The Ship Model Forum

A hit to No 1 boiler room seems plausible, at least more so than a hit to the so-called starboard boiler room. Apart from the timeline problem, a torpedo hit to a centerline space would seem unlikely.
It's interesting to note that the spaces just ahead of the No 1 boiler room include the 10.5cm magazines. That could have been interesting.

First:Thanks Laurence, I'll look into those DVDs. Sound interesting. I have an all code DVD player with a TV systems convertor so I can play all DVDs from any nation. Being American, we have that different TV standard, thus the convertor.
Second: The original question about German Naval Radar in the second half of the war, here is what made me ask the question. This is from Busch's book based on direct quotes from Scharnhorst survivors. And I think we must agree, that no one can tell us what happened aboard Scharnhorst other than them. They may not be 100% in the know, being stationed in one place, but they are all we have.
At the time Scharnhorst was just being approached by RN force 2: P.O. G�dde, stationed on the bridge wing searchlight control column which was used as a lookout postion due to it's excellent optical qualities, he was on the internal communications circuit of the commander on the bridge. " "The after Radar had been putting through in routine fashion reports on the British ship shadowing astern, had suddenly discovered another target to starboard [force 2] . And now at the captains request, it was reporting the range and bearing of the new target. The P.O. suddenly recalled what the captain had announced to all stations at 11:30 hours:that an enemy force was 150 miles away. G�dde pondered this. Threee hours previously the Scharnhorst had turned on to her present south-esterly course; before that she had been in the second action with the crusier squadron. What would be the speed of this new force? 28 to 30 knots, three hours at the most. But this force would obviously have been receiving continuous reports on the speed, course and position of Scharnhorst- from the shadowing cruiser; hence G�dde reasoned, if they will have been able to take a short cut. This batlle group must now be just about ready to strike. Suddenly the piercing sound of the alarm bells. It was 1600 hours.
From the captain to all stations! We are not yet out of the wood! Intensify the look-out! As you all know we have a shadowing ship on our tail since noon and have not been able to shake her off. The radar has jsut reported tagets to starboard. [force2]

To my mind, this information shows clearly that Scharnhorst was using her radar and that it had tracked both force 1 and force 2. Force 2 only at the last minute, but nevertheless, Scharhorst knew a second force had appeared and that odds were that it was the heavy ship reported to have been to her west 3 hours earlier.

Some action reports: At 1655 hours a 14 inch shell hit the starboard bows abreast "A" turret and the blast threw P.O. G�dde to the deck.
Shortly after the first hit, a second was scored amidships. [the boiler room hit??].

At this point accounts from survivors do not agree due to the action and the survivors knowing only of what took place at their own stations. Bush admits it is not clear from this point on. But there was heard on the Signals Transmitter in the port IV 5.9 inch turret. "torpedo hit in boiler room "I" speed eight knots".
Must have been fog of battle, because the RN Destroyer force was not in attack position as of yet. So the boiler room problem is anyones guess. But other sources say the boiler room problem was real and that the steam supply was cross connected [a standard procedure] to deliever 22 knots soon after the event in the number "I" boiler room.


Bob B.

bengtsson wrote:

phil gollin wrote: There is no definite evidence as to where the hit was that caused Scharnhorst to slow down (there is even SPECULATION that it may not have been a hit !)

The RN's official report merely mentions that a hit Abaft Y (no.3) turret was observed about the time the Scharnhorst slowed down

In Woodman's book he describes the following taking place at the time Scharnhorst and Duke of York were engaged early in the chase. "Only three hits had been observed on board Scharnhorst although one of these had started a fire amidships. The German fire parties soon controlled and extinguished it. Duke of Yorks gunnery control radar failed due to shock from the concussion of firing full salvos smashing valves [electronic tubes] in the set. This reduced the British to optical gunnery control. But all was not well aboard Scharnhorst. She had lost speed, first due to shock from near misses and then to the explosion of a 14 inch shell in her starboard boiler room. Her speed fell to 10 knots and, although swift cross connection of her steam supply enabled her to quickly work up to 22 knots, she sacrificed a vital part of her lead">

I guess sources are the all important question. His information would have had to be from someone who survived the sinking and related the information to the British or post war made it known.

On the original subject. I read a book by one of Scharnhort's survivors Fritz Otto Bush, he reports that Scharnhorst's after Radar [fire control??] reported a contact to the bridge shortly before starshell burst above her.

Bob B.

And another book has a description of a "torpedo hit" adjacent to a boiler room that caused the slow-down (at a time when no torpedoes had even been fired.

The problem is there are lots of stories (with no evidence or where relevent sources), but no real facts.

I have a LITTLE problem with the idea of a proper boiler room hit as PRESUMABLY any damage to the boilers or main pipework would not have been easily repaired so quickly with all the metalwork hot. Of course it MAY have been one or two splinters in a condensor or in minor pipework, but ????????

