German Naval Radar in WWII

[bengtsson]

In reading Richard Woodman's excellent book "Arctic Convoys 1939-45" he mentioned the heavy German ships Tirpitz, L�tzow and Scharnhorst being assembled in Northern Norway in early 1943. As the Germans contemplated using these forces to intercept Arctic Convoys, he mentions the weather as a big factor in consideration. He claims due to their relience on Optical rangefinding for gunnery control. In other words, bad visibilty would reduce their optical performance and give a great advantage to the RN covering forces in any engagement.
I thought, but may well be wrong, that the Sharnhorst was fitted with fire control radar by that time. I would assume the Tirpitz would have all the latest in German naval radar mounted at that time. Is it true that the German heavy forces would have relied on only optical range finding?
Does lack of good radar account for the poor perfomance of German Destroyers in the Battle of the Barents sea? They failed to engage the RN's Destroyer forces which had free range to threaten Hipper which could not get at the convoy.

Bob B.

[Tiornu]

Scharnhorst had radar at North Cape, though Norfolk successfully disabled some of it.
Radar rangefinding won't do you much good if you can't see the target. Rangefinding finds the range--not the direction. Even DoY, theoretically capable of some blind-fire, delivered many salvos that were on in range but well off in deflection.

[Werner]

The Seetakt were 500Hz sets with a range of 100Km (50Km useful range) and an accuracy of 50m. I wonder if they were still sensitive to shock by 1944. Certainly all the early sets had a tendency to shut down the first moment they were needed.

[bengtsson]

The Seetakt were 500Hz sets with a range of 100Km (50Km useful range) and an accuracy of 50m. I wonder if they were still sensitive to shock by 1944. Certainly all the early sets had a tendency to shut down the first moment they were needed.

Yes, Werner I did some further research yesterday and it seems the British radars at the North Cape battle had their own problems. Shock and technical problems. I guess once again it was the RN destroyer force that rode in to the rescue with their torpedo attack. The RN search radars did their job well enough before the action began.
Just because a warship carries a system doesn't always mean it is up to battle conditions. That's why just technical comparisons of various warships does not always tell the whole story.


Bob B.

[MartinJQuinn]

I guess once again it was the RN destroyer force that rode in to the rescue with their torpedo attack.

Yes, but if it wasn't for a "lucky" hit on Scharnhorst that slowed her speed, the destroyer force wouldn't have been able to get into position to deliver the death blow...

It's interesting to note the German reluctance to engage the British due to the poor performance of their radars. If the shoe was on the other foot, I don't think the RN would have given a second thought to avoiding combat.

[bengtsson]

I guess once again it was the RN destroyer force that rode in to the rescue with their torpedo attack.

Yes, but if it wasn't for a "lucky" hit on Scharnhorst that slowed her speed, the destroyer force wouldn't have been able to get into position to deliver the death blow...

It's interesting to note the German reluctance to engage the British due to the poor performance of their radars. If the shoe was on the other foot, I don't think the RN would have given a second thought to avoiding combat.

I agree about the hit by Duke of York which slowed Scharnhorst down long enough for the Destroyers to get in position. I often think that the "Lucky Hit" is the essence of naval warfare. How many battles have been decided by who gets in a lucky hit at the right time. I think in the "Arctic Convoys" book I was reading the author mentions the great advantage that Scharnhorst had with her extra knots. Without that hit in a boiler room, Scharnhorst makes it back to base. The German destroyer forces never seemed to be up to supporting the German heavy ships properly. Neither at the Barents Sea or North Cape.

Bob B.

[Guest]

I believe the luck penetration through a gap in the armored deck on Scharnhorst into the machinery space is the only one of its kind in the entire battleship history. The penetration into Hood's magazine was through the sloping sides rather than the actual deck. That's rather ironic considering every battleship designed after Jutland was conceived with prospect of raining plunging shells through the deck of the enemy.

[Werner]

Although it's totally academic, it is possible Yamato's final explosion was in the aft 15.5cm magazine. An AP bomb hit the roof of this turret, which was only one inch, and was able to penetrate all the way to the handling room of this turret and start a fire which was never properly addressed by the damage control team. The 15.5cm magazine is in the middle of the 46cm powder magazines.

[Guest]

Although it's totally academic, it is possible Yamato's final explosion was in the aft 15.5cm magazine. An AP bomb hit the roof of this turret, which was only one inch, and was able to penetrate all the way to the handling room of this turret and start a fire which was never properly addressed by the damage control team. The 15.5cm magazine is in the middle of the 46cm powder magazines.

The wreck survey shows surprising little damage even for a full blown 15.5 cm magazine detonation, and certainly the 46cm magazine around it didn't go off. The 15.5 cm magazine explosion probably occurred after the ship is already submerged and the aft magazine cluster has been mostly flooded. So it's exact cause will likely remain obscure, and connection to the firing raging in the 15.5 turret is not strong.

The big detonation reputedly heard 110 miles away was in the forward 46cm powder magazine under the B-turret. Exact cause of this detonation is also unknown, and explanations necessarily speculative.

[Werner]

So it's exact cause will likely remain obscure....

Exactly. It is, however, the opinion of some experts.

The facts remain that there was a "hole" in her armor at the roof of the 15.5cm turret and the barbette which could have conducted an AP bomb down to the shell/powder flats and the associated 46cm magazines. Once a bomb penetrated the roof of the triple 15.5cm turret, only light rotating structure and flash-proofing protects the main magazine area.

