U.S. Nuclear Focus Has Dimmed, Studies Find

[Jack Ray]

Should a dedicated SAC be re-created? General Welch's report doesn't say so specifically,

However, the Welch report is highly critical of the split commands. The report concludes that combining nuclear forces with nonnuclear organizations has led to "markedly reduced levels of leadership whose daily focus is the nuclear enterprise and a general devaluation of the nuclear mission and those who perform the mission."

.

Not exactly naval, but very interesting. The US must avoid this sort of degeneration--pretty soon Russian weapons inspector's will be finding that our list of nukes in inventory and the actual stock do not match. This is not good enough.

Jack

U.S. Nuclear Focus Has Dimmed, Studies Find
The two independent reviews were ordered after a B-52 carried warheads across the country last year.By Peter Spiegel, Times Staff Writer
Los Angeles Times
February 13, 2008
Pg. 14

WASHINGTON -- The U.S. military has lost focus on its nuclear-weapons mission and has suffered a sharp decline in nuclear expertise, factors that may have contributed to a mishap last year in which a B-52 bomber unknowingly carried six nuclear warheads across the country, according to two new independent reviews.

Both studies found that levels of nuclear training and alertness at the Air Force slipped after the end of the Cold War. But one of the reports was much more critical, saying accidents far worse than the errant B-52 flight could occur without immediate changes in nuclear procedures.

"The task force and several of the senior [Defense Department] people interviewed believe that the decline in focus has been more pronounced than realized and too extreme to be acceptable," said the report compiled by an outside panel chaired by retired Air Force Gen. Larry D. Welch.

Both reviews were ordered after the August bomber flight, in which Air Force weapons officers accidentally loaded the B-52 in North Dakota with nuclear weapons.

The bombs were flown to an air base in Louisiana the following day, where they were eventually discovered and belatedly secured.

Dozens of officers have been either disciplined or relieved of command, but the Welch report's findings raise new questions about whether failures within the Air Force were more systemic than originally believed. The first Air Force investigation into the incident, completed in October, pinned much of the blame on individual officers at Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota.

Neither Welch's study nor an internal Air Force review, conducted by Maj. Gen. Polly A. Peyer, found any failures in the security of U.S. nuclear weapons. But at a Capitol Hill hearing, Welch testified that the military units responsible for handling the bombs are not properly inspected and, as a result, may not be ready to perform their missions.

"We have uncovered no safety issues," Welch said. "If you look at all the areas and all the ways that we have to store and handle these weapons in order to perform the mission, it just requires, we believe, more resources and more attention than they're getting."

Both studies could put new pressure on Gen. T. Michael Moseley, the Air Force chief of staff, to reorganize the service's nuclear forces.

After the Cold War, the once-vaunted Strategic Air Command, which controlled all Air Force nuclear weapons, was dismantled. The military's nuclear missiles were assigned to a division responsible for operations in space, and its nuclear bombers were moved to Air Combat Command, which also includes nonnuclear fighters and reconnaissance aircraft.

Although the internal Air Force review has not been made public, a copy of its executive summary obtained by The Times asserts that the split organization has led to fragmentation of policies and accountability, without a single commander responsible for nuclear missions.

In an interview, Peyer, who headed the 30-person internal review, said that her report does not specifically recommend re-creating the Strategic Air Command, and she warned against attempting to go back to Cold War polices with a nuclear force that is now much smaller than in the 1980s.

"We can't go back to where we were in 1991," Peyer said. "We don't live in the same world. It's not the same environment."

However, the Welch report is highly critical of the split commands. The report concludes that combining nuclear forces with nonnuclear organizations has led to "markedly reduced levels of leadership whose daily focus is the nuclear enterprise and a general devaluation of the nuclear mission and those who perform the mission."

Welch's report was completed at the request of Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, who has already raised concerns with Air Force officials that the original investigation into the B-52 incident may have unfairly limited blame to midlevel officers. The internal Air Force investigation was ordered by Moseley.

Air Force officials said they are already implementing many of the recommendations in both reports but insisted that existing regulations governing nuclear procedures were adequate.

Testifying alongside Welch, Lt. Gen. Daniel J. Darnell, the Air Force's head of operations, said that while Peyer's blue-ribbon commission showed that the service could improve its nuclear programs, the underlying policies and procedures were validated.

