a commander responsible for that feat would not be a good thing.

Laurence Batchelor · Post by **Laurence Batchelor** » Fri Jun 15, 2007 5:09 pm

One also has to think of a country's morale in that situation.

The article I site or was it the rules of the game I read years ago I forget which one or the other showed how Jellicoe covered up Beatty's failings and helped shoulder the blame.

Werner · Post by **Werner** » Fri Jun 15, 2007 9:20 pm

Leadership is standing in the weather in your oilskins, drenched by spray and as the third ship of your squadron explodes in your binoculars, you say "Something is bloody wrong with our ships today!"

In one act he demonstrated fearlessness in the face of the enemy, seamanship and a real appreciation of the technical problem. Would have made an excellent P.M. (Oh, wait. He was divorced and re-married to Ethel Field of Lake Forest, Illinois).

ingura · Post by **ingura** » Sat Jun 16, 2007 1:44 am

Guest · Post by **Guest** » Sat Jun 16, 2007 3:32 am

He was leading the Germans toward the Grand Fleet so they could be overwelmed. IE Battlecruisers as bait.

Werner · Post by **Werner** » Sat Jun 16, 2007 6:48 am

I think the battle distances were determined by wind direction and sun angle.

Beatty's comments on calibre vs AP is proof the AP were breaking up on impact or before they could do any damage. British AP had this known defect.

It is a crime to send good men into battle with defective equipment.

Laurence Batchelor · Post by **Laurence Batchelor** » Sat Jun 16, 2007 7:30 am

Werner wrote: It is a crime to send good men into battle with defective equipment.

Its a crime only if you know it is defective beforehand!