Whatever (and wherever) the damage occured it must have either caused damage easily repaired or diverted around or else had caused a precautionary reduction in speed for the damage to be assessed.

I think the book has had at least three different titles in English. Kind of annoying. Isn't one title good enough?
Stephen Howarth's book on the history of the IJN originally appeared in Britain under a good title, Morning Glory. The US publisher decided that wasn't good enough and changed it to The Fighting Ships of the Rising Sun. Not only is it an inferior title, but it's not particularly accurate. It's an organizational history rather than a survey of ships.
There are some decisions that don't have to be made.

Tiornu wrote:Busch was not a Scharnhorst survivor. At least, I don't see him on the list. Perhaps he was a crewman previously.
This is the first time I've heard that near misses rattled the ship enough to cause problems. Locating the hit in the starboard boiler room would be at variance with the G&D account, which is the one that cites the boiler hump as the point of penetration.

Yes, on closer checking, I find you are right. Corvette Captain Busch was not a survivor. The book reads almost like he is, but he instead quotes other survivors. One in particular in Willi G�dde.
The book was written in Germany and translated to English 1956.

Bob B.

Busch was not a Scharnhorst survivor. At least, I don't see him on the list. Perhaps he was a crewman previously.
This is the first time I've heard that near misses rattled the ship enough to cause problems. Locating the hit in the starboard boiler room would be at variance with the G&D account, which is the one that cites the boiler hump as the point of penetration.

Bob,
I don't have the time at present to add my usual lengthy posts to this excellent discussion.

I recommend to loan through inter-library loan or buy the 2 DVD documentaries on Scharnhorst Vol 1 & 2 by Archive of War.
I have them and found out some usual information from surviving Germans interviewed on them which I've not read elsewhere before.
These documentaries were made with EU money in the 1990s I think and have now come out on DVD.
I have about 12 of them in all and they are very well made as they are usually made using German sources and old hands, but they are in English.
There's 3 on DKM destroyers in WW2 ones on U-boats, S-boats, Battle of Atlantic, Ceylon etc

Here's the link (they can be bought through Amazon or play.com etc:

http://www.eurekavideo.co.uk/classics/

phil gollin wrote:

Anonymous wrote:
I believe the luck penetration through a gap in the armored deck on Scharnhorst into the machinery space is the only one of its kind in the entire battleship history.............

There is no definite evidence as to where the hit was that caused Scharnhorst to slow down (there is even SPECULATION that it may not have been a hit !)

The RN's official report merely mentions that a hit Abaft Y (no.3) turret was observed about the time the Scharnhorst slowed down

In Woodman's book he describes the following taking place at the time Scharnhorst and Duke of York were engaged early in the chase. "Only three hits had been observed on board Scharnhorst although one of these had started a fire amidships. The German fire parties soon controlled and extinguished it. Duke of Yorks gunnery control radar failed due to shock from the concussion of firing full salvos smashing valves [electronic tubes] in the set. This reduced the British to optical gunnery control. But all was not well aboard Scharnhorst. She had lost speed, first due to shock from near misses and then to the explosion of a 14 inch shell in her starboard boiler room. Her speed fell to 10 knots and, although swift cross connection of her steam supply enabled her to quickly work up to 22 knots, she sacrificed a vital part of her lead">

I guess sources are the all important question. His information would have had to be from someone who survived the sinking and related the information to the British or post war made it known.

On the original subject. I read a book by one of Scharnhort's survivors Fritz Otto Bush, he reports that Scharnhorst's after Radar [fire control??] reported a contact to the bridge shortly before starshell burst above her.

Bob B.

The RN report also mentions survivor testimony regarding a hit near the screws.

Anonymous wrote:
I believe the luck penetration through a gap in the armored deck on Scharnhorst into the machinery space is the only one of its kind in the entire battleship history.............

There is no definite evidence as to where the hit was that caused Scharnhorst to slow down (there is even SPECULATION that it may not have been a hit !)

The RN's official report merely mentions that a hit Abaft Y (no.3) turret was observed about the time the Scharnhorst slowed down

Passive radar warning usually possess much greater range than active radar searching. The numerical inferiority of the German Navy caused the Germans emphasize avoidance of action except from a position of local superiority. Therefore the Germans emphasize radar warning over radar detection.

Straying slightly back to the original topic, one factor that deserves to be mentioned when it comes to German radar during WW2 is that there was peculiarly little in the way of organized backing to its employment with capital ships - it was mostly the individual captain and his determination to press for it to get it installed that was responsible for how any ship was equipped.

