RN Powder/Cord and Hood

[Werner]

When Sir Eustace Tennyson-d'Eyncourt sat at his drafting table, he would design the most powerful ship ever to sail the seas; and would be so for two decades. He could have used the best principles of naval engineering and technology, not wasting a line, not sparing a ton.

He would have designed an office block.

Instead, d'Eyncourt understood another function of a warship, one lost on today's design committees: a ship is a representation of the majesty and power of the people who commissioned her. She is meant to inspire emotions like awe, envy, respect. Art is a key component of these esthetic qualities, and worth the small extra price over the office block form.

He designed the Hood.

[chuck]

But in d'Eyncourt's defense, his creation Hood did try to redeem herself at the last moment by splitting in half and standing on end so she could look properly like an office block for once just before she vanished forever.

[Werner]

I appreciate the humor, but I really see very few defects in his design. I think the loss of Hood was due to a combination of very bad luck and British tactical doctrine, which assumed a combat range of 12,000 yards or so. Hood and the rest of the British battle line were capable of hitting at much longer ranges. Unfortunately, so was her enemy.

The assumption of a 12,000 yard range made modernization of the deck armor to protect against major caliber hits far less important than modernization to protect against aviation bombs and torpedoes of all forms. Unfortunately, the financial arrangements made for the Royal Navy were insufficient for them to be ready even with their own modest goals by the start of the war. Again, no fault of the designer, or of Hood, but of the circumstances of the 1930s and of the political decisions taken in the period.

I think there is a circumstantial case to be made that the powder materials and arrangements may have been defective in British 1940 practice, but I certainly am not the expert in this area and have been advised to look elsewhere. My circumstantial case was also built on the idea of a parsimonious Whitehall keeping powders past their expiration date, but those who have studied this have said in this forum that this was probably not the case.

Given the extraordinarily tight budgets between the wars, I think the Admiralty made all the right choices in neglecting the capital ships in favor of cruisers and destroyers. It did force them to surrender the substantial qualitative lead they had at the end of WW.I in capital ship operations, but the lack of a cruiser or destroyer in so many other operations of WW.II would have been vastly more damaging to the war's progress.

Returning to the topic at hand, the real question to be answered is 'what is the role of the RN in future British policy?' The present government seems to have no idea that the RN will be required by Britain's unique relationships to perform substantial and important roles outside of any EU joint military, and perhaps even outside and US-UK arrangements, as at the Falklands. If their view is in fact otherwise, then they have been criminal in allowing the size and readiness of the RN to decline. Someone, perhaps the next government, will have to match the RN's abilities to British diplomatic obligations, which means rather a large shipbuilding program is required, I fear.

A pair of carriers is quite nice, because it means that one may be ready at the time of a crisis. Perhaps the F-35 aircraft will eventually put in an appearance, too. The problem I see is the rest of any carrier task group. The Type 45's abilities have been rather oversold, and these ships really are not as powerful or plentiful as would be needed to protect a carrier task group. The PAAMS seems to be slightly better than the "TARTAR-D" system when fit to the USN CLGNs of the 1980s, although less vulnerable to saturation, and a little short of the original Ticonderoga when equipped with SM-2MR/VL. It really lacks the range to make the '45 an effective area defense ship. In addition, a carrier task group requires ASW and UNREP assets which could only be provided by the RN by stripping them from other missions. When things get bad, they typically get bad all at once. That does not seem to be in the RN's current playbook.

It's also very disingenuous of the RN to send the '45s into commission without several of the advertised, critical systems, which will not be fit to the ships until several years into their service lives.

Prolonging the life of the Nimrod is also a good idea, because they can plug a substantial hole in the battlegroup in the area of AEW and ASW in the outer zone. One wonders if a few of these aircraft are enough to assist in the protection of what is essentially in irreplaceable national asset.

I assume the genesis of the British CV is the result of gaming prior experiences like Falklands and Suez, and militating to keep that level of capability within the control of the Admiralty. Unfortunately, I think the next crisis will put the RN and USN squarely against far more able enemies half way around the world, far from supplies and maintenance dockyards.

For example, I doubt a new British carrier task force will be able to push over an Indian squadron in the Bay of Bengal. The Indian Navy has had decades more experience operating carriers in the region and conditions. The RN CTF will still be an evolving entity in the 2020-2030 timeframe, lacking useful tactical experience and doctrinally immature.