"The Air Force portion of the nuclear deterrent is sound, and we will take every measure necessary to provide safe, secure, reliable nuclear surety to the American public," Darnell said.

[chuck]

The reason why American nuclear focus has dimmed is simply that our nuclear arsenal is far too large for our pragmatically foreseeable needs, and it is always hard to keep an expensive luxury on a sharp focus.

[Jack Ray]

The reason why American nuclear focus has dimmed is simply that our nuclear arsenal is far too large for our pragmatically foreseeable needs, and it is always hard to keep an expensive luxury on a sharp focus.

They are very large. All the more reason for extreme care.

Jack

[Andy G]

Having spent $5,800,000,000,000 on nuclear weapons* what's the benefit of the US arsenal today?

Nuclear weapons

• - Do not deter terrorists

• - Do not have a conceivable role in "Oil War" theatres

• - Have a lower "threat" benefit in an increasingly globalised economy - we're not far from a position where a wayward state could effectively be "North Korea-d" out of the trade net with the flick of a switch

• - Are losing any first strike bonus with increasingly effective anti-missile technologies

If there's no current role for thousands of these weapons, why pay to maintain them, store them and clean them up? Why not use their radioactive components to generate CO2-free power at a time when we need it more than ever?

Ownership of nuclear weapons along with the refusal to allow some other nations to have them smacks of cultural imperialism of the worst kind. It isn't a surprise that non-nuclear nations object to The Loud Neighbour with the Big Stick. So why shouldn't nuclear states lead by example and disarm?

Andy

* (Brookings Institute, 1998 dollars, period 1940-1998)

[Werner]

Possession of nuclear weapons may enable cultural imperialism, but I believe you would be hard pressed to find evidence of such cultural imperialism in action. Has the US or Russia imposed their culture on subject countries in ways which would not be equally accepted were it not for nuclear weapons? Maybe Jerry Lewis or McDonalds is not wanted in France, but are there because the US has an immense arsenal of nuclear weapons?

Terms like "cultural imperialism", with or without a nuclear threat, is an anachronism representing a failed and disreputable theory of human relations primarily evolved by the followers of Mao.

Cultural imperialism would include burning the library at Alexandria, or banning the Hebrew language in Spain. I don't know what profound or subtle changes to culture were enabled because the imposing party had an atomic bomb.

[Jack Ray]

Possession of nuclear weapons may enable cultural imperialism, but I believe you would be hard pressed to find evidence of such cultural imperialism in action. Has the US or Russia imposed their culture on subject countries in ways which would not be equally accepted were it not for nuclear weapons? Maybe Jerry Lewis or McDonalds is not wanted in France, but are there because the US has an immense arsenal of nuclear weapons?

Terms like "cultural imperialism", with or without a nuclear threat, is an anachronism representing a failed and disreputable theory of human relations primarily evolved by the followers of Mao.

Cultural imperialism would include burning the library at Alexandria, or banning the Hebrew language in Spain. I don't know what profound or subtle changes to culture were enabled because the imposing party had an atomic bomb.

Perhaps the West's possession of nuclear weapons (i.e., USA, UK France) deterred the USSR from forcefully changing Western culture. I suppose that would be reverse "cultural imperialism".

By the way, it also protected the communist cultures.

Jack

[Werner]

Perhaps the West's possession of nuclear weapons (i.e., USA, UK France) deterred the USSR from forcefully changing Western culture. I suppose that would be reverse "cultural imperialism".

By the way, it also protected the communist cultures.

Jack

That certainly is the conventional view of historians like Richard Rhodes, who has written extensively.

A weapon as awesome as the atomic bomb and it's big brother the fusion bomb imposed a strict status quo on the part of the major parties, leading to the use of surrogates to prosecute the most minor fringe aspects of the relationship. Imagine Germany 1946-1950 without the threat of nuclear retaliation.

It seems to me the atomic bomb allowed former satellite countries to obtain concessions from their hosts which would not otherwise be the case.

China's accusation of cultural hegemony was merely a recognition that because of the bombs there could be no immediate or forceful devolution of the colonial influence which prevailed in Asia since the 1700s.