German Naval Radar in WWII

[Tiornu]

I think the book has had at least three different titles in English. Kind of annoying. Isn't one title good enough?
Stephen Howarth's book on the history of the IJN originally appeared in Britain under a good title, Morning Glory. The US publisher decided that wasn't good enough and changed it to The Fighting Ships of the Rising Sun. Not only is it an inferior title, but it's not particularly accurate. It's an organizational history rather than a survey of ships.
There are some decisions that don't have to be made.

[phil gollin]

There is no definite evidence as to where the hit was that caused Scharnhorst to slow down (there is even SPECULATION that it may not have been a hit !)

The RN's official report merely mentions that a hit Abaft Y (no.3) turret was observed about the time the Scharnhorst slowed down

In Woodman's book he describes the following taking place at the time Scharnhorst and Duke of York were engaged early in the chase. "Only three hits had been observed on board Scharnhorst although one of these had started a fire amidships. The German fire parties soon controlled and extinguished it. Duke of Yorks gunnery control radar failed due to shock from the concussion of firing full salvos smashing valves [electronic tubes] in the set. This reduced the British to optical gunnery control. But all was not well aboard Scharnhorst. She had lost speed, first due to shock from near misses and then to the explosion of a 14 inch shell in her starboard boiler room. Her speed fell to 10 knots and, although swift cross connection of her steam supply enabled her to quickly work up to 22 knots, she sacrificed a vital part of her lead">

I guess sources are the all important question. His information would have had to be from someone who survived the sinking and related the information to the British or post war made it known.

On the original subject. I read a book by one of Scharnhort's survivors Fritz Otto Bush, he reports that Scharnhorst's after Radar [fire control??] reported a contact to the bridge shortly before starshell burst above her.

Bob B.

And another book has a description of a "torpedo hit" adjacent to a boiler room that caused the slow-down (at a time when no torpedoes had even been fired.

The problem is there are lots of stories (with no evidence or where relevent sources), but no real facts.

I have a LITTLE problem with the idea of a proper boiler room hit as PRESUMABLY any damage to the boilers or main pipework would not have been easily repaired so quickly with all the metalwork hot. Of course it MAY have been one or two splinters in a condensor or in minor pipework, but ????????

Whatever (and wherever) the damage occured it must have either caused damage easily repaired or diverted around or else had caused a precautionary reduction in speed for the damage to be assessed.

[bengtsson]

First:Thanks Laurence, I'll look into those DVDs. Sound interesting. I have an all code DVD player with a TV systems convertor so I can play all DVDs from any nation. Being American, we have that different TV standard, thus the convertor.
Second: The original question about German Naval Radar in the second half of the war, here is what made me ask the question. This is from Busch's book based on direct quotes from Scharnhorst survivors. And I think we must agree, that no one can tell us what happened aboard Scharnhorst other than them. They may not be 100% in the know, being stationed in one place, but they are all we have.
At the time Scharnhorst was just being approached by RN force 2: P.O. G�dde, stationed on the bridge wing searchlight control column which was used as a lookout postion due to it's excellent optical qualities, he was on the internal communications circuit of the commander on the bridge. " "The after Radar had been putting through in routine fashion reports on the British ship shadowing astern, had suddenly discovered another target to starboard [force 2] . And now at the captains request, it was reporting the range and bearing of the new target. The P.O. suddenly recalled what the captain had announced to all stations at 11:30 hours:that an enemy force was 150 miles away. G�dde pondered this. Threee hours previously the Scharnhorst had turned on to her present south-esterly course; before that she had been in the second action with the crusier squadron. What would be the speed of this new force? 28 to 30 knots, three hours at the most. But this force would obviously have been receiving continuous reports on the speed, course and position of Scharnhorst- from the shadowing cruiser; hence G�dde reasoned, if they will have been able to take a short cut. This batlle group must now be just about ready to strike. Suddenly the piercing sound of the alarm bells. It was 1600 hours.
From the captain to all stations! We are not yet out of the wood! Intensify the look-out! As you all know we have a shadowing ship on our tail since noon and have not been able to shake her off. The radar has jsut reported tagets to starboard. [force2]

To my mind, this information shows clearly that Scharnhorst was using her radar and that it had tracked both force 1 and force 2. Force 2 only at the last minute, but nevertheless, Scharhorst knew a second force had appeared and that odds were that it was the heavy ship reported to have been to her west 3 hours earlier.

Some action reports: At 1655 hours a 14 inch shell hit the starboard bows abreast "A" turret and the blast threw P.O. G�dde to the deck.
Shortly after the first hit, a second was scored amidships. [the boiler room hit??].

At this point accounts from survivors do not agree due to the action and the survivors knowing only of what took place at their own stations. Bush admits it is not clear from this point on. But there was heard on the Signals Transmitter in the port IV 5.9 inch turret. "torpedo hit in boiler room "I" speed eight knots".
Must have been fog of battle, because the RN Destroyer force was not in attack position as of yet. So the boiler room problem is anyones guess. But other sources say the boiler room problem was real and that the steam supply was cross connected [a standard procedure] to deliever 22 knots soon after the event in the number "I" boiler room.


Bob B.

[Tiornu]

A hit to No 1 boiler room seems plausible, at least more so than a hit to the so-called starboard boiler room. Apart from the timeline problem, a torpedo hit to a centerline space would seem unlikely.
It's interesting to note that the spaces just ahead of the No 1 boiler room include the 10.5cm magazines. That could have been interesting.