[phil gollin]

I appreciate the humor, but I really see very few defects in his design. I think the loss of Hood was due to a combination of very bad luck and British tactical doctrine, which assumed a combat range of 12,000 yards or so. Hood and the rest of the British battle line were capable of hitting at much longer ranges. Unfortunately, so was her enemy.

The assumption of a 12,000 yard range made modernization of the deck armor to protect against major caliber hits far less important than modernization to protect against aviation bombs and torpedoes of all forms. Unfortunately, the financial arrangements made for the Royal Navy were insufficient for them to be ready even with their own modest goals by the start of the war. Again, no fault of the designer, or of Hood, but of the circumstances of the 1930s and of the political decisions taken in the period.

I think there is a circumstantial case to be made that the powder materials and arrangements may have been defective in British 1940 practice, but I certainly am not the expert in this area and have been advised to look elsewhere. My circumstantial case was also built on the idea of a parsimonious Whitehall keeping powders past their expiration date, but those who have studied this have said in this forum that this was probably not the case.

Given the extraordinarily tight budgets between the wars, I think the Admiralty made all the right choices in neglecting the capital ships in favor of cruisers and destroyers. It did force them to surrender the substantial qualitative lead they had at the end of WW.I in capital ship operations, but the lack of a cruiser or destroyer in so many other operations of WW.II would have been vastly more damaging to the war's progress. ..........

The fighting range was 12,000 to 15,000 yards for preference. This was chosen to maximise hits. Longer range fire was practiced and expected (both to give and receive), but the intention was to get to a range where decisive fire could be given (and again recieved).

The deck armour was know to be weak and the 1930s RN Capital ship modernisations intended to help improve matters.

The was nothing particularly wrong with British cordite or arrangements in 1940. The cordite problem was First World War.

.

[Werner]

The was nothing particularly wrong with British cordite or arrangements in 1940. The cordite problem was First World War.

.

Darn insomnia.

Yes, the powders as made were fine. What I referred to at the time (and was discounted by the more knowledgeable on the board) was based on an article by Robert Sumrall, who is probably the greatest living authority on the Iowa class, and until recently curator of ship models at the US Naval Academy. The problem is that all powders have a certain amount of volatile material which either evaporates or changes over time, changing the characteristics of the powders. For example, the batches of US powders made between 1936 and 1940 for the 16-inch/45 of Colorado & North Carolina were considerably more stable and uniform than the powders made between 1940 and 1950 for the Iowa, even though they were treated, handled and preserved identically.

Materials which changed in the mixtures include ether, water, certain plastic additives, esters, and other moderating or protective material. The storage varied from copper lined cans in warehouses to large underground climate-controlled tanks equipped with a stirrer, yet the powders behaved similarly.

The solution in the 1980s was to unpack all the 1940-1950 powder, stir it so the quality was at least uniform, and re-bag it together with "Swedish Additive" (titanium dioxide) to increase barrel life. A small doppler Radar was added over the center gun of each turret to measure the velocity at the muzzle, and a correction applied at the plot. With this change, the almost useless Iowa of Beirut became an extremely accurate shooter. Obviously, this did not solve the increased danger of the old powders, though.

Thr 1936 powder was much more uniform and better shooting, and after being bagged in the 1980s, was used whenever extreme accuracy was a necessity. It was also a much safer powder for the same reasons.

When I wrote on this earlier (about 2005, I think), I suggested that powders which had spent several years in Hood. or earmarked for her ashore, may have behaved similarly, and since the problem was not fully appreciated until the 1980s, perhaps they took less care to remove and destroy the superannuated inventory of powder bags for Hood. Indeed, they may have been more worried about the black powder ignition pads than the quality of the powder itself. Based on common sense and some minutes in Churchill's compendious history, I believe it is entirely possible Portsmouth bureaucrats economized (rightly so, based on the evidence) during these extremely tough financial times.

The result would have been that all non-cartridge based ammunition at the start of the war, and for some time thereafter, would have represented an extreme ignition hazard to ships so equipped. The shell which penetrated the aft machinery spaces of Hood, and which likely generated splinters which carried into the aft 15-inch magazine, could easily have destroyed the ship under the circumstances. It would be a terrible error in judgment to blame Hood or Sir Eustace Tennyson-d'Eyncourt under these circumstances.

The Germans, as we all know, relied on either partial or complete copper cartridges which were sealed into similar copper cartridge storage drums. I find it odd that the USN continued to design ships around silk bags after the performance of the cartridge-based 6-inch/47 was demonstrated. It was a full decade before cartridge based 6- and 8-inch guns appeared, and this was primarily to facilitate full automatic firing rather than powder stability.

