The Key to Mare Nostrum was Malta either capture it or neutralise it.
Simply a half hearted attempt to stopping supplies getting through to it and bombing the heck out of Valletta won't do!
Laurence,
I think Malta was neutralized several times, but the RN was dedicated to keeping it in play, and rightfully so. All those Spitfires and Hurricanes went somewhere. IIRC,
Wasp conducted her second Spitfire fly-off because most of the machines delivered in the first were so rapidly put out of commission or destroyed.
This show a total ineptness from their naval design bureau.
I think the designers, like most under a dictator, were going the �bigger is better� route, since meglomaniacs are frequently enamoured with such things. The Med was a very harsh environment for such boats, especially given the clear waters where subs could be sighted submerged down to 50 ft in some instances. (Which is why I think the U-class were ideal for the Med, but again, I digress.) However, Italian boats did better outside the Mediterranean. Italian boats based at Bordeaux accounted for over 568,000 tons sunk and another 200,000 damaged. While the environment was much more target rich, it was also much more submarine friendly.
Crew morale and discipline has everything to do with going into combat. Fatigue, moral and discipline can be the difference to winning or loosing a naval battle.
Agreed, but the likes of Bergami, Campioni, Iachino and Paladini didn�t regard moral as low. Franco Magueri wrote postwar that �In ships, in manpower, in seamanship and in esprit de corps, we had no reason to feel ashamed.�
Where do you get the idea of 20 x 15-inch guns for the British?
The twenty guns are on the Italian battleships, with 10 each.
Thus your figures are folly.
Cesare or Cavour,10 guns with 1,157 lbs shells
10 x 1157 = 11,570 lbs
Warspite, 8 guns, 1,938 lbs shells
8 x 1938 = 15,504 lbs.
You�ll note that I said
Warspite alone had a broadside advantage of nearly 50 % over EITHER Italian, not both.
Admiral Cunningham would not have tucked tail and withdrawn from the minor damage Admiral Campioni sustained on Cesare.
And Warspite was withdrawn from the waters around Crete and sent to Bremerton for repairs with bomb damage why? Certainly the bomb wasn�t equal to one of her own shells? I don�t doubt Cunningham�s testicular fortitude at all, but only the fool or the desperate continues fighting with damaged ships when there is opportunity to withdraw.. At the time of Calabria, Campioni was neither and had that opportunity.
I ask you what risks where there to the Italian's for continuing the battle?
In a word,
Eagle. The Italians had respect for the potential of aircraft, even if their own relationship with the RA was less than perfect.
Just as valid a question though is why did Cunningham not continue pursuit? He had the advantage in firepower and the Campioni was slowed by the hit. Yet he broke off as well, not even entering the Italian smoke screen. I know why he did so, his thinking the Italians were drawing him into a trap, either submarines or torpedo boats and the proximity to Sicily and the airfields there. That�s prudence, for risking Warspite or even Malaya for minor victory exceeds diminishing returns. Why is it not so when the Italians practice the same?
Finally an important point you seemed to have missed is the Japanese were firing 24-inch 1,200lb warhead torpedoes at PoW whereas the British hit Veneto with an 18-inch 700-800lb warhead.
Thus the Japanese's warhead was much larger and should cause more damage.
You�re confusing the fabled Type 93 �Long Lance� carried by surface ships with the 17.7� Type 91 of the IJNAF. The Model 1 carried by the Nells that did the critical damage to PoW in the Second Attack had only a 331lb warhead. The Bettys that delivered the coup de grace had the Model 2 version, with a 452 lb warhead.
Further, her Veneto class can outrange and one on one out gun any British battleship in the Med apart from a Nelson.
What has she got to fear?
The RN has the supplies to repair Nelson, the RM would hard pressed to repair Veneto. In the event of loss, Veneto represents one-sixth of Italian battleship strength, while Nelson represents one-fifteenth. To reiterate my previous point, the RM wasn�t going to engage in a war of attrition with the largest navy in the world. It�s a loosing strategy.
No I'm saying she had 11 months to prepare for her opening movements in the war.
I�d note that it was at the RM�s insistence that the Ministry of Communication finally signaled the merchantmen outside the Med to make for home, neutral of friendly ports within three days.
Mussolini only jumped in when France capitulated because he thought the war was going to be short and needed to get in on the spoils. Had he consulted his military leadership, a third of Italy�s merchant tonnage wouldn�t have been lost that first day because of its location and there certainly would have been more stockpiling of raw materials.