Yamato was not "Wonder Women" or "Super Girl". She was a device designed by mortals, and subject to the same flaws as any other human mechanism.

[Guest]

So it's exact cause will likely remain obscure....

Exactly. It is, however, the opinion of some experts.

The facts remain that there was a "hole" in her armor at the roof of the 15.5cm turret and the barbette which could have conducted an AP bomb down to the shell/powder flats and the associated 46cm magazines. Once a bomb penetrated the roof of the triple 15.5cm turret, only light rotating structure and flash-proofing protects the main magazine area.

Yamato was not "Wonder Women" or "Super Girl". She was a device designed by mortals, and subject to the same flaws as any other human mechanism.

This would not be an appropriate thread to launch into another of your opinionated topic hijacking diatribes.

[Werner]

This would not be an appropriate thread to launch into another of your opinionated topic hijacking diatribes.

I agree, but your statement:

I believe the luck penetration through a gap in the armored deck on Scharnhorst into the machinery space is the only one of its kind in the entire battleship history.

clearly required me to respond with information about Yamato's faults and hypothetical damage accounting for her loss was necessary to refute your claim.

Anyone with Skulski's Anatomy of the Ship: Yamato can look at the armor elevation and confirm this assertion.

[JWintjes]

Straying slightly back to the original topic, one factor that deserves to be mentioned when it comes to German radar during WW2 is that there was peculiarly little in the way of organized backing to its employment with capital ships - it was mostly the individual captain and his determination to press for it to get it installed that was responsible for how any ship was equipped.

This is interesting also from another angle - while the U-boat effort seems to have been slightly more organized, and Luftwaffe nightfighter units stunningly disorganized, Luftwaffe in general had quite a good grip on radar. There could well have been an interservice issue here.

Jorit

[Guest]

Passive radar warning usually possess much greater range than active radar searching. The numerical inferiority of the German Navy caused the Germans emphasize avoidance of action except from a position of local superiority. Therefore the Germans emphasize radar warning over radar detection.

[phil gollin]

I believe the luck penetration through a gap in the armored deck on Scharnhorst into the machinery space is the only one of its kind in the entire battleship history.............

There is no definite evidence as to where the hit was that caused Scharnhorst to slow down (there is even SPECULATION that it may not have been a hit !)

The RN's official report merely mentions that a hit Abaft Y (no.3) turret was observed about the time the Scharnhorst slowed down

[Tiornu]

The RN report also mentions survivor testimony regarding a hit near the screws.

[bengtsson]

I believe the luck penetration through a gap in the armored deck on Scharnhorst into the machinery space is the only one of its kind in the entire battleship history.............

There is no definite evidence as to where the hit was that caused Scharnhorst to slow down (there is even SPECULATION that it may not have been a hit !)

The RN's official report merely mentions that a hit Abaft Y (no.3) turret was observed about the time the Scharnhorst slowed down

In Woodman's book he describes the following taking place at the time Scharnhorst and Duke of York were engaged early in the chase. "Only three hits had been observed on board Scharnhorst although one of these had started a fire amidships. The German fire parties soon controlled and extinguished it. Duke of Yorks gunnery control radar failed due to shock from the concussion of firing full salvos smashing valves [electronic tubes] in the set. This reduced the British to optical gunnery control. But all was not well aboard Scharnhorst. She had lost speed, first due to shock from near misses and then to the explosion of a 14 inch shell in her starboard boiler room. Her speed fell to 10 knots and, although swift cross connection of her steam supply enabled her to quickly work up to 22 knots, she sacrificed a vital part of her lead">

I guess sources are the all important question. His information would have had to be from someone who survived the sinking and related the information to the British or post war made it known.

On the original subject. I read a book by one of Scharnhort's survivors Fritz Otto Bush, he reports that Scharnhorst's after Radar [fire control??] reported a contact to the bridge shortly before starshell burst above her.

Bob B.

[Laurence Batchelor]

Bob,
I don't have the time at present to add my usual lengthy posts to this excellent discussion.

I recommend to loan through inter-library loan or buy the 2 DVD documentaries on Scharnhorst Vol 1 & 2 by Archive of War.
I have them and found out some usual information from surviving Germans interviewed on them which I've not read elsewhere before.
These documentaries were made with EU money in the 1990s I think and have now come out on DVD.
I have about 12 of them in all and they are very well made as they are usually made using German sources and old hands, but they are in English.
There's 3 on DKM destroyers in WW2 ones on U-boats, S-boats, Battle of Atlantic, Ceylon etc

Here's the link (they can be bought through Amazon or play.com etc:

http://www.eurekavideo.co.uk/classics/

[Tiornu]

Busch was not a Scharnhorst survivor. At least, I don't see him on the list. Perhaps he was a crewman previously.
This is the first time I've heard that near misses rattled the ship enough to cause problems. Locating the hit in the starboard boiler room would be at variance with the G&D account, which is the one that cites the boiler hump as the point of penetration.

[bengtsson]

Busch was not a Scharnhorst survivor. At least, I don't see him on the list. Perhaps he was a crewman previously.
This is the first time I've heard that near misses rattled the ship enough to cause problems. Locating the hit in the starboard boiler room would be at variance with the G&D account, which is the one that cites the boiler hump as the point of penetration.

Yes, on closer checking, I find you are right. Corvette Captain Busch was not a survivor. The book reads almost like he is, but he instead quotes other survivors. One in particular in Willi G�dde.
The book was written in Germany and translated to English 1956.

Bob B.