I would welcome further comment on this idea.

[RNfanDan]

It took exceptions to prove the rule.

It took you to identify those exceptions.

Rule stands.

Except, in this case, when you remove all the exceptions, there is almost no rule left.

By your flawed reasoning, Yamato and Musashi beat the entire USN, and the Tiger tank and ME262 win the war for Germany. What next, water flows uphill and the universe revolves around Earth?

[phil gollin]

Darn insomnia.

Yes, the powders as made were fine. What I referred to at the time (and was discounted by the more knowledgeable on the board) was based on an article by Robert Sumrall, who is probably the greatest living authority on the Iowa class, and until recently curator of ship models at the US Naval Academy. The problem is that all powders have a certain amount of volatile material which either evaporates or changes over time, changing the characteristics of the powders. For example, the batches of US powders made between 1936 and 1940 for the 16-inch/45 of Colorado & North Carolina were considerably more stable and uniform than the powders made between 1940 and 1950 for the Iowa, even though they were treated, handled and preserved identically.

Materials which changed in the mixtures include ether, water, certain plastic additives, esters, and other moderating or protective material. The storage varied from copper lined cans in warehouses to large underground climate-controlled tanks equipped with a stirrer, yet the powders behaved similarly.

The solution in the 1980s was to unpack all the 1940-1950 powder, stir it so the quality was at least uniform, and re-bag it together with "Swedish Additive" (titanium dioxide) to increase barrel life. A small doppler Radar was added over the center gun of each turret to measure the velocity at the muzzle, and a correction applied at the plot. With this change, the almost useless Iowa of Beirut became an extremely accurate shooter. Obviously, this did not solve the increased danger of the old powders, though.

Thr 1936 powder was much more uniform and better shooting, and after being bagged in the 1980s, was used whenever extreme accuracy was a necessity. It was also a much safer powder for the same reasons.

When I wrote on this earlier (about 2005, I think), I suggested that powders which had spent several years in Hood. or earmarked for her ashore, may have behaved similarly, and since the problem was not fully appreciated until the 1980s, perhaps they took less care to remove and destroy the superannuated inventory of powder bags for Hood. Indeed, they may have been more worried about the black powder ignition pads than the quality of the powder itself. Based on common sense and some minutes in Churchill's compendious history, I believe it is entirely possible Portsmouth bureaucrats economized (rightly so, based on the evidence) during these extremely tough financial times.

The result would have been that all non-cartridge based ammunition at the start of the war, and for some time thereafter, would have represented an extreme ignition hazard to ships so equipped. The shell which penetrated the aft machinery spaces of Hood, and which likely generated splinters which carried into the aft 15-inch magazine, could easily have destroyed the ship under the circumstances. It would be a terrible error in judgment to blame Hood or Sir Eustace Tennyson-d'Eyncourt under these circumstances.

The Germans, as we all know, relied on either partial or complete copper cartridges which were sealed into similar copper cartridge storage drums. I find it odd that the USN continued to design ships around silk bags after the performance of the cartridge-based 6-inch/47 was demonstrated. It was a full decade before cartridge based 6- and 8-inch guns appeared, and this was primarily to facilitate full automatic firing rather than powder stability.

I would welcome further comment on this idea.

You are mixing things up a bit.

The British, in general, did not use "powders" they used cordite in "cords" (thin rods). The problems in WW1 (mainly to do with poor quality control in manufacture, but also storage was overcome by better quality control and then changing the type of cordite. The British were extremely pleased with the cordite and high temperature accelerated storage with testing was used to check on each batch produced.

The British believed in extreme flash-proof arrangements to help with the issue of safety. They did not approve of German or US arrangements.

The British only got themselves sorted out over the proper ventilation of magazines in the mid-30s and had rather haphazard (but safe) measures in place by WW2.

.

[Werner]

The British only got themselves sorted out over the proper ventilation of magazines in the mid-30s and had rather haphazard (but safe) measures in place by WW2.

.

Phil, you should read Jutland: An Analysis of the Fighting as regards the post-war powder tests and evaluation of American and German arrangements.

During the anniversary period, I read several quotes from "experts" who state that the Hood would not have blown up if she had been equipped with US powders in 1941. The truth is we will probably never know for sure.

My earlier comment on the US powders in the 1940s and 1980s was intended to illustrate how very similar formulations and constructions of powder, whether handled similarly or differently, age in very different and peculiar ways. I have absolutely no evidence to indict the victualer of the Navy or whoever prepared and maintained the powder storage except the hearsay evidence of others and my own conclusions.