The RM's incompetence was 2 fold:
1) To incorrectly plan for a naval war with the Royal Navy in the Med.
2) To incorrectly adjust technically, doctrinally and tactically as the naval war progressed, lessons became self-evident and apply those changes rapidly or at all.
We already disagree in whether Italy planned for war, so I we�ll disagree on point one as well.
To point two, I�d say they did adjust, certainly as the RN and USN did when confronted with circumstances unconsidered in the previous decade, and I�d point to the conversion of the Liner Roma to the carrier Aquila as evidence of that adjustment. But the illustration of their adjustments were cut short with the fall of Tunisia in May of 1943 and the end of the Navy�s mission to resupply North Africa.
1) A lack of a naval air arm and too much given over to high level bombing.
2) A lack of aircraft carriers - The French developed Bearn in 1927 what made the RM so reluctant?
I can understand their thinking about being always close enough for land based aircraft, but they were planning to face a navy partly based at Gib, Alex and Malta thats quite a vast distance and a mobile aircraft force would be a major tactical ace up their sleeve.
Apart from a small floatplane carrier why did they not at least make 1 small aircraft carrier inter-war to evaluate the possabilities?
3) Poor inter-service inter-operability something which would dog her and Japan for the entire war.
Further enough simply wasn't done quickly enough to rectifiy the problems when they became glarringly obvious.
On point one, I agree completely. I�ll point again to Operation Hats, foiled by a lack of adequate recon. Had indigenous airpower been available, the RM would have been in much better control of circumstances. In the case of Operation Hats, either Force H, Force F or the Mediterranean Fleet might have been destroyed in detail�
To point two, I�d direct you to Sadkovich�s �The Italian Navy in World War II�. He has excellent passages on the decision, the reasoning behind it and the politics of the time, and his work is EXTREMELY well sourced. Beware the cost, though; they're not kidding about the 'arm' and 'leg' part. But again, I digress
I agree on point three as well, and it could be applied to Germany just as easily. And to a lesser extent, to the US and UK as well.
[quote] The Key to Mare Nostrum was Malta either capture it or neutralise it.
Simply a half hearted attempt to stopping supplies getting through to it and bombing the heck out of Valletta won't do![/quote]
Laurence,
I think Malta was neutralized several times, but the RN was dedicated to keeping it in play, and rightfully so. All those Spitfires and Hurricanes went somewhere. IIRC, [i]Wasp[/i] conducted her second Spitfire fly-off because most of the machines delivered in the first were so rapidly put out of commission or destroyed.
[quote] This show a total ineptness from their naval design bureau.[/quote]
I think the designers, like most under a dictator, were going the �bigger is better� route, since meglomaniacs are frequently enamoured with such things. The Med was a very harsh environment for such boats, especially given the clear waters where subs could be sighted submerged down to 50 ft in some instances. (Which is why I think the U-class were ideal for the Med, but again, I digress.) However, Italian boats did better outside the Mediterranean. Italian boats based at Bordeaux accounted for over 568,000 tons sunk and another 200,000 damaged. While the environment was much more target rich, it was also much more submarine friendly.
[quote] Crew morale and discipline has everything to do with going into combat. Fatigue, moral and discipline can be the difference to winning or loosing a naval battle.[/quote]
Agreed, but the likes of Bergami, Campioni, Iachino and Paladini didn�t regard moral as low. Franco Magueri wrote postwar that �In ships, in manpower, in seamanship and in esprit de corps, we had no reason to feel ashamed.�
[quote] Where do you get the idea of 20 x 15-inch guns for the British?[/quote]
The twenty guns are on the Italian battleships, with 10 each.
[quote] Thus your figures are folly.[/quote]
Cesare or Cavour,10 guns with 1,157 lbs shells
10 x 1157 = 11,570 lbs
Warspite, 8 guns, 1,938 lbs shells
8 x 1938 = 15,504 lbs.
You�ll note that I said [b][i]Warspite[/i][/b] alone had a broadside advantage of nearly 50 % over EITHER Italian, not both.
[quote] Admiral Cunningham would not have tucked tail and withdrawn from the minor damage Admiral Campioni sustained on Cesare.[/quote]
And Warspite was withdrawn from the waters around Crete and sent to Bremerton for repairs with bomb damage why? Certainly the bomb wasn�t equal to one of her own shells? I don�t doubt Cunningham�s testicular fortitude at all, but only the fool or the desperate continues fighting with damaged ships when there is opportunity to withdraw.. At the time of Calabria, Campioni was neither and had that opportunity.