This is interesting also from another angle - while the U-boat effort seems to have been slightly more organized, and Luftwaffe nightfighter units stunningly disorganized, Luftwaffe in general had quite a good grip on radar. There could well have been an interservice issue here.

Jorit

Chuck wrote:This would not be an appropriate thread to launch into another of your opinionated topic hijacking diatribes.

I agree, but your statement:

Chuck wrote:I believe the luck penetration through a gap in the armored deck on Scharnhorst into the machinery space is the only one of its kind in the entire battleship history.

clearly required me to respond with information about Yamato's faults and hypothetical damage accounting for her loss was necessary to refute your claim.

Anyone with Skulski's Anatomy of the Ship: Yamato can look at the armor elevation and confirm this assertion.

Werner wrote:

Chuck wrote:So it's exact cause will likely remain obscure....

Exactly. It is, however, the opinion of some experts.

The facts remain that there was a "hole" in her armor at the roof of the 15.5cm turret and the barbette which could have conducted an AP bomb down to the shell/powder flats and the associated 46cm magazines. Once a bomb penetrated the roof of the triple 15.5cm turret, only light rotating structure and flash-proofing protects the main magazine area.

Yamato was not "Wonder Women" or "Super Girl". She was a device designed by mortals, and subject to the same flaws as any other human mechanism.

This would not be an appropriate thread to launch into another of your opinionated topic hijacking diatribes.

Chuck wrote:So it's exact cause will likely remain obscure....

Exactly. It is, however, the opinion of some experts.

The facts remain that there was a "hole" in her armor at the roof of the 15.5cm turret and the barbette which could have conducted an AP bomb down to the shell/powder flats and the associated 46cm magazines. Once a bomb penetrated the roof of the triple 15.5cm turret, only light rotating structure and flash-proofing protects the main magazine area.

Yamato was not "Wonder Women" or "Super Girl". She was a device designed by mortals, and subject to the same flaws as any other human mechanism.

Werner wrote:Although it's totally academic, it is possible Yamato's final explosion was in the aft 15.5cm magazine. An AP bomb hit the roof of this turret, which was only one inch, and was able to penetrate all the way to the handling room of this turret and start a fire which was never properly addressed by the damage control team. The 15.5cm magazine is in the middle of the 46cm powder magazines.

The wreck survey shows surprising little damage even for a full blown 15.5 cm magazine detonation, and certainly the 46cm magazine around it didn't go off. The 15.5 cm magazine explosion probably occurred after the ship is already submerged and the aft magazine cluster has been mostly flooded. So it's exact cause will likely remain obscure, and connection to the firing raging in the 15.5 turret is not strong.

The big detonation reputedly heard 110 miles away was in the forward 46cm powder magazine under the B-turret. Exact cause of this detonation is also unknown, and explanations necessarily speculative.

Although it's totally academic, it is possible Yamato's final explosion was in the aft 15.5cm magazine. An AP bomb hit the roof of this turret, which was only one inch, and was able to penetrate all the way to the handling room of this turret and start a fire which was never properly addressed by the damage control team. The 15.5cm magazine is in the middle of the 46cm powder magazines.

I believe the luck penetration through a gap in the armored deck on Scharnhorst into the machinery space is the only one of its kind in the entire battleship history. The penetration into Hood's magazine was through the sloping sides rather than the actual deck. That's rather ironic considering every battleship designed after Jutland was conceived with prospect of raining plunging shells through the deck of the enemy.

MartinJQuinn wrote:

bengtsson wrote:I guess once again it was the RN destroyer force that rode in to the rescue with their torpedo attack.

Yes, but if it wasn't for a "lucky" hit on Scharnhorst that slowed her speed, the destroyer force wouldn't have been able to get into position to deliver the death blow...

It's interesting to note the German reluctance to engage the British due to the poor performance of their radars. If the shoe was on the other foot, I don't think the RN would have given a second thought to avoiding combat.

I agree about the hit by Duke of York which slowed Scharnhorst down long enough for the Destroyers to get in position. I often think that the "Lucky Hit" is the essence of naval warfare. How many battles have been decided by who gets in a lucky hit at the right time. I think in the "Arctic Convoys" book I was reading the author mentions the great advantage that Scharnhorst had with her extra knots. Without that hit in a boiler room, Scharnhorst makes it back to base. The German destroyer forces never seemed to be up to supporting the German heavy ships properly. Neither at the Barents Sea or North Cape.

Bob B.

bengtsson wrote:I guess once again it was the RN destroyer force that rode in to the rescue with their torpedo attack.

Yes, but if it wasn't for a "lucky" hit on Scharnhorst that slowed her speed, the destroyer force wouldn't have been able to get into position to deliver the death blow...

It's interesting to note the German reluctance to engage the British due to the poor performance of their radars. If the shoe was on the other foot, I don't think the RN would have given a second thought to avoiding combat.