I hasten to add that I use the generic term powders whether it is the hexagonal grain powders used in the USA or the British Cordite.

Hood was a good ship, in no significant way inferior to her adversary. She was let down to a degree by battle doctrine, but no one has put a finger on a single cause for her loss, except perhaps luck.

(I edited this at 17:50Z. I do not know if the edit history function is working).

[Werner]

Source page: http://www.warship.org/loss_of_hms_hood__part_3.htm

It must be noted however, that British double-based propellants, which contained a substantial amount of nitroglycerine in their makeup, were significantly more susceptible to ignition than their single-base American counterparts. In 1945 the U.S. Navy Bureau of Ordnance conducted systematic tests to determine the susceptibility of various propellant formulations to accidental ignition.[68] Using a nozzle mechanism capable of generating a reproducible flash, they found that while British Cordite type propellants would ignite while still some 530mm from the vent, standard American single base propellants would not ignite until the distance was reduced to 120mm, and the relatively new U.S. "SPCG" flashless powder, incorporating nitroguanadine, would have to be within 25mm of the nozzle before ignition took place. These are very substantial differences. Assuming the flame of the explosion to expand in a spherical front, the same explosion which would ignite one cubic unit of standard American powder, would be capable of igniting almost seventy-five times as much cordite. In the confined space of a magazine, the relative amounts of gas evolved, and the ensuing internal pressures could easily spell the difference between disturbance and disaster. Had Hood carried single base propellant instead of cordite, there is in fact a good possibility that the fatal explosion might never have occurred.[69]

[68] Bulletin of Ordnance Information, No.245, pp. 54-60.
[69] I am indebted to John Howard Oxley of Halifax, Nova Scotia for bringing to mind the role that powder characteristics might have played in the disaster.

The "double base" propellants contain relatively more of the volatiles I mentioned before, and as such would have short, variable and odd "shelf life" depending highly on handling.

[Filipe Ramires]

But in d'Eyncourt's defense, his creation Hood did try to redeem herself at the last moment by splitting in half and standing on end so she could look properly like an office block for once just before she vanished forever.

Dark colour insignialess helicopters are flying over your house...the sound of kukhris being draw disturbs the silence of the night...

[MartinL]

But in d'Eyncourt's defense, his creation Hood did try to redeem herself at the last moment by splitting in half and standing on end so she could look properly like an office block for once just before she vanished forever.

Dark colour insignialess helicopters are flying over your house...the sound of kukhris being draw disturbs the silence of the night...

Yeh i had no answer for that that could stay respectful. Thanx for saying it for me

[Timmy C]

I split this discussion apart from Evo6's post on the new RN carriers.

[Filipe Ramires]

Yeh i had no answer for that that could stay respectful. Thanx for saying it for me

Evo6tme,

Chuck is like that but we usually take his humour lightly don't you worry. I am a big fan of Hood myself and it is certainly a touchy subject her sinking for many of us. Aside her natural/engineering beautifullness the ship had flaws like many others and like Werner said a bad doctrine/strategy mistake by Holland and the "lucky" factor for Bismark contributed a lot for her sad loss.

[MartinL]

it has nothing to do with ships flaws,they all have them ,its his seemingly disrespect fof life that gets at me.. If he looks at it closely 2 office blocks standing on end mean simmlar things ?? all i ask is people think ...

[chuck]

You are the only one making this association, and posturing by condemning in other what apparently exist only in your own head.

[Werner]

The nature of this thread and the reaction to Chuck's posts only prove my initial point, that the esthetics and appearance of a warship is a valuable component of the design which furthers the ship's purpose as an extension of the political and economic will of the government and people who made and man her.

[Lesforan]

I find nothing humorous in the loss of the Hood, nor for that matter, the Bismarck.
In all likelihood, there are members of this forum who lost relatives on one, or possibly both, of these ships.

A lot of speculation is out there as to why Hood was lost so quickly. In addition to the theories about unstable propellant and inadequate armor, there is a theory that a shot (possibly from Prinz Eugene) penetrated a funnel and ignited fuel vapors!

We can agree that it was indeed a very lucky shot. Even the crew of Bismarck was stunned by the sudden explosion and disappearance of Hood.

What if Holland had not attempted to turn Hood to allow her aft turrets to engage? Would a run-in on Bismarck's beam, presenting an end-on aspect in a rush to get inside the Zone of Immunity cause Bismarck to miss? Could Bismarck's radar and superior optics still get hits in such a situation? We'll never know.

[Werner]

Admiral Holland is not to blame for following doctrine. Let's remember Admiral Byng was executed for not doing so. Although it would have been highly unlikely that Holland or any other WW.II Admiral would be shot for failing to follow fighting instructions, the point was institutionally sound and from the same point-of-view fairly recent in nature.

After all, Holland could have saved Hood simply by turning Northeast instead of West to engage.

[phil gollin]

Phil, you should read Jutland: An Analysis of the Fighting as regards the post-war powder tests and evaluation of American and German arrangements.

During the anniversary period, I read several quotes from "experts" who state that the Hood would not have blown up if she had been equipped with US powders in 1941. The truth is we will probably never know for sure.

My earlier comment on the US powders in the 1940s and 1980s was intended to illustrate how very similar formulations and constructions of powder, whether handled similarly or differently, age in very different and peculiar ways. I have absolutely no evidence to indict the victualer of the Navy or whoever prepared and maintained the powder storage except the hearsay evidence of others and my own conclusions.

I hasten to add that I use the generic term powders whether it is the hexagonal grain powders used in the USA or the British Cordite.

Hood was a good ship, in no significant way inferior to her adversary. She was let down to a degree by battle doctrine, but no one has put a finger on a single cause for her loss, except perhaps luck.

(I edited this at 17:50Z. I do not know if the edit history function is working).

Campbell did know what he was talking about - mainly because he was a REAL expert in what he talked about, he went through the archives (leaving some few pencilled notes) and, possibly most importantly for those more modern "experts" talking to the people involoved.

I have also read the Cordite Committee's working papers and reports, so am quite happy with my state of knowledge re. cordite.

IF the cause of Hood's loss is as was the Board of Inquiry found then it is extremely unlikely (as in nearly impossible) that any different propellent would have had any other effect.

The generic name should really be "propellent", rather than cordite, cord, powder or grain.

Hood was deficient compared with Bismark in terms of deck armour and it was that rather than doctrine that led to her loss. She was unlucky because a minute or so later and the "lucky" hit would have been almost impossible. (But never "impossible" - the British always realised that "lucky hits" were a possibility - they realised throughout their design processes that even a mast or spar might deflect a shell sufficiently to cause a fluke/lucky angle of attack.)

.

[phil gollin]

Source page: http://www.warship.org/loss_of_hms_hood__part_3.htm

It must be noted however, that British double-based propellants, which contained a substantial amount of nitroglycerine in their makeup, were significantly more susceptible to ignition than their single-base American counterparts. In 1945 the U.S. Navy Bureau of Ordnance conducted systematic tests to determine the susceptibility of various propellant formulations to accidental ignition.[68] Using a nozzle mechanism capable of generating a reproducible flash, they found that while British Cordite type propellants would ignite while still some 530mm from the vent, standard American single base propellants would not ignite until the distance was reduced to 120mm, and the relatively new U.S. "SPCG" flashless powder, incorporating nitroguanadine, would have to be within 25mm of the nozzle before ignition took place. These are very substantial differences. Assuming the flame of the explosion to expand in a spherical front, the same explosion which would ignite one cubic unit of standard American powder, would be capable of igniting almost seventy-five times as much cordite. In the confined space of a magazine, the relative amounts of gas evolved, and the ensuing internal pressures could easily spell the difference between disturbance and disaster. Had Hood carried single base propellant instead of cordite, there is in fact a good possibility that the fatal explosion might never have occurred.[69]

[68] Bulletin of Ordnance Information, No.245, pp. 54-60.
[69] I am indebted to John Howard Oxley of Halifax, Nova Scotia for bringing to mind the role that powder characteristics might have played in the disaster.

The "double base" propellants contain relatively more of the volatiles I mentioned before, and as such would have short, variable and odd "shelf life" depending highly on handling.

Oh dear.

First your comment - no, it was the single base propellents that had a more variable "shelf-life" - this was one of the reasons the British didn't like them.

Re. Nathan's comment, I'm afraid I can quote British tests which contri-wise showed that there was no easy correlation between US or British propellents and their ignitability under varying conditions (they used a travelling flame). Which merely shows that going by one source is a problem.

Nathan has changed his quote over time (originally it was quoted as a WW1 test). In addition he has failed to expalin why the US took into service Canadian flashless cordite.

I am extremely suspicious of any tests which are so dogmatic and yet aren't widely accepted.

AND, as before, IF the Hood's loss is as believed, then the tye of propellent wouldn't have mattered one jot.

So many red-herrings.

.