[quote] I ask you what risks where there to the Italian's for continuing the battle?[/quote]
In a word, [i]Eagle[/i]. The Italians had respect for the potential of aircraft, even if their own relationship with the RA was less than perfect.
Just as valid a question though is why did Cunningham not continue pursuit? He had the advantage in firepower and the Campioni was slowed by the hit. Yet he broke off as well, not even entering the Italian smoke screen. I know why he did so, his thinking the Italians were drawing him into a trap, either submarines or torpedo boats and the proximity to Sicily and the airfields there. That�s prudence, for risking Warspite or even Malaya for minor victory exceeds diminishing returns. Why is it not so when the Italians practice the same?
[quote] Finally an important point you seemed to have missed is the Japanese were firing 24-inch 1,200lb warhead torpedoes at PoW whereas the British hit Veneto with an 18-inch 700-800lb warhead.
Thus the Japanese's warhead was much larger and should cause more damage.[/quote]
You�re confusing the fabled Type 93 �Long Lance� carried by surface ships with the 17.7� Type 91 of the IJNAF. The Model 1 carried by the Nells that did the critical damage to PoW in the Second Attack had only a 331lb warhead. The Bettys that delivered the coup de grace had the Model 2 version, with a 452 lb warhead.
[quote]
Further, her Veneto class can outrange and one on one out gun any British battleship in the Med apart from a Nelson.
What has she got to fear?[/quote]
The RN has the supplies to repair Nelson, the RM would hard pressed to repair Veneto. In the event of loss, Veneto represents one-sixth of Italian battleship strength, while Nelson represents one-fifteenth. To reiterate my previous point, the RM wasn�t going to engage in a war of attrition with the largest navy in the world. It�s a loosing strategy.
[quote] No I'm saying she had 11 months to prepare for her opening movements in the war.[/quote]
I�d note that it was at the RM�s insistence that the Ministry of Communication finally signaled the merchantmen outside the Med to make for home, neutral of friendly ports within three days.
Mussolini only jumped in when France capitulated because he thought the war was going to be short and needed to get in on the spoils. Had he consulted his military leadership, a third of Italy�s merchant tonnage wouldn�t have been lost that first day because of its location and there certainly would have been more stockpiling of raw materials.
[quote] The RM's incompetence was 2 fold:
1) To incorrectly plan for a naval war with the Royal Navy in the Med.
2) To incorrectly adjust technically, doctrinally and tactically as the naval war progressed, lessons became self-evident and apply those changes rapidly or at all.[/quote]
We already disagree in whether Italy planned for war, so I we�ll disagree on point one as well.
To point two, I�d say they did adjust, certainly as the RN and USN did when confronted with circumstances unconsidered in the previous decade, and I�d point to the conversion of the Liner Roma to the carrier Aquila as evidence of that adjustment. But the illustration of their adjustments were cut short with the fall of Tunisia in May of 1943 and the end of the Navy�s mission to resupply North Africa.
[quote]1) A lack of a naval air arm and too much given over to high level bombing.
2) A lack of aircraft carriers - The French developed Bearn in 1927 what made the RM so reluctant?
I can understand their thinking about being always close enough for land based aircraft, but they were planning to face a navy partly based at Gib, Alex and Malta thats quite a vast distance and a mobile aircraft force would be a major tactical ace up their sleeve.
Apart from a small floatplane carrier why did they not at least make 1 small aircraft carrier inter-war to evaluate the possabilities?
3) Poor inter-service inter-operability something which would dog her and Japan for the entire war.
Further enough simply wasn't done quickly enough to rectifiy the problems when they became glarringly obvious.[/quote]
On point one, I agree completely. I�ll point again to Operation Hats, foiled by a lack of adequate recon. Had indigenous airpower been available, the RM would have been in much better control of circumstances. In the case of Operation Hats, either Force H, Force F or the Mediterranean Fleet might have been destroyed in detail�
To point two, I�d direct you to Sadkovich�s �The Italian Navy in World War II�. He has excellent passages on the decision, the reasoning behind it and the politics of the time, and his work is EXTREMELY well sourced. Beware the cost, though; they're not kidding about the 'arm' and 'leg' part. But again, I digress
I agree on point three as well, and it could be applied to Germany just as easily. And to a lesser extent, to the US and